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A VIEW TO THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
The people along the sand
All turn and look one way.
They turn their back on the land.
They look at the sea all day.
They cannot look out far.
They cannot look in deep.
But when was that ever a bar
To any watch they keep?
ROBERT FROST1
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO FUTURISTS AND FUTURISM
Futurism has become a big business. There have been best-
selling books and sequels in which the authors foretell the future.2
It seems as if every Fortune 500 company has created a futures
division, or at least brought in futurist consultants, and American
universities now offer degrees with an emphasis in futures studies.3
Long-range planning certainly is in vogue throughout the govern-
mental sector.4
There are any number of plausible explanations for these devel-
opments, including the increased uncertainty from such world
events as the fall of European communism and an economic ambi-
tion to participate in the globalization of the economy. Futurism
and futurists have arrived. I think this probably has a lot to do
with the fact that the next millennium is less than a decade away.
Indeed there was no shortage of predictions for the future the last
time we approached a new century. In 1893, for example, one
prominent futurist of that era confidently predicted that during the
1. ROBERT FROST, Neither Out Far Nor In Deep, in COMPLETE POEMS OF ROBERT
FROST 394 (1949).
2. See, e.g., JOHN NAiSBrrr, MEGATPENDS (1982); JOHN NAisBrrr & PATRICIA
ABURDENE, MEGATRENDS 2000 (1990); ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1970); ALVIN
TOFFLER, POWERSHIFr (1990); ALvIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE (1980).
3. Jack Fischer, The Study of the Future is Big Business, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
July 11, 1993, at A5.
4. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Some Preliminary Thoughts on Long-Range Planning
for the Federal Judiciary, 23 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1 (1992) (discussing and analyzing
efforts at long-range planning in the federal courts).
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20th century all war would be abolished and "[M]an will grow
wiser, better and purer.,
5
I must admit that I find all this intriguing.6 I also must con-
fess that a lot of what I read that passes for futurism strikes me as
more akin to science fiction.7 Even futurists themselves will tell
you that the best futurists, the most helpful futurists, do not actual-
ly attempt to predict the future. Instead, they offer alternative sce-
narios, describing different possible futures.8 These hypothetical
scenarios, however, tend to extremes of optimism or pessimism. I
think this is a professional hazard of futurists. Who wants to hear
that the future is going to be more of the same? Predictions of
profound change, for the better or for the worse, garner consulting
fees and book royalties.9
I do not pretend to have a crystal ball to see into the future.
A major difficulty I had preparing this paper is that I am not a
5. Mike Robinson, A Futurist Group's Forecasts for '90s Fell Wide of the Mark,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 23, 1993, at A6. See Maurice Rosenberg, The Federal
Courts in the 21st Century, 15 NOVA L. REV. 105, 105 (1991) (stating that "[i]n forecast-
ing the future, one should undoubtedly pick a target date far enough ahead to assure that
mortality will get there first.").
6.
Tlime is of special interest to the inquiring minds of the men and women of
our epoch because the socioeconomic, ecological, and ideological crises charac-
teristic of the end of the twentieth century are, in a fundamental way, time-
related. Specifically, they arise from the time-compactness of our lives and/or
derive from and shape certain changes in peoples' assessments of the relative
importance of future, past, and present.
J.T. FRASER, OF TIME, PASSION, AND KNOwLEDGE-REFLECTIONS ON THE STRATEGY OF
EXIsTENCE at xv (2d ed. 1990).
7. See, e.g., Isaac Asimov, The Next 70 Years for Law and Lawyers, 71 A.B.A. J.
57, 58 (1985) (predicting the elaborate role computers will play in the future of the jus-
tice system).
8. Rushworth M. Kidder, Futurists Focus on Perspective, Not Prophecy, CHRISTIAN
Se. MONrrOR, July, 31, 1989, at 13 (citing remarks made by Joseph F. Coates at the
sixth general assembly of the World Future Society).
9. Prominent futurist Alvin Toffler has observed, "I believe futurists tend to be apoca-
lyptic or wildly optimistic. Life doesn't come that way; it's bittersweet. It's filled with
horrible complexity and problems and all sorts of good things, too." See Ellen Creager,
What's Next? Futurist Alvin Toffler Updates His Predictions of "Future Shock," DETROIT
FREE PRESS, June 21, 1989, at 1B (reviewing Toffler's predictions).
10. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Seen In a Glass Darkly: The Future of the
Federal Courts, Address at the Kostenmeier Lecture, University of Wisconsin Law School,
in 1993 Wis. L. REv. 1 ("Predicting the shape and size of the federal judiciary in the
future requires us to gaze into a rather clouded crystal ball .... ). Indeed, it is my belief
that the "farther one gazes into the crystal ball the more likely one is destined to dine on
ground glass." Baker, supra note 4, at 7.
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futurist and I do not much believe in futurism. Predicting future
changes in institutions as complex as the state and federal courts is
fraught with difficulty and nuanced further by the elaborate interac-
tions between the two judicial branches. We cannot expect their
joint future to be any more linear than their past has been. Political
decisions and public policy compromises in the fifty state legisla-
tures and in Congress will shape the courts' futures, not rational
discourse at judicial conferences or comprehensive studies in law
reviews.
The nineteenth century French traveller and commentator,
Alexis de Tocqueville, observed that every social issue in this
country eventually becomes a legal issue for the courts." At the
end of the twentieth century, social scientists will tell you that the
nature and number of disputes brought into courts are determined
by social trends." The one overriding consensus among courts
futurists today is that "the quality of justice in the United States is
at risk at the same time that social and economic conditions are
changing rapidly."'3 In short, state and federal courts are in extre-
mis and the crisis promises to continue for the foreseeable future.
This is the conclusion of the two most recent and most important
studies of the courts' futures.
In 1989, Georgetown University conducted the "Delphi Study,"
an intensive and comprehensive study of the opinions of forty
prominent experts-judges, administrators, scholars, writers, and
practitioners-about the future of the state courts. 4 The partici-
pants, who collectively had nearly 1200 years experience in judicial
matters, each provided a detailed written analysis along with a per-
sonal interview for the compilation.
In that same year, the Federal Courts Study Committee hired
the prestigious Hudson Institute to predict the trends that would
affect the federal courts. 5 The predictions relied on data from the
Bureau of Census and the Bureau of Justice Statistics, reports from
11. "There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or
later turn into a judicial one." ALEXS DE TocQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270
(George Lawrence trans. & J.P. Mayer ed., 1969).
12. Franklin M. Zweig et al., Securing the Future for America's State Courts, 73 JUDI-
CATURE 296, 302 (1990) [hereinafter Delphi Study].
13. Id. at 297.
14. Id. at 296. See also Edward B. McConnell, Managing Courts: What Does the
Future Hold for Judges?, JUDGES' J., Summer 1991, at 9, 9-10 (discussing and analyzing
the Delphi Study).
15. HUDsoN INSTITUTE, TRENDS AFFECTING THE FEDERAL COURTS (Oct. 1989).
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the Rand Institute for Civil Justice, congressional hearings and
various other government reports and documents, interviews with
relevant experts, and scholarly literature.
The methodology of each study was state of the art. Both
studies sought to predict trends over the next thirty years, roughly
through the year 2020. Their conclusions have been confirmed by
numerous other futures studies about courts. 6 The following is
what the Delphi study and the Hudson Institute study predicted
about the future of the state and federal courts.
Demographic changes will be pronounced. 7 Population in the
United States will increase by about thirty million, although the
rate of growth will be slow and will begin to decline. Since the
basic workload of courts is greatly a function of total population, if
everything else were constant, workload would slowly increase and
then level off.
The population trends, however, are more complicated, as are
the effects on court caseloads. 8 The composition of the population
will change significantly, with resulting impact on court dockets.
First, the population will become older, as the baby-boom genera-
tion approaches retirement. More people will be older and living
longer. Therefore, issues related to the elderly such as social secu-
rity, pensions, health care, and death and dying, will become more
salient politically as well as judicially.
Second, the nation's racial composition will change. Differences
in birth rates among racial groups and the effects of immigration
will result in proportional increases in the percentages of nonwhite
ethnic and racial groups. Immigrants also tend to be younger on
average than the rest of the population, so we might experience
some racial tensions along generational lines. With greater numbers
of minorities entering the workplace, the courts can expect increas-
16. See Lars Fuller & Craig Boersema, Judging the Future: How Social Trends Will
Affect the Courts, 69 DENY. U. L. REV. 201 (1992) (identifying major social trends and
predicting their impact on the courts); Panel Discussion, The Changing Face of Ameri-
ca-How Will Demographic Trends Affect the Courts?, 72 JUDICATURE 125 (1988) (re-
viewing demographic trends and their possible effect on the courts).
17. See HUDSON INsTrrtJrE, supra note 15, at 1-5 (describing the dramatic demograph-
ic changes that are expected); Delphi Study, supra note 12, at 299-302 (discussing major
societal trends and their impact).
18. See Wolf Heydebrand & Carroll Seron, The Rising Demand for Court Services: A
Structural Explanation of the Caseload of U.S. District Courts, 11 JUST. Sys. J. 303
(1986) (highlighting changes in U.S. district court caseloads and the variables contributing
to those changes).
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es in cases dealing with equal opportunity and discrimination issues
over business practices and wages. 9 Concomitantly, as more
women enter the workforce, the courts can expect increases in
litigation involving related issues such as sexual harassment and
disparity in compensation."c These will include individual as well
as class action suits. Beyond the workplace and school environ-
ments, greater multicultural diversity likely will place uncertain
strains on the judicial system as diverse groups work out their
differences in the larger society. Traditions from other cultures are
sure to conflict with our civil and criminal norms, and the courts
will be expected to reconcile them.' The administrative burden of
providing court services to non-English speaking peoples will in-
crease.' Economic woes will add more litigation over employ-
ment rights. The shift from a smokestack economy to a service
industry and information-based economy will have huge unsettling
effects on businesses and workers in transition. We can expect
more litigation over workplace safety issues and job security is-
sues.' Third, as the risks against the institution of the family con-
tinue and the poverty cycle expands and deepens, courts will be
faced with more cases raising such familiar issues as juvenile de-
linquency and welfare administration.24 Finally, the AIDS epidem-
ic will further complicate public policy decisionmaking as courts
are called upon to resolve disputes over resource allocations and
the availability of treatment.' Legislative initiatives on these is-
19. Fuller & Boersema, supra note 16, at 219.
20. Id. at 214.
21. Consider the following real examples. In Los Angeles, a Japanese woman attempted
a parent-child suicide in the traditional manner called oyaku-shinju because of her humilia-
tion over her husband's marital infidelity. Joseph Tybor, Eye of Newt, Wool of Bat: Is
This What the Future Holds for American Courts?, Cm. TRIB., Aug. 21, 1988, at 4. The
woman was rescued, but the children died. She pled guilty to manslaughter and was
placed on probation with psychiatric treatment. Id. Also in California, a Laotian Hmong
tribesman acted out a traditional custom called zij poj niam, amounting to marriage by
capture of an assimilated Hmong woman. Id. He was charged with kidnapping and rape,
but negotiated a plea for false imprisonment, with a limited jail sentence and a fine in
reparation to the victim. Id.
22. William E. Davis, Language and the Justice System: Problems and Issues, 10
JUST. Sys. J. 353, 353 (1985).
23. Fuller & Boersema, supra note 16, at 210-11 (noting that productivity gains from
advanced technology may come "at the expense of laborers").
24. Id. at 216 (warning that crime will substantially threaten family living); see Delphi
Study, supra note 12, at 299-300 (citing weakening family structure, poverty cycles, and
children in poverty as important trends).
25. See Fuller & Boersema, supra note 16, at 224-25; Delphi Study, supra note 12, at
300 (including the long-term effect of AIDS in a discussion about health trends).
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sues will generate substantial litigation.
Another set of factors is less connected to demographics. Ab-
stract considerations such as political, social, and economic factors
obviously have an effect on court dockets.' These can best be
evaluated separately for their effect on criminal and civil caseloads.
The criminal caseload can be expected to increase simply as a
result of the increase in population. Of more significance, however,
will be the continued trend on the part of legislatures to
criminalize behavior and the proclivity on the part of prosecutors
to prosecute more offenders. Both these trends are well-documented
and expected to continue. Consequently, the number of criminal
cases will increase even among those crimes whose percentage of
the total is decreasing. Some categories of crimes will continue to
increase dramatically. The most important factor on the criminal
docket, of course, is the "war on drugs." Indeed, many in the
judicial branches have expressed concern that the courts will be an
unintended casualty of this "war."'27 You do not have to be a fu-
turist to predict that the drug caseload has become and will contin-
ue to be "intractable" and that it will "persist, expand, and gain
momentum well into the twenty-first century."' There are also
projections for new or more vigorously enforced crimes dealing
with "white collar" offenses, such as fraud, embezzlement, and
forgery. New prosecutorial offensives can be expected to deal with
crimes involving computers such as electronic transfers of funds
and manipulation of financial markets. More and more offenses
will involve international transactions, given the increasing global-
ization of the economy. Furthermore, we can expect that prisoner
rights litigation over conditions of confinement will increase as
prison populations exceed everyone's expectations. The burden on
state budgets felt from the current prison expansion program, which
shows no sign of slowing, will result in state funding crises for
other important state functions, such as education, and we can
26. See HUDSON INSTrTUTE, supra note 15, at 5-10; Delphi Study, supra note 12, at
299-302 (listing examples of such factors).
27. See Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at a United States Sentencing
Commission Symposium on "Drugs and Violence in America" (June 18, 1993), in REtrrR
TRANscRIPr REP., June 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File (discuss-
ing the severe demands the war on drugs has placed on some federal courts); see also
Vincent L. McKusick, Combining Resources, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 19, 1990, at 13 (arguing
that federal and state courts should pool their resources to deal with the spiraling number
of drug cases).
28. Delphi Study, supra note 12, at 299.
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expect more public law litigation contesting legislative compromises
over taxing and spending. The crisis of funding for the courts
certainly will worsen.29
Identifiable political, social, and economic factors likewise will
affect the civil caseload in four primary categories." First, there is
every reason to expect that political decisions will continue to
extend civil rights and antidiscrimination statutes to more and more
groups as well as individuals. Legislative understandings of what
types of discrimination should be made unlawful will continue to
expand for the public and private sectors. This will take the form
of amendments to existing legislation as well as new legislation
creating new causes of action at the state and federal levels. The
second major trend on the civil side will involve tort cases. Leav-
ing aside the current debate whether the courts have experienced an
explosion in tort litigation,3" experts see no reason to expect either
significant growth or decline in current levels of litigation for the
familiar categories of personal injury cases. Currently developing
areas of tort litigation, involving, for example, health and environ-
mental matters, will be stimulated. These new causes of action will
deal with complex and difficult issues of causation and risk alloca-
tion, often against a background of elaborate administrative regula-
tions. Specific environmental and scientific issues-such as acid
rain, ozone depletion, and global warming-will be litigated at
international and global levels of involvement.32 These will press
the limits of judicial adaptability, as science and technology devel-
op beyond existing legal concepts and procedures.33 Third, fore-
casts predict more cases dealing with engineering, technology, and
29. See Fuller & Boersema, supra note 16, at 227 (burgeoning entitlements may make
it difficult to fund government services).
30. See HUDsON INSTrrtrrE, supra note 15, at 8-10; Delphi Study, supra note 12, at
299-302 (predicting that civil matters may be displaced by spiraling criminal caseloads).
31. See Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3, 3
(1986) (examining the costs, benefits, and effects of the explosion in tort litigation and
concluding that it is not a crisis); cf Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything
About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-and Why Not, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1147, 1149 (1992) (arguing that the existing empirical evidence on the behavior of the
tort litigation system is inadequate because it is clouded by many variables).
32. See Fuller & Boersema, supra note 16, at 229 (resulting litigation may bring about
a need for special "environmental courts"); Delphi Study, supra note 12, at 301 (predict-
ing a significant increase in environmental disputes).
33. See CARNEGIE COMM'N ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOV'T, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND MEETING
CHALLENGES (1993) (noting the difficulty of meshing a judicial system rooted in the 19th
century with 21st century technology).
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science, in the contexts of copyrights, patents, and other intellectual
property theories.34 Fourth, current trends and predicted political
decisions likely will result in growing numbers of professional
malpractice lawsuits in traditional areas such as medicine and law
as the professions become "de-mythologized." This attitude and
these suits likely will spread to more novel areas such as educa-
tion, religion, and even government. Fourth, alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms will be structured to offset partly these ex-
pectations for more and more court cases. However, their increased
use will further complicate court administration and funding deci-
sions.
Given the differences between state and federal courts, in com-
position, organization, and jurisdiction, these predictions will have
different impacts on the two judiciaries. Furthermore, there are
numerous other factors that affect the judicial system which, futur-
ists admit, are virtually impossible to assess.35 These other factors
easily can overcome the individual predictions I have summarized,
and conceivably even their cumulative effect. The level of litigious-
ness in society is well-nigh impossible to measure, let alone pre-
dict. It seems to be influenced by such complex forces as the
attitudes of lawyers and clients, the receptivity of judges and
courts, and the agendas of legislatures. A sociologist has more
chance of explaining this aspect of our culture than does a legal
scholar or courts expert. Forecasts of the effect on court caseloads
from these factors thus are fraught with difficulty, if not impossi-
bility, and predictions must be so tentative and so qualified that
they amount to educated guesses about the near future.36 While
34. Pamela Coyle, Techno Trials, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 66.
35. See HUDSON INSTITUTE, supra note 15, at 11-13; Delphi Study, supra note 12, at
302-03 (pointing out the difficulty of determining the impact of emerging societal trends).
36.
To forecast growth in the federal caseload, then, one must be able to predict
changes in the nation's substantive goals-a hazardous enterprise. It is difficult
to predict any but the grossest social, economic, political, or demographic
trends more than a few years in advance. It is even harder to predict what
kinds of law are likely to emerge and how these laws will affect the federal
courts. Such difficulties frustrate long term planning for the federal judiciary,
making it irresponsible to offer solutions purporting to look more than a few
years ahead.
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ROLE OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE STATES (Mar. 12, 1990), reprinted in 1
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE WORKING PAPERS AND SUBcoMMrrTEE REPORTS 1,
136 (July 1, 1990).
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these intangible factors will determine the future, they are inherent-
ly impossible to predict. The most we can hope to do is to discuss
them rationally and consider the possibilities. We can be sure of
one thing: the next generation of court reformers will have their
hands full solving the problems created by our generation.'
My organization will be to sketch briefly some likely future
scenarios for state courts and federal courts and then highlight what
I expect will be the future opportunities for cooperation and judi-
cial federalism.
II. THE FuTURE OF THE STATE COURTS
Of the two judicial branches, state and federal, the state courts
are the more stable branch today and collectively are doing more
to prepare for the future. This assumption may be faulty, the prod-
uct of my limited familiarity with state courts and my greater
awareness of federal courts. I do not think so, however. I can
confidently predict that the future of the state courts will be "more
or less" the same as the present. Better stated, I predict "more"
and "less" in the state courts' future: "more" cases and "less" in
terms of resources."
A. More Cases
"[T]he state courts are and will continue to be the primary
arena for the resolution of legal disputes in the United States." '39
By comparison to the federal judiciary, the fifty state court systems
are Brobdingnagian and nearly defy statistical measure." State
court statistics are compiled each year by joint project of the Con-
ference of State Court Administrators, the State Justice Institute,
and the National Center for State Courts. The most recent annual
37. "The history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the problems created by
the preceding generation's procedural reforms." Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70
CORNELL L. REv. 603, 624 (1985).
38. "We do not know enough about the future to be absolutely pessimistic." Martin E.
Marry, The Many Faces of Technology, The Many Voices of Tradition, in TRADITIONAL
MORAL VALUES IN TH AGE OF TECHNOLOGY 131 (W. Lawson Taitte ed., 1987).
39. CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM'RS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS:
ANNUAL REPORT 1992, at xi (1994) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 1992] (reporting on a
joint project of the Conference of State Court Administrators, the State Justice Institute,
and the National Center for State Courts' Statistics Project).
40. "Any attempt to assess the business of the nation's state courts must appreciate the
enormity and complexity of bringing together information from 50 distinct and highly
diverse court systems." Id.
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report identified three trends that are likely to continue for the
foreseeable future:
- Annual increases in caseload volume continue in an
upward trend. An extrapolation suggests that trial and ap-
pellate caseloads will double before the end of the decade.
- Trial and appellate filings exceed dispositions and back-
logs are rising. The public demand for court services will
continue to outstrip supply.
- Over the past five years criminal cases have represented
the greatest caseload increases. Proportionally more and
more judicial resources and support services are being
reallocated to those cases.'
Due to their size, in the aggregate, the state courts are far
more important for our nation's judicial future than are the federal
courts. The state courts dominate the federal courts statistically. An
estimated 95% to 99% of all litigation at the trial level in the
United States occurs in state courts.42 While the state trial courts
of general jurisdiction have 15 times as many judges as the U.S.
district courts, state trial judges handle 83 times as many criminal
cases and 41 times as many civil cases as their federal col-
leagues.43
Recent trend lines are relevant to compare. Taking 1985 as a
base year, civil filings in state courts have grown 21%, while civil
cases in U.S. district courts actually have declined 16%.' During
the same period, criminal filings increased 22% in federal courts,
but the increase in the state courts has been 39%, almost twice as
much.45 Much has been made of the docket threat of drug cases
in the federal courts; however, state courts in many individual
states handle more drug cases in a year than the entire federal
system.' The bottom line statistical comparison is this: on aver-
41. Id.
42. FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL-COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 56 (1994);
McKusick, supra note 27, at 13.
43. ANNUAL REPORT 1992, supra note 39, at 44. If you add back in state court filings
in traffic and ordinance cases, "the state courts, in the aggregate, handle more than 53
times as many cases with fewer than 20 times as many judges as the federal courts." Id.
at 43.
44. Id. at 44.
45. Id.
46. McKusick, supra note 27, at 13. According to the calculations of Maine's Chief
Justice, "[the state courts in Manhattan handle more drug cases in one day than are han-
dled in the entire federal court system in a year." Id.
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age, a trial judge in a state court processes more than three times
as many civil and criminal cases as a U.S. district court judge.47
Everyone can be assured of one thing: in the future there will
more and more cases in state courts, and new filings will continue
to exceed the state courts' capacities. When you consider the state
totals, "more" means huge numbers of cases. In 1992, there were
more than 93 million new cases filed in state trial courts.' The
civil and criminal filings were more than 100 times the number of
civil and criminal filings in the federal district courts.4 9 Most trou-
bling were the estimates that only about 1 out of 4 state trial
courts are keeping up with new filings."0 This is to say that 3 out
of 4 state trial courts are experiencing growing backlogs.
It is also relevant to take into account the differences and
similarities in the appellate caseloads of the state and federal judi-
ciaries. A recent study of the caseloads of the state supreme courts
and the U.S. courts of appeals found that:
business cases and criminal cases are roughly equal in their
percentage of the total caseload, that the state courts have
twice as large a share of tort cases, and that the state
courts have substantial segments of real property, family
law, and estate cases which are almost completely absent
from federal dockets."
Another study observed, "[a]part from criminal cases, the largest
portion of state supreme court litigation involves economic is-
sues-whether relating to state regulation of public utilities, zoning,
and small businesses or labor relations and workmen's compensa-
tion, natural resources, energy, and the environment."52 The feder-
al appellate courts decide nearly twice as many public law cases,
although that gap has narrowed. In recent years, federal question
decisions in state appellate courts have nearly tripled, accounting
for more than a quarter of published state supreme court deci-
47. ANNUAL REPORT 1992, supra note 39, at 45.
48. Id. at xi (nearly 20 million civil cases, more than 13 million criminal cases, close
to 2 million juvenile cases, and nearly 59 million traffic or other ordinance violation
cases).
49. Id. at xii.
50. Id.
51. COFFIN, supra note 42, at 50, 342 n.9 (citing G. ALAN TARR & MARY C. POR-
TER, STATE SUPREME CoURTs IN STATE AND NATION 6 (1988)).
52. Id at 50, 342 n.10 (quoting DAviD M. O'BRiEN, 1 CONSTrTUONAL LAW AND
POLrTIcs 628 (1991)).
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sions 3
In this light, we should not lose sight of characteristics com-
mon to state courts that distinguish them and their problems from
federal courts. 4 By comparison, "[t]he active participation of state
judges in the policy process is much more taken for granted and
much less controversial than the involvement of federal judges in
the national government."'55 The state judiciary has broad-based
jurisdiction and traditional responsibility for the common law doc-
trine.56 The state judiciary usually is perceived to be more worthy
and more stable than state legislatures. 7 While state judges are
elected officials, they often are chosen and retained in office in
nonpartisan or retention elections. 8 The political distances between
state judges and state legislatures are smaller and often are bridged
by prior political experience on the part of the state judges. 9 In a
dozen states, state courts are authorized to render advisory opin-
ions' and thus more directly and more formally participate in
state policy debates. The relations among the three branches in
many states must take into account the fact that the governor has a
line item veto over legislation, including legislation affecting the
state courts. 61 Many states have traditions of direct popular law-
making through mechanisms such as the initiative and referen-
dum.62 Thus, while there are some aspects in common, state poli-
tics involving the state judiciaries are not merely smaller, local
versions of the national experience.
53. Id. at 50, 342 n.11 (citing Daniel J. Meador, Concluding Remarks: National Con-
ference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships, 78 VA. L. REV. 1895, 1900 (1992)).
54. Hans A. Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS:
TowARD INSTuTIONAL COMITY 117 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988).
55. Id. at 117.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 118.
58. Id.
59. Linde, supra note 54, at 118.
60. Id. at 118 n.1 (citing NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 1984 STATE APPELLATE
COURT JURISDICTION GUIDE FOR STATISTICAL REPORTING, SUMMARY TABLES 34-45
(1985)).
61. Id. at 118.
62. Id.
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B. Fewer Resources
All entities of state government, including state courts, are
experiencing a fiscal era characterized by diminishing resources.
Available resources are effectively decreased when greater and
greater demands are made on existing budgets. This is exacerbated
in some states where there have been actual decreases in judicial
appropriations in recent years. Demand for justice is far greater
than supply. Public perceptions complicate the problem. In a recent
American Bar Association poll, respondents estimated that, on aver-
age, 27% of their federal, state, and local government expenditures
went for criminal and civil justice activities. The respondents even
supported higher funding, up to 34% of all government expendi-
tures.6" What is the actual number? Just more than 3%.' Of
course, people who believe that courts receive more than a quarter
of their tax dollars and who would be willing to spend more than
a third of their tax dollars to support courts, are entitled to high
expectations from their courts systems. Over half (58%) of the re-
spondents believed that whatever the expenditure level was for
courts, it was too low and expressed a willingness to pay more
taxes for better court funding."
We can compare those public perceptions with budget realities.
Governments in the United States, federal, state, and local, spent
$74 billion of their funds on the nation's justice system in 1990,
the most recent year for which totals are available.' That is a lot
of money, but it represents only 3.3% of total governmental expen-
ditures.67 And it compares to 20.5% on social insurance programs,
14% on education, 10.7% on interest on debt, and 3.5% on trans-
portation." This $74 billion total amounts to about $299 per capi-
ta, broken down to include: $128 for police, $100 for corrections,
$29 for prosecution and public defense, and $37 for courts.69
Government spent $37 per capita for courts. This compares with
$49 per capita for space research and technology.
We should examine what the present reality is like at current
funding levels before speculating about the future. U.S. Circuit
63. Steven Keeva, Demanding More Justice, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 46, 47-48.
64. Id. at 47.
65. The average response was $209 in additional taxes. Id. at 48.
66. Don J. DeBenedictis, Struggling Toward Recovery, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 50, 51.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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Judge Frank M. Coffin, in a commendable recent book, provides a
rather Dickensian description of the sense of "almost unrelieved
crisis" surrounding state courthouses:
Courts have been closed, and newly built courtrooms have
remained unused for lack of judges, judicial vacancies not
being filled. Plans for new facilities and equipment replace-
ment have been canceled. Civil jury trials have been de-
layed, have been made conditional on the payment of a
substantial fee, and have even been suspended for substan-
tial periods. Criminal charges, even felony charges, have
been dismissed for lack of capacity to hold prompt trials.
Crime reduction programs, youth shelters, and public de-
fender services have been eliminated or curtailed. Probation
staffs have been cut in half. Prisons are overcrowded, forc-
ing the early release of inmates. Public access to clerks'
offices has been limited to allow shrunken staff to catch up
with paperwork. Court employees have suffered massive
reductions and deferments in compensation, curtailment in
travel and court security, and elimination of training pro-
grams.
70
A "second opinion," if one is needed, can be found in the report
of the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Funding
the Justice System. Based on a survey of all the state justice sys-
tems, the Special Committee concluded, "[t]he justice system in
many parts of the United States is on the verge of collapse due to
inadequate funding and unbalanced funding."'" That report sound-
ed the alarm that "the American justice system is under siege and
its very existence is threatened as never before."' 2
How did we get to this point? State judiciaries are vulnerable
in state politics. The electoral process extracts its costs.73 Caseload
increases and public expectations far outstrip the capacity of the
state judicial system. Compensation gaps between judges' salaries
and practitioners' earnings continue to widen. Balanced budget
70. COFFIN, supra note 42, at 62-63.
71. Excerpts from a Report by the A.B.A. Special Committee on Funding the Justice
System, 32 JUDGES' J. 7, 8 (1993).
72. Id. at 9.
73. See HARRY P. STUMPF & JOHN H. CULVER, THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 43
(1992) (noting that the cost of the electoral process can be high and that it also creates
potential conflicts of interest).
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restrictions on state spending translate to across-the-board reduc-
tions in funding that have pernicious effects on courts. Further-
more, there are few reasons for expecting things to change.
What are state judiciaries to do? How can we expect them to
respond in the future? How should they respond? These questions
can be answered in terms of the short run and the long run.
In the short run, we can expect further belt-tightening mea-
sures, marginal techniques in what has been called "cut-back man-
agement."'74 In these ways, available dollars are stretched, much
like a household conserves at the end of the month to make it to
payday. The problem is that the payday shows no sign of ever
getting here and the projected shortfalls are far too large to be
covered by such techniques. Furthermore, I submit that after years
and years of cut-back management there simply are no more ways
to save substantial funds, even in a unified court budget.' Within
the larger justice system, however, there may be additional savings
through radical management techniques. One example is the North
Carolina program of "structured sentencing" or "capacity-based
sentencing." All sentencing is done based on a grid that was devel-
oped with a computer simulation model that takes into account
available prison capacity, the severity of the crime, and the
defendant's past record.76 As a result, more defendants are sen-
tenced to probation and prisoners are given early release. While the
state has had to hire more probation officers, it is less costly than
prison construction.77 This is the beginning of the fiscal realization
that corrections has been the fastest growing segment of state bud-
gets for the last several years.7
In the long run, state courts can look to Congress. This strate-
gy, however, is not very promising. Congress does not seem will-
ing or able to support even the federal courts. The budgets for
federal courts for the last several years have not increased suffi-
74. See Harry 0. Lawson & Barbara J. Gletne, Cutback Management in the Judicial
Branch: Controlling Costs Without Courting Disaster, 7 JusT. Sys. J. 44, 44-46 (1982)
(discussing the "cut-back management" approach to managing scarce resources by develop-
ing better resource management).
75. See generally Ronald Stout, Planning for Unified Court Budgeting, 69 JUnIcATURE
205 (1986) (discussing the points that court administrators should consider prior to imple-
menting centralized financing unified court budgeting).
76. William Claiborne, Making Sentences Fit the Prisons, WASH. POST, July 16, 1994,
at Al.
77. Id.
78. Don Phillips, Steaming Down the Line Toward Prosperity Junction, WASH. POST
WKLY., July 24, 1994, at 32.
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ciently to maintain constant levels of services. During this cycle,
Congress has appropriated less than what it would cost to provide
the same level of services-not higher levels to meet higher de-
mands-as the previous year.79 It goes without saying that Con-
gress has not been willing to provide the federal courts with suffi-
cient funds to pay jurors' fees and indigents' defense costs. Instead,
Congress has allowed the system to shut down, requiring an ex-
traordinary supplemental appropriation to get it going again."
The experience in the 1960s and 1970s with the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration (LEAA) is another historical prece-
dent for what happens when state institutions become dependent on
federal financial assistance. That program provided funds to state
justice systems for all sorts of improvements. It lasted for "a 14-
year period of intense activity, controversy, and constant modifica-
tion, its mandate was removed and the agency expired completely
in 1982."'" Courts should learn from the universities: soft money
will create more new problems for state court budgets.
Even if federal funding were more permanent, the more basic
question is whether the state courts want to go the route that other
state government departments have gone. Today, national grants
exceed one-fourth of state and local governmental budgets. 2 More
disturbing for principles of federalism than the level of dependence
on national grants is how "conditions that are attached to those
grants reach far into areas traditionally within the scope of state
power." 3 Indeed, there is some question whether the states have
the power to sell their sovereignty.84 But in the arena of federal
79. Budget Passed by House Falls Short of Judiciary's FY 95 Needs, THIRD BRANCH,
July 1994, at 1, 1.
80. See Laura Duncan, Cash Crunch Again Hits Federal Courts, CID. DAILY L. BULL.,
June 21, 1993, at 1 (explaining that all new federal civil trials were suspended because
money to pay jurors was exhausted); Eva M. Rodriguez, Federal Courts Win $200 Mil-
lion Hike in Budget, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 8, 1993, at 10 (noting that funds for lawyers
representing indigent clients and civil jurors were exhausted in 1993, requiring an emer-
gency allocation).
81. Peter Haynes, Measuring Financial Support for State Courts: Lessons from the
LEAA Experience, 11 JUST. SYS. J. 148, 149 (1986).
82. Note, Taking Federalism Seriously: Limiting State Acceptance of National Grants,
90 YALE LJ. 1694, 1695 (1981).
83. Id.
84. William Van Alstyne, "Thirty Pieces of Silver" for the Rights of Your People:
Irresistible Offers Reconsidered as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 16 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 303, 307 (1993) (concluding that when conditions are attached to federal
spending programs that would maintain rights guaranteed by the state's constitution, the
state cannot accept the federal funding).
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grants-in-aid, state sovereignty does not count for much. 5 State
courts should be cautious lest they be treated no better than state
executives and state legislatures. The spending clause may be the
only federal power more powerful than the commerce clause. 6
Consider, for example, the constitutional challenge to the condition-
ing of states' receipt of federal highway funds upon their enact-
ment of a twenty-one-year-old minimum drinking age.' What
about the Tenth Amendment or, better yet, the Twenty-first
Amendment? "No problem," the Supreme Court said without much
more analysis than that."8 State courts ought to think long and
hard whether the strings that might be attached to federal funds
still make the money worthwhile.
One worry for the future is that Congress, on its own, might
begin treating state courts like it treats the other branches of state
government. This would be bad news indeed for the state courts.
Since the 1970s, Congress has enacted nearly 200 federal mandates
and initiatives, without any federal funding, that require colossal
expenditures at the state and local levels. These unfunded mandates
have become common in the environmental area, but they are
proliferating in all areas of governmental activity and their project-
ed annual costs run in the hundreds of billions dollars. 9 Congress
85. See Richard B. Cappalli, Restoring Federalism Values in the Federal Grant System,
19 URBAN LAW. 493, 502-03 (1987) (arguing that Congress has indeterminate power over
the states through grants-in-aid resulting from a combination of the spending power, the
necessary and proper clause, and the supremacy clause).
86. Margaret G. Stewart, Political Federalism and Congressional Truth-Telling, 42
CATH. U. L. REV. 511, 522 (1993) (arguing that use of the spending power to regulate in
lieu of direct regulation through the commerce clause makes it more difficult for the
political process to defend the role of the states).
87. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
88. Id. at 212 (upholding statute conditioning a state's receipt of some federal highway
funds on implementation of 21-year-old minimum drinking age).
89. See William Claiborne, Unfunded Mandates Occupy Center Stage, WASH. POST,
May 18, 1994, at A21 (estimating that state and local governments will spend over $200
billion to comply with federal waste water mandates alone during the 1990s); G. Tracy
Mehan, Il, "The Buck's Passed Here": Unfunded Mandates for State and Local Govern-
ments, HERIrAGE FOUND. REP., Sept. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (calcu-
lating that compliance costs with environmental mandates would total $1,084,484,880 in
1991); Ron Scherer, Mayors Balk at Washington Telling Them How to Spend Their Mon-
ey, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Jan. 7, 1994, at 2 (noting that mayors are upset over new
spending forced upon them by the federal government and citing a study which found
that cities were spending 11.7% of their budgets to meet required federal programs); Pete
Wilson, How Federal Mandates Are Bankrupting the States, WASH. TIMEs, Mar. 18, 1994,
at A25 (pointing out that federal immigration statutes compel states to spend approximate-
ly $400 million in health insurance costs alone for illegal aliens).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
shows little sign of giving up this control over state and local
budgets.' State judges can ask their federal court colleagues to
help them imagine a worst case scenario. Suppose, for example,
the Congress decided to do to state courts what it did to federal
courts in the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990."9 Clearly, the les-
son is that depending on the kindness of Congress is a risky fu-
ture.
The federal executive is neither a likely nor a better friend of
the state courts. One might logically expect federal recognition of
the role state courts play in effectuating federal policy to result in
financial impact funding. "Inasmuch as such a significant portion
of state judicial manpower is devoted to federal purposes," Profes-
sor Meador once argued, "it is not inappropriate that federal fund-
ing assist those judicial systems in developing more effective pro-
cedures and in bringing into services the most advanced technolo-
gy."' Congress created the State Justice Institute in 1984 to insti-
tutionalize just such a policy "on a permanent basis."93 Just as
permanent has been executive branch opposition. In a remarkable
measure of bipartisanship, the Reagan administration, then the Bush
administration, and now the Clinton administration, all have target-
ed the State Justice Institute (SJI). To borrow a phrase, this Presi-
dent and his two predecessors have not been "friends of the
courts." Presidents appear to be capable of being penny wise and
pound foolish; the latest effort to eliminate SJI would have saved
90. Bills have been introduced to allow for a point of order during floor debate
against legislation creating unfunded mandates. See, e.g., S. 993, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994); H.R. 4771, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
In the early days of the 104th Congress, legislation to end the practice of imposing
federal mandates on the states has been linked with the debate over the balanced budget
amendment. The Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, H.R. 9, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1994); see Jerry Gray, The 104th Congress: The Overview, N.Y. TtMES, Jan.
18, 1995, at Al (noting how the Senate debate on the unfunded mandates bill has raised
concerns about the balanced budget amendment being logically inconsistent with a ban on
unfunded mandates).
91. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1990) (requiring each district court to implement a
civil justice expense and delay reduction plan); Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reforma-
tion in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REv. 375, 382 (1992) (concluding that the Civil
Justice Reform Act violates the separation of powers principle and interferes with the
ability of federal courts to control the internal proceedings of civil litigation); Linda S.
Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of
Powers, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1284, 1288 (1993) (noting that the Civil Justice Reform Act
shifts judicial rulemaking authority from federal courts to Congress).
92. Daniel J. Meador, Federal Law in State Supreme Courts, 2 CONST. COMMENTARY
347, 355 (1986).
93. Id.
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less than a person wins in a state lottery.94 It has taken the inter-
vention of such congressional friends of the courts as Neal Smith
and Howell Heflin to save SJI from the executive budget axe.95
In the theoretical future, state courts might try to emulate state
executives and sue the federal government under a theory of feder-
al impact fund relief. Congress has the power under the Constitu-
tion to give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction of matters within
the Article III federal judicial power but, unless Congress does so,
state courts have concurrent power to hear and decide cases based
on federal law.' State courts that otherwise have jurisdiction may
not generally decline to enforce federal laws.' In the words of
the Supreme Court:
Federal law is enforceable in state courts not because Con-
gress has determined that federal courts would otherwise be
burdened or that state courts might provide a more conve-
nient forum-although both might be true-but because the
Constitution and laws passed pursuant to it are as much
laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature."
One question still is open in this regard: "The Supreme Court has
not yet considered whether Congress can require state courts to
entertain federal claims when there is no analogous state-created
right enforceable in the state courts."" But it is a professor's
point to suggest that state judiciaries could escape the burden of
federal issues by closing down state trial courts to analogous state
law claims.
It is not so unrealistic to predict that state judicial branches
could adopt the "sue-the-federal-bastards" approach taken recently
94. See David Lawsky, Clinton to Shut Down 115 Programs, REUTERS WORLD SERV.,
Feb. 4, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (shutting down SJI would
save only approximately $6 million dollars); see also Ray Archer, Little-Known Federal
Programs Hold the Key to Safeguarding Treasury, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 15, 1993, at
AI0 (reporting the SJI Chairman's request for additional funding); Neil Brown, A Federal
Program that Refuses to Die, SARAmENO BEE, Mar. 15, 1993, at B13 (reporting Presi-
dent Clinton's recommendation to eliminate the SiJ).
95. Congress recognized the viability of the S1 in the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40607-40608, 108 Stat. 1796, 1982
(1994), by assigning it specific tasks for research and coordination.
96. IA-PT2 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTCE I 0.201 (2d ed.
1994).
97. Id.
98. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990).
99. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHr, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 290 (5th ed. 1994).
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by state executives in public controversies over the impact on state
budgets from illegal immigration. The states of Arizona, California,
and Texas have sued the U.S. Government for its failure to control
national borders, a failure the suits allege has obliged the plaintiff
states to bear the costs of public education, health care, social
services, and law enforcement totaling in the billions of dollars." °
We could see the same legal theory applied to the concurrent juris-
dictions that Congress routinely enacts that have a profound impact
on state judicial budgets. This is not so farfetched a legal theory.
There have been federal statutes on the books for a long time that
authorize reimbursement payments for the impact on state and local
governments from federal installations such as military bases.'
Facing up to reality, even future reality, obliges us to admit
that the most likely source of relief for state court budget woes is
the state legislature. Later, I will discuss some ideas for lobbying
state legislatures. For now I want to repeat the prediction that state
budgetary woes will continue and worsen. That brings me to anoth-
er related prediction, extrapolated from the present: some state
judicial branches already have adopted the "sue-the-legislative-bas-
tards" approach, and I predict this trend will broaden, much to the
regret of all concerned.
The problem of inadequate court funding can lead to a separa-
tion of powers showdown that ends up in court. This showdown
happened in New York in 1991."°  The Governor submitted a
budget that substantially reduced the funding requested by the state
judicial branch. Chief Judge Wachtler of the New York Court of
100. See, e.g., Sylvia Moreno, Texas Sues U.S. Over Immigration, DALLAS MORNING
NEws, Aug. 4, 1994, at 16A; Rorie Sherman, Immigration Suits Gain Critical Mass,
NAT'L L.J., June 13, 1994, at A6 (arguing that California's suit against the federal gov-
ernment to recover the costs of imprisoning, feeding, educating, and housing illegal immi-
grants actually springs from politics and not sound legal reasoning); Sam Howe Verhovek,
Texas Plans to Sue U.S. Over Illegal Aliens Costs, N.Y. TIMEs, May 27, 1994, at A10
(announcing Texas' and Florida's suits against the federal government to recover the costs
of public services for illegal immigrants).
101. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2391 (Supp. 1994) (authorizing the allocation of funds to
state and local governments to offset the adverse impact of closing military installations);
12 U.S.C. § 1715Z-3 (1988) (providing mortgage insurance for areas impacted by the
military).
102. See Howard B. Glaser, Wachtier v. Cuomo: The Limits of Inherent Powers, 78
JUDICATURE 12 (1994) (arguing that Wachtler pushed the doctrine of inherent powers
beyond its limits); John K. Powers, Crisis in the Courts?-The New York Experience,
TRIAL, Apr. 1993, at 22 (discussing Wachtler and whether the judicial branch has the
inherent power to compel the legislature and executive branches to provide funding for
the courts).
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Appeals sued the Governor in state court to compel adequate fund-
ing. Governor Cuomo then brought suit in federal court to enjoin
the court proceeding. When federal relief was denied, the Governor
removed the state court suit to federal court and filed a separate
action for a declaratory judgment. The spectacle garnered a great
deal of media coverage but never went to trial. The litigation was
settled to the satisfaction of the judicial branch."
The doctrine of inherent powers posits that "the very existence
of the courts implies their authority to exercise power reasonably
necessary to the performance of judicial functions."'" The New
York case was not the first to invoke the theory. Sadly, it has a
venerable common law history in the several states, though typical-
ly the doctrine has been invoked in smaller disputes over smaller
budget matters."5 There may be a state constitutional basis for
this theory: "Unlike state agencies, courts cannot reduce services;
they are constitutionally mandated to administer the judicial power
of the state."'" In 1991, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated a
budget-balancing statute that defined the courts as a "state agency"
subject to an executive commission's authority to reduce funding,
by invoking the separation of powers in the state constitution."°e
The typical defense is either that the courts are still functioning
or that the "cupboard is bare."'0 8 But that bluff may be called,
given the dire situation in some states."° Court leaders in several
states have asked or required judges and other court personnel to
103. See Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 91-CU-1235, 1991 WL 249892 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 21,
1991); Don J. DeBenedictis, Right to Funds, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1992, at 17 (reporting that
the settlement will allow the judicial budget to continue at $874 million in 1992 and to
be increased by $19 million in 1993, thereby allowing closed courtrooms to be reopened
and laid-off employees to be rehired).
104. Glaser, supra note 102, at 12; see Carl Boar, The Continuing Development of the
Inherent Powers Doctrine, 78 JUDICATURE 22 (1994) (invoking inherent powers to secure
the resources necessary for the effective operation of the courts).
105. See Ted Z. Robertson & Christa Brown, The Judiciary's Inherent Power to Compel
Funding: A Tale of Heating Stoves and Air Conditioners, 20 ST. MARY'S L.. 863, 865
(1989) (giving, as examples, low salaries for judges and court employees and inadequate
equipment).
106. Id. at 883.
107. Chiles v. Children, 589 So. 2d 260, 263-64 (Fla. 1991).
108. Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Funding, and Inherent Judi-
cial Powers, 52 MD. L. REv. 217, 238-45 (1993).
109. See, e.g., Don J. DeBenedictis, Unpaid Leave for Judges, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1992, at
17 (relating several instances where judges were forced to endure financial hardships such
as being forced to take unpaid leave or to take pay cuts as a result of a state budget
crisis).
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take time off without pay or to forego paid leave. There have been
actual court closings in some states, sometimes for a few days,
sometimes for more than a week, when everyone has gone home
and the courthouse door has been locked.
Because we cannot expect that the budget woes of states and
state courts will improve any time soon, we can expect greater and
greater temptation to resort to the confrontational lawsuit against
the political branches."' In my opinion, giving into this tempta-
tion would be self-defeating for the state judiciaries. At best, these
suits are pyrrhic victories."' I am not persuaded that this is an
effective political tool to gain leverage in the immediate budget
negotiations. Furthermore, these suits may harm public confidence
and support for the courts and likely will undermine relations with
the political branches in the long run.
There is an alternative to the state judiciary bringing the law-
suit. Beyond the institutional interest of the judicial branch, there
are also individual rights at stake as, for example, under state
constitutional guarantees to open courts."2 After the Supreme
Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment did not require it,"
3
110. See Is U.S. Justice System in a Crisis?, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2, 1993, at 23-24 (re-
porting that judges and attorneys interviewed thought that a lack of funding is the greatest
problem confronting the justice system).
111. See Glaser, supra note 102, at 22 (noting that the handling of the Wachtler v.
Cuomo case has undermined public confidence in the judiciary and injured the judiciary's
relationships with the other branches to the extent that the damage resulting from the case
has outweighed the potential gains in funding).
112. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Comparative American Judicial Systems, 24 U. RICH. L.
REV. 171, 180 (1990) (suggesting that this type of suit could be based on the infringe-
ment of individual state constitutional rights). At least in theory, there could be some
federal constitutional basis for such a lawsuit. See Charles Clark, The Role of National
Courts in 200 Years of Evolving Governance, 18 CUMB. L. REV. 95, 107-08 (1987) (cau-
tioning that such relief is only warranted when expressly authorized by Congress pursuant
to its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment). But profound federalism problems
abound. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) (dissolving a
district court's desegregation decree after recognizing that the allocation of power under
our federal system would make a continued displacement of local authority unconstitution-
al); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 57 (1990) (holding that the federal government can
require a school district to levy taxes exceeding statutory limits "in order to compel the
discharge of an obligation imposed . . . by the Fourteenth Amendment"); Spallone v.
United States, 493 U.S. 265, 280 (1990) (holding that a district court's contempt sanctions
imposed on City Council members for violating Title V1II and the Equal Protection
Clause by intentionally enhancing segregation in housing were an abuse of discretion); see
generally Joel H. Swift, Fiscal Federalism: Who Controls the States' Purse Strings?, 63
TEMP. L. REv. 251 (1990) (examining the Supreme Court's treatment of state fiscal auton-
omy and the Court's attempt to distinguish between judicial and legislative invasions of
the states' reserved powers).
113. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 1 (1973) (holding that the
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the Texas Supreme Court interpreted the right to education provi-
sion in the Texas Constitution to oblige the Texas Legislature to
increase and equalize funding for public schools.114 Why not ap-
ply that same reasoning to state constitutional provisions dealing
with state courts?' Public interest groups and state bar associa-
tions might have organizational standing to bring these suits on
their own behalf and on behalf of their members. These plaintiffs
would sue the state legislature, in effect, for breaching the state's
social compact. The state courts thus would avoid the problems of
a direct lawsuit against a coequal branch of state government.
The problems caused by inadequate court budgets will lead to
further privatization that will manifest itself in two ways, and per-
haps a third. First, private alternative dispute resolution will be-
come a more and more attractive "alternative." Second, we can
expect courts to experiment more with user fees. Third, we should
not be surprised if the state courts, in future and even more dire
straights, attempt to tap into the American tradition of volunteerism
Texas system of school funding, which favored wealthy school districts, did not violate
the Constitution).
114. Carrollton-Farmers Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d
488, 489 (Tex. 1992). See William P. Hobby & Billy D. Walker, Legislative Reform of
the Texas Public School Finance System, 1973-1991, 28 HARV. J. ON Laids. 379 (1991)
(examining efforts to reform public school financing in Texas); Allan E. Parker, Jr., Pub-
lic Free Schools: A Constitutional Right to Educational Choice in Texas, 45 Sw. LJ. 825
(1991) (discussing the Texas constitutional issue of school choice and tuition reimburse-
ment); Mikal Watts & Brad Rockwell, The Original Intent of the Education Article of the
Texas Constitution, 21 ST. MARY'S LJ. 771 (1990) (arguing that the original intent of the
education article was not to cause inequality in school district funding). This state consti-
tutional development has spread among the states with remarkable momentum. See Allen
W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP.
L. REv. 1325 (1992) (examining education equality litigation in several states); Molly
McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28 HARv. J.
ON LEGIS. 307 (1991) (discussing the use of education clauses in state constitutions as
bases for court ordered school finance reform); Richard J. Stark, Education Reform: Judi-
cial Interpretation of State Constitutions' Education Finance Provisions-Adequacy vs.
Equality, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 609 (1992) (discussing the equal opportunity and
adequate education approaches to education finance litigation); Julie K. Underwood &
William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 517 (1991) (discussing approaches used in pursuit of fiscal equity in
schools through litigation); Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State
Courts, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1072 (1991) (arguing that legislative inertia and judicial
deferrence to political branches have hindered plaintiffs in school financing cases from
securing constitutional remedies).
115. See Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive
Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS
LJ. 1057 (1993) (exploring state enforcement of positive constitutional rights).
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manifested more particularly by the legal tradition of lawyers serv-
ing pro bono publico, not as advocates but as judges.
First, by private ADR I am not talking about the tendency to
recast trial judges as managers of dispute resolution who take an
active role in attempting to settle cases or who divert disputes into
court-annexed programs. Certainly, that trend will continue."6
What will change, perhaps, is the present approach that allows each
individual judge to adopt a favorite alternative and then to force
every dispute through it in a procrustean fashion. Indeed, one com-
mentator has noted, "[t]he specific techniques advocated by...
managerial judges vary so widely that it is not clear what, if any-
thing, they have in common.""' 7 There seems to be a growing
appreciation among experts and practitioners of alternative dispute
resolution that specific alternatives to trial are better suited to par-
ticular types of disputes."' Recognizing this need for matching
the alternative with the dispute will require judges in the future to
perform dispute triage. They will be expected to evaluate disputes
and then to assign them to the most suitable alternative. If this
approach is carried to its logical extreme, courts and litigants will
"stop thinking of ADR as an alternative to judicial proceedings and
[will] begin to think of judicial proceedings as one of the many
and varied alternatives to be matched with appropriate disputes to
achieve a just and efficient resolution.""' 9
By speculating that the "alternative" will be taken out of alter-
native dispute resolution, I am not predicting that courts will be-
come obsolete. 2 ' Quite the contrary, judges will continue to be
the central actors in the multi-door courthouse of the future. Privat-
116. See generally Steven Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to Professor Resnik 35
HASTINGS LJ. 505 (1984) (arguing that managerial judging does not interfere with due
process and is necessary for efficiency reasons); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (discussing the emergence of managerial judging and the ab-
sence of restraint that accompanies it).
117. E. Donald Elliot, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CID.
L. REv. 306, 309 (1986).
118. See CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE-THE IDEOLOGY AND INSTITU-
TIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT (1985) (examining alternative dispute resolu-
tion as a political resource).
119. THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL-THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS 197 (1994).
120. See Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Are Courts Obsolete?, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1385,
1398 (1992) (discussing the value of non-judicial dispute resolution systems and conclud-
ing that courts are not obsolete because they serve in areas and ways that no ADR entity
can).
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ization might play out differently than many judges expect, howev-
er. If I understand the zeal of some trial judges for ADR, they
believe that low end disputes--cases that are by some measure less
deserving of a judge's time and talents-would be diverted to non-
judges for resolution. It would be like the old Post Office trying to
get rid of junk mail. The future might hold the opposite effect.
Litigants and attorneys in high end disputes-cases in which mon-
ey is no object but delay will cause problems-might take their
disputes outside the courthouse into the private sector. The "rent-a-
judge" phenomenon that originated in California may become more
and more common in large commercial cases.' Thus, it might
end up resembling Federal Express taking premium business away
from the U.S. Postal Service.
One way to keep this from happening is for the courts to de-
velop subsidized ADR programs and summary adjudication proce-
dures that are less expensive and more efficient for the run of
cases. This would free judicial resources for "high end cases."'"
Another way to maintain the "high end cases" would be for the
public sector to compete on the same terms as the private firms. It
is my prediction that filing fees will be reconceptualized in the
future as user fees. Many states have experimented with increasing
filing fees to generate more revenue." Future budget problems
may be the occasion for legislatures to revisit the assumption that
courts are public goods. 24 The debate is predictable. The cost of
running a typical trial court is estimated at between $400 and $600
an hour, upwards of $5,000 a day."u Current filing fees are
$120"u and so there is a free-rider problem, in common with oth-
121. See generally Note, The California Rent-A-Judge Experiment: Constitutional and
Policy Considerations of Pay-as-You-Go Courts, 94 HARV..L. REv. 1592 (1981) (detailing
the development of "rent-a-judge" systems and evaluating the merit of such systems).
122. See Paul Nejelski, Judicial Work in the 1980s: Nuts and Bolts, 31 CATH. U. L.
REV. 213, 218-21 (1982) (discussing future developments of nonjudicial alternatives to the
current system); John B. Oakley, The Future Relationship of California's State and Feder-
al Courts: An Essay on Jurisdictional Reform, the Transformation of Property, and the
New Age of Information, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2233, 2249 (1993) (discussing trends in the
relationship between state and federal courts in California and suggesting ways to improve
the relationship through cooperative ADR).
123. See DeBenedictis, supra note 66, at 50, 52-53 (discussing court systems' efforts to
finance their operations).
124. See Rex E. Lee, The American Courts as Public Goods: Who Should Pay the
Costs of Litigation?, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 267, 268 (1985) (discussing free rider concerns
associated with a publicly funded judicial system).
125. Id.
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (1988).
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er public goods. But more is at stake than just money. Because
courts are overcrowded, each dispute is delayed and overall there is
a worry for the quality of justice in a system operating beyond ca-
pacity. The economic solution would be to devise a fee schedule to
shift a larger proportion of courts' costs onto litigants who will
benefit and who can afford to pay, at least when there is no con-
ceivable public benefit from the litigation. The difficult question is
how to define this category for imposing appropriate user fees. 7
Both private ADR and user fees, however, compromise
society's commitment to "Equal Justice Under Law." Currently,
there is genuine concern that "the disparities of a multitiered justice
system-with corporations, other large organizations and wealthy
individuals at the top, small business and most working individuals
squeezed into the middle, and the very poor entrenched at the
bottom-appear to be deepening."' 28  Citizens and taxpayers pay
for courts of justice.
My third and least likely (though not completely facetious) pre-
diction for the future is the idea of the volunteer lawyer-judge.
Some states have already experimented with this concept to deal
with backlogs and to help reduce delay.29 Although most of the
past programs have been implemented at the state trial court of
limited jurisdiction, statutes currently on the books in several states
authorize broader use of attorneys designated as temporary judges
to preside over a given dispute.3 These lawyer-judges usually
act with the consent of the parties. This is not functionally much
different from well-established programs imposing mandatory arbi-
tration or mediation. Of course, state equivalents of the federal
Article IH judge requirement would have to be overcome, but that
should not be considered impossible in a compelling future crisis
facing the state courts."'
Any discussion of the future must take into account technology.
127. See Lee, supra note 124, at 272.
128. James Podgers, Chasing the Ideal, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 56, 57.
129. See ALEXANDER B. AIKMAN ET AL., FRIENDS OF THE COURT-LAWYERS AS SUP-
PLEMENTAL JUDICIAL RESOURCES at xix (1987) (discussing different jurisdictions' attempts
to incorporate lawyers as judges pro tern).
130. NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF LAWYERS TO
SUPPLEMENT JUDICIAL RESOURCES at v, 18 (1984).
131. But see Virginia L. Richards, Note, Temporary Appointments to the Federal Judi-
ciary: Article 11 Judges?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 702, 703 (1985) (arguing that temporary
appointment of federal judges contravenes Article III's life tenure requirement and is un-
constitutional).
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In the context of this discussion of fewer resources, there is a
certain irony to the realization that while new technology is expen-
sive, it promises greater efficiency and cost savings. One can confi-
dently predict that video technology will be relied on more in the
future for depositions, hearings, and perhaps even trials."' By
now, all but a handful of states allow contemporary broadcast of
in-court proceedings. This has made possible Court TV-a kind of
electronic version of the courthouse hanger-on. 3 The states are
far ahead of the federal courts in this regard.'34
While strides have been made, "[t]he current. state of court
automation [still] is eons behind that of the business world.13 5
Automation of the clerk's office is now considered a necessity for
efficient internal case management, improved productivity, and im-
proved service to the public.3 6 Computer equipment in chambers
currently relied on for word processing will be more sophisticated
in the future to permit comprehensive networking and elaborate
data retrieval.' 37
132. See B. Paul Cotter, Jr., When the Electronic Judge Meets the Electronic Lawyer,
JUDGES' J., Spring 1988, at 2, 3 (asserting that using a computer can make judges more
efficient); Robert S. Gerstein, Appeal by "Video, L.A. LAW. Aug.-Sept. 1990, at 21, 21
(addressing the possibility of replacing trial transcripts with videotapes in the appellate
process).
133. This national cable network is exclusively devoted to courtroom coverage and has
more than. 14 million viewers. See David A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court
TV, Conventional Television, and Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice System, 35
ARiz. L. REV. 785, 800 (1993) (stating that by the 1990s over 40 states allowed audio
and video trial coverage); Stephen Brill, Watching the Drama of Justice, AM. LAW., Aug.
1990, at 3 (citing the trend in the states for allowing television cameras in the courtroom
as leading to a 24-hour cable station); Scott Minerbrook, It's Court Time, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., July 15, 1991, at 16 (discussing the beginnings of Court TV).
134. See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & CAROL KRAFKA, ELECTRONIC MEDIA COVER-
AGE OF FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEEDINGS: AN EVALUATION OF THE PILOT PROGRAM IN SIX
DISTRICT COURTS AND Two COURTS OF APPEALS, A REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER TO THE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (Fed. Jud. Ctr. ed., 1994) (reporting
the success of state pilot programs for electronic media coverage of trials); Stephen G.
Thompson, Electronic Media in the Courtroom: Some Observations on Federalism and
State Experimentation, 3 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 349, 353 (1982) (pointing out that Rule 53
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits courtroom broadcasting).
135. Carol M. Neal, Courts Enter the Computer Age, but Slowly, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 30,
1992, at 7.
136. Cristin Birch, Automation in the U.S. Courts, 36 FED. B. NEWS & J. 238, 238
(1989).
137. See Brian Forst, Overburdened Courts and Underutilized Information Technology: A
Modern Prescription for a Chronic Disorder, 68 JUDICATURE 30, 33 (1984) (noting that
judicial suspicion of computer technology has eroded because of increasing case backlogs,
the proliferation of powerful small computers, and the availability of more productive
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Some state courts are already operating in the future by estab-
lishing computer-integrated courtrooms.' Judges and lawyers use
computer screens to retrieve transcripts of testimony, depositions,
records in earlier cases, and other data. 139 Often the systems link
together prosecutors' offices, law enforcement agencies, corrections
facilities, and other agencies." Some existing systems connect
the clerk's office, the judge's chambers, the prosecutor's office, and
the defender's office in one integrated network. 14 CD-ROM tech-
nology has been incorporated so that vast amounts of data can be
stored, retrieved, and processed. 42 Numerous courts have on-line
access to opinions available to the bar and public. 43 A few tech-
nologically-advanced courts are experimenting with electronic filing
and using software and a modem. These types of technology elimi-
nate the need to file paper pleadings and allow for instantaneous
access by the opponent and the court.'" As far as technology is
concerned, the future is here, at least in some courts.
Of course, there are limits to technology. We cannot confident-
ly predict that judges will rely on computer programs for actual
decisionmaking 4 Judging is and always will remain a peculiarly
human activity."4  And it should be remembered that
information systems); Richard B. Klein & Patricia R. Lykos, What Computer Support
Should a Judge Have?, JUDGES' J., Fall 1989, at 16, 18 (giving specific recommendations
to judges on what computer hardware, software, and training to invest in to increase
efficiency and enhance communications); Jane B. Luca, The Quiet Revolution: Computer-
ization of Court Systems for the 21st Century, 14 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 169, 177 (1987)
(noting that a "vast computer revolution" is taking place in United States courts and con-
cluding that it will continue in the future).
138. See Don J. DeBenedictis, L.A. Log-On: Municipal Courts Automate into the Future,
A.B.A. J., July 1990, at 50, 50 (noting Los Angeles' court automation in the mid-1980s);
Jessica Copen, Courts of the Future, A.B.A. J., June 1991, at 74, 74 (stating that the
most innovative computer activity is occurring in state courts on an experimental basis).
139. Copen, supra note 138, at 74.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 76.
142. Id. at 77.
143. Id. at 74.
144. See Daniel B. Kennedy, The Future of Filing, A.B.A. J., July 1994, at 32, 32 (dis-
cussing Mead Data Central's Complex Litigation Automated Docketing System).
145. See Stuart S. Nagel, Computer-Aided Law Decisions, 21 AKRON L. REv. 73, 94
(1987) (stating that the costs of computer-aided decisionmaking are "mainly a willingness
to think differently and more explicitly about the judicial process and lawyering than one
may be accustomed to"); Charles P. Rippey, Computer-Assisted Decision Writing, JUDGES'
J., Summer 1994, at 36, 37 (noting the fear that computer programs will lead to judges
using them to replace reasoned decisionmaking).
146. See Douglas E. Winter, Down-Time: A Fable, LTG., Fall 1986, at 48 (relating a
fantasy story of a completely automated nonhuman judicial system which became defec-
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"[t]echnology can be helpful, but it is not a panacea."'47 Future
technology will not solve all the future problems. Indeed, it is a
fair observation to note that society typically does not know what
to do with new technology: "Consider some of the characteristic
technologies of the last 100 years: the telephone, the automobile,
the radio, the television, and the computer. At the time of their
inception and for many years afterward, no one understood the
implications of their invention and use."'" Future technology will
be utilized in the virtual future. It is more likely that in the next
future the courts finally will get around to understanding and using
the present technology, like personal computers. Even this is not
assured, however, because what two experts said about the relative-
ly well-off federal courts applies even more so to the budget pre-
dicament of state courts:
The ability of the courts to acquire and install computers
and peripheral equipment ... is completely dependent on
the availability of a budget adequate to the task....
[S]erious budget reductions will not be accompanied by
corresponding reductions in the workloads of the
courts.... The public will be poorly served if the courts
are forced to carry their current burdens, and accept new
ones, without the aid of modem automation.49
C. State Constitutional Law
Over the last decade, state constitutional law has enjoyed a
renaissance which most assuredly will continue to broaden and
deepen in the future. Describing how this phenomenon will mani-
fest itself in the jurisprudences of fifty independent sovereign state
supreme courts, however, is equally intimidating in the writing and
in the reading. Whole books and law review symposia are given
over to the subject' A few generalizations are in order for this
tive).
147. Nejelski, supra note 122, at 221.
148. Tom Maddox, The Cultural Consequences of the Information Superhighway, WIL-
SON Q., Summer 1994, at 29, 31.
149. Joseph W. Weis, Jr. & Gordon Bermant, Automation in the Federal Courts: Prog-
ress, Prospects and Problem, JUDGES' J., Fall 1987, at 14, 36.
150. See, e.g., BRADLEY D. MCGRAw, DEvELOPMENTS IN STATE CONsTITIroNAL LAW
(1985); STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLiCYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 3-79 (Mary C.
Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982) (devoting three chapters to constitutional policymaking
in state supreme courts); Symposium, Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law, 66
TEMP. L. REV. 1145 (1993) (commenting on issues such as abortion, item vetoes, and
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canvass of judicial federalism in the future.'51
There are at least three different theories about the relationship
between the state constitutions and the U.S. Constitution in decid-
ing individual rights cases. The primacy theory'52 views the state
constitution as the primary source of individual rights and calls
first for an analysis of the state claim. Only if the claim of state
right is denied should the state supreme court reach and decide the
federal claim. The supplemental theory'53 views state constitution-
al rights as supplemental to federal constitutional rights. The feder-
al claim is resolved first and the state claim is resolved only after
the federal claim is denied and the state constitution is interpreted
to justify an outcome favorable to the individual and against the
government. The coequal theory 5 4 views the two organic docu-
ments as being on the same decisional plane. Alternative claims
under the two documents are separately considered and then inde-
pendently decided. The future will bring some further reconcili-
ation.
Whichever view of the rhetoric and hyperbole that has attended
the renaissance in state constitutional law,'55 it must be conceded
school choice); Symposium, The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1339 (1985) (addressing the growth of state constitutional jurisprudence).
151. "Let me not count the ways state constitutions are different one from the other and
all from the federal." Thomas E. Baker, The Ambiguous Independent and Adequate State
Ground in Criminal Cases: Federalism Along a Mobius Strip, 19 GA. L. REV. 799, 832-
33 (1985).
152. See generally Hans Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of
Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980) (arguing that states are primarily responsible for
individual rights); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of
State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REv. 3 3 (1984)
(supporting the legitimacy of independent state constitutional adjudication).
153. See generally Robert A. Sedler, The State Constitutions and the Supplemental Pro-
tection of Individual Rights, 16 U. TOL. L. REV. 465 (1985) (arguing that state constitu-
tions should be used to supplement federal constitutional rights); Herbert P. Wilkins, Judi-
cial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in Relation to Cognate Provi-
sions of the United States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 887, 889 (1980) ("The
state court is bound by federal requirements and may invoke the state constitution only to
provide greater safeguards.").
154. See, e.g., Phylis Skloot Bamberger, Methodology for Raising State Constitutional
Issues, in RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONsTrrUTIONAL LAW 287, 304-05
(Practicing Law Inst. 1985) (discussing the coequal theory); Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate
and Independent Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and
Federal Courts, 63 TEx. L. REV. 977, 983 (identifying a "dual reliance" approach where
both state and federal law are considered).
155. Compare William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977) (advocating state court activism for greater
constitutional protections) with Earl M. Malz, False Prophet-Justice Brennan and the
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that this area of judicial federalism still remains today more of a
future potential rather than a present actuality. The new federalism
is still coming. State supreme courts today continue to rely on
federal law more than state law in constitutional cases."6 One can
be confident, however, that the development of state constitutional
law will surge dramatically in the future.5 7 State high courts
around the country, including high courts in the Mid-Atlantic
states, are beginning to demonstrate an outright enthusiasm for
state constitutional law.' The momentum will increase as state
constitutional law precedents accumulate in the common law meth-
od.'59 State constitutional holdings, doctrines, and theories will
begin to influence the development of federal constitutional law
more than was ever thought possible.'" Indeed, some scholars
have concluded that the developments in state constitutional law
already have become a rich source of new ideas.' Even some of
Theory of State Constitutional Law, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429 (1988) (criticizing
Justice Brerinan's proposal for state court activism).
156. Michael Esler, State Supreme Court Commitment to State Law, 78 JUDICATURE 25,
25 (1994); see generally John W. Shaw, Comment, Principled Interpretations of State
Constitutional Law-Why Don't the "Primacy" States Practice What They Preach?, 54 U.
PrrT. L. REV. 1019, 1038-50 (1993) (examining application of the primary theory by the
Oregon Supreme Court and concluding that the results have been mixed).
157. See Ronald K.L. Collins et al., State High Courts, State Constitutions, and Individ-
ual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey, 13 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 599, 622-
23 (1986) (noting that state supreme court justices perceive an increase in state constitu-
tional rights litigation, and that this trend will likely continue in the future).
158. See Gene R. Nichol, Dialectical Federalism: A Tribute to the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals, 90 W. VA. L. REv. 91, 96-107 (1987) (examining cases where
the West Virginia Supreme Court has interpreted its state constitution to give broader civil
rights than the analogous federal provisions).
159. Cf Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and the Common Law, 73 JUDICATURE
149, 150-51 (1989) (discussing recent Supreme Court trends away from federalization of
the common law); John Martinez, Taking Time Seriously: The Federal Constitutional Right
to Be Free from "Startling" State Court Overrulings, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 297,
340 (1988) (proposing that federal intrusion into state decisions should decrease when the
state common law is adequate).
160. See Jennifer Friesen, Adventures in Federalism: Some Observations on the Overlap-
ping Spheres of State and Federal Constitutional Law, 3 WIDENER J. Pua. L. 25, 28
(1993) ("The Supreme Court has been known to follow the lead of the states in expand-
ing the scope of a federal guarantee."); Barry Latzer, Four Half-Truths About State Con-
stitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1123, 1125-30 (1992) (arguing that states may interpret
constitutional provisions more narrowly than the Supreme Court in anticipation of a later
narrowing of federal constitutional law); Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., Toward a New Partner-
ship: The Future Relationship of Federal and State Constitutional Law, 49 U. PrrT. L.
REV. 729, 739-44 (1988) (advocating that federal courts look to state constitutional deci-
sions for persuasive authority).
161. One scholar attributes this reliance on state constitutional law to the recent lack of
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the least repentant federal judges have confessed the importance of
accepting state judges into an equal partnership to enforce civil
rights and civil liberties.'62 As part of this larger phenomenon, we
can expect one related procedural development for judicial federal-
ism: federal courts will be obliged to certify more state law ques-
tions to the state courts in recognition of the growing renaissance
in state constitutional law. 63 The "new federalism" will become
even more important in the future than it is today." 4
D. State Court Futures Activities
The state courts are collectively far ahead of the federal courts
on the learning curve about futures activities and long range plan-
ning. "'65 This may have something to do with the fact that state
federal constitutional development, stating, "I find recent federal constitutionalism to be
impoverished-not because it is increasingly conservative, but because it is increasingly
petulant, shrill, formulaic, and intellectually incoherent." David Schuman, A Failed Critique
of State Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. REv. 274, 277 n.18 (1992).
162.
What does this history suggest? One lesson is clear if left alone,
state courts are fully capable of vindicating the rights of most citizens against
governmental oppression when the ultimate responsibility is theirs. But they
tend to default when their judgements are too often reviewed and revised by
federal courts. In that climate, the state courts tend to become weak-first
angry, then apathetic-and inclined to pass the buck in cases involving unpopu-
lar causes. It follows, I think, that the federal courts, including the Supreme
Court, must get off the backs of the state courts.
J. Skelly Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions of a Federal Judge, 11
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 181 (1984) (footnote omitted); cf. Carl M. McGowan, Feder-
alism-Old and New-and the Federal Courts, 70 GEO. LJ. 1421, 1431 (1982)
("[F]ederalism has meant the desirability and necessity of the general government deferring
to the states in order to allow them their proper role over issues of state and local con-
cern.").
163. See generally Ronald T. Gerwatowski, Of Comity and Common Sense: The Need
for Federal Courts to Certify Questions of Unsettled State Constitutional Law, 75 MASS.
L. REV. 3, 20-24 (1990) (outlining when and how a federal court should "certify" a state
law question to the proper state court).
164. See generally Judicial Federalism: Don't Make a Federal Case Out of It . . . or
Should You?, 73 JUDICATURE 146, 146 (1989) (discussing the ramifications of the "new
federalism"); Paul Marcotte, Federalism and the Rise of State Courts, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1,
1987, at 60, 64 (discussing the future of the power shift to state courts).
165. Indeed, state judges have a lot to teach federal judges about planning and futures
activities, if federal judges are willing to learn. One judge has advocated cooperation
between federal and state courts for planning:
It would, of course, be desirable to help the state systems as well as
the federal system. The great bulk of disputes are resolved in state courts.
However, although the [proposed] study will benefit state systems, the
practicalities appear to be that, as far as planning and implementation, it would
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courts have more to do, greater workload, and more diverse juris-
dictions and functions than federal courts."6 The shared sense of
crisis is more pronounced among state judges and in state courts,
where the siege mentality of workload far in excess of resources is
more longstanding and far more threatening. It also may be partly
the result of greater political flexibility to reorganize in the state
courts. For example, while the federal courts have been weeping
and gnashing their teeth over the deluge of drug cases and the
draconian sentences being imposed under the federal sentencing
guidelines, there has been a "drug court" in Florida's Dade County
for more than five years. 7 The tribunal, which has been replicat-
ed elsewhere, deals with possession offenses not involving violent
crime and emphasizes treatment and rehabilitation programs, educa-
tion, and vocational training.
At the national level, the American Bar Association sponsored
the "Just Solutions" Conference which brought together delegates
from around the country to scrutinize the justice system in the
United States.' The anticipated follow-up will be to establish a
State Justice Commission-comprised of members of the bench and
bar, court administrators, and citizens-in every state to serve as a
catalyst for reform. In 1990, the American Judicature Society, with
funding from the State Justice Institute, presented "The Future and
the Courts Conference" to encourage state judiciaries to forecast
alternative futures for the next century. 9 Since then, nearly half
be better to concentrate on the federal system. Developing a blueprint for the
year 2000 would be immeasurably less complicated if consideration is limited
to one judicial system and the three branches of the federal government. It
would be extremely difficult to provide additional future planning for the 50
states. However, state courts could benefit from a close liaison with this project
by representatives of the state governments. In addition, progressive states have
many ideas that should be considered in the study of the federal system. To
this end, I suggest that there be close cooperation with the National Center for
State Courts and the Conference of State Chief Justices.
J. Clifford Wallace, Working Paper-Future of the Judiciary, 94 F.R.D. 225, 234-35
(1981); see Jim Dator, Judging the Future, 57 TEX. B. J. 758, 760 (1994) (praising the
progress of some state courts' futures activity).
166. Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges' Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on
Maccy, 23 J. LEGAL STuD. 647, 649 (1994).
167. Drug Court Celebrates Fifth Year, FLA. B. NEWS, July 15, 1994, at 13. Congress
appropriated grant funds for enlarging this experiment in the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994. See infra notes 208-45 and accompanying text.
168. R. William Ide, El, A Giant Step Toward Reform-Conference on Problems in
Justice System Focuses on Realistic Solutions, A.B.A. J., June 1994, at 8, 8; James
Podgers & Henry J. Reske, Facing the "New Realities," A.B.A. J., June 1994, at 77, 77.
169. IRA PILCEEN & SANDRA RATCIFF, AMERIcAN JUDICATURE SOC'Y, THE FUTURE
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the states have already held various innovative futures activities
and most of the other states are preparing similar programs.
171
Several of the Mid-Atlantic states already have taken definite steps
to begin understanding what the future has in store and to prepare
for it.'7 ' A guidebook published last year by the National Center
for State Courts, with a grant from the State Justice Institute, de-
scribes a successful state court "vision process" and covers such
requirements as support, resources and activities, and incorporating
visionary ideas into existing long-term planning efforts:
State courts have discovered the future. Throughout the
U.S., state courts are employing such futures tools as envi-
ronmental scanning, vision development, and anticipatory
management. Courts in many states are in crisis: concerns
for budget cuts, overloaded dockets, and personnel limita-
tions. For many, futures tools are being used to improve
management. Vision development has been part of some of
these efforts, though not all.
7 2
One important feature of all this state court futures activity is
the cross-pollination that is occurring as states learn from each
other by borrowing and adapting successful and promising futures
strategies. This interstate synergy takes such traditional forms as
comprehensive reports issued by state commissions, empirical stud-
ies, scholarly papers, and so on. 7 1 Indeed, one challenge facing a
court leader new to the futures game is how to deal with the body
of information and study that presently is available. 174 But there
is one particular forum for contemplating the futures of the state
courts that is itself indicative of both the level of activity and the
degree of innovation in the states. Court futures studies have gone
into cyberspace. Those interested in studies on the future of the
state court justice systems now regularly meet on the Internet.
AND THE COURTS: CONDUCTING STATE COURT FUTURES ACTIVIrTS 1 (1993).
170. Id. at 29-54 (describing the futures activities projects in 22 states).
171. Id. at 44-46, 48-50 (describing the activities in North Carolina, South Carolina,
Virginia, and West Virginia).
172. Id. at 53.
173. Id. at 29-50.
174. See, e.g., PILCHEN & RATCLIFF, supra note 169, at 51-54 (listing plans for new
state court futures projects); COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE CALIFORNIA COURTS,
JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE 2020, at 221 (1993) (listing research papers); Fuller &
Boersema, supra note 16, at 201 n.2 (identifying futures studies of several major state
judiciaries).
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There is a discussion list monitored by James Dator, a professor at
the University of Hawaii and Director of the Hawaii Research
Center for Future Studies, and Judge Richard Klein, a Philadelphia
trial judge and vice-chair of the steering committee of the Pennsyl-
vania Future Commission on Justice in the 21st Century. It is
located at Temple University along with a Court Futures Studies
Gopher that serves as a. repository of information. 75
When it comes to futures activities, the state courts have prov-
en themselves to be laboratories of imagination in the best sense of
that Holmes-Brandeis federalism metaphor: state courts have acted
responsibly to prepare for what is ahead and have demonstrated an
admirable willingness to be bold and adventuresome. 76
H. THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
The situation in the federal courts today is relatively unstable.
By comparison to the state courts, the future of the federal courts
is far less certain and less predictable. Perhaps because of this,
federal courts appear to be substantially less future-oriented than
the state courts. The big reason for the first conclusion of instabili-
ty and uncertainty is that Congress simply does not know what it
is doing so far as the issue of "federalization" is concerned. There
are additional reasons having to do with jurisdiction, procedure,
and structure. The second conclusion, about the lack of focus on
the future, may be based on an unfair comparison between, on the
one hand, the fifty independent and separate state judiciaries which
guarantee variety and, on the other hand, the monolithic federal
judiciary which is characterized by one legislature, one supreme
court, and one administrative organization. The federal judiciary is
further complicated by the tradition of decentralization and autono-
my which, notwithstanding John Donne, encourages each federal
judge to be an island."7
175. To subscribe by modem, send mail to LISTSERV@TEMPLEVM.B1TNET or
LISTSERV@VM.TEMPLE.EDU. In the body of the message, write "SUBFUTUREL." If
you encounter problems, contact Judge Klein at V5444E@TEMPLEVM.BITNET or
V5441E@VM.TEMPLE.EDU; his "snail" mail address is 215 One E. Penn Square, Phila-
delphia, PA 19107.
176. The metaphor, often used by Justices Brandeis and Holmes, has become part of the
vocabulary of judicial federalism. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing states as laboratories for social and
economic experiments); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) (describing the Court's hesitation to quash social experimentation by states).
177. For example, when various amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
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A. Federalization
The big story now and in the future for the federal courts is
"federalization." In a new monograph published by the Federal
Judicial Center that is the single best treatment of the arguments,
Judge Schwarzer and his coauthor define the problem as "the ex-
tension of federal court jurisdiction to civil claims and criminal
prosecutions that could be maintained in state courts."'' The is-
sue is complicated and multiphasic: 79
It is beyond argument that, for a variety of reasons,
Congress has increasingly looked to the federal courts as
the place to attack problems it regards as having national
significance. Congress has created new rights of action and
remedies, many of which touch areas traditionally covered
by state law; and it has enacted criminal statutes opening
the federal courts to the prosecution of offenses that tradi-
tionally would have been brought in state courts. Similarly,
the executive branch has increasingly prosecuted in federal
court offenses that could have been prosecuted in state
court. The bar, for its part, jealously protects its access to
went into effect on December 1, 1993, each district court was accorded authority to abro-
gate or modify the amendments in several particulars. By a vote of the district judges, the
Northern District of Texas decided not to exercise this authority uniformly within the
district. Rather, the district court entered an order that provided in part: "Each judge will
apply the amended Federal Rules in the manner the judge deems appropriate and will
provide the parties with appropriate notice regarding how the judge intends to apply the
amended rules." Applicability of the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the North-
ern District of Texas, LUBBOCK LAW NOTEs, Jan. 1994, at 1, 6 (quoting Northern District
of Texas' Special Order No. 2-12 on Dec. 21, 1993). This had the effect of rendering the
uniform, national rules of procedure into judge-specific regulations. See DONNA STIENSTRA,
IMPLEMENTATION OF DisCLosuRE IN FEDERAL DIsTRICr CouRTs, wITH SPECIFIC ATTEN-
TION TO SELECTED COURTS' RESPONSES TO SELECTED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26 (Fed. Jud. Cir. ed., 1994) (describing lack of compliance with
amended Rule 26 by federal courts).
178. WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (Fed. Jud. Ct'. ed., 1994).
179.
The case for deregulation and devolution to state and local authorities
often depends on the purpose of a regulatory scheme. Some regulatory schemes
are designed to promote economic goals; some are redistributive; others are
designed to protect rights. Some regulatory programs are also intended to shape
preferences, to reflect the outcome of deliberative process among the citizenry
or representatives, or to promote noncommodity or public values.
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 507
(1987).
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the federal courts. And state officials are watching with
mixed emotions, concerned about the impact of these trends
on the stature and independence of state courts but also
conscious of the resulting relief afforded state court dock-
ets. 80
The debate over federalization is part of a larger debate over
the proper or ideal role of the federal courts under the Constitu-
tion. The 1969 study of judicial federalism by the prestigious
American Law Institute attempted a comprehensive approach based
on "rational principle.''. In its 1990 Final Report, the Federal
Courts Study Committee attempted "a principled allocation of juris-
diction."'' Over the years, numerous academic critics have at-
tempted to articulate some "grand unified theory" against which to
measure existing and proposed federal jurisdiction." 3 One attempt
at a comprehensive approach would analyze federal court jurisdic-
tion against the following criteria: (1) facilitating state-federal
cross-pollination; (2) maintaining the autonomy of the two judicial
sovereigns; (3) preserving some degree of litigants' choice; (4)
180. SCHWARz & WHEELER, supra note 178, at 3.
181. AMERICAN LAW INsTrrrTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURT 6 (1969).
182. FEDERAL CoURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COM-
MrruE 35 (1990).
183.
We began this article with the intent of constructing an ideal model
of federal jurisdiction for Congress to use in allocating judicial resources. After
further consideration we concluded that this is not a fruitful approach and,
indeed, that the common assumption that there is an objectively "correct" model
of federal jurisdiction misconceives the problem. There are objectively identifi-
able outer constitutional limits on federal jurisdiction-the limits established in
Article Ell of the United States Constitution. But these are extremely permissive,
and no one contends that federal jurisdiction should extend that far. Within the
limits of Article Il, however, the Constitution establishes no objectively "cor-
rect" role for the lower federal courts. On the contrary, largely because they
could not agree on what role the federal courts should play, the framers of the
Constitution left such questions to Congress, essentially making the lower feder-
al courts a resource to be used as Congress deems necessary.
The decisions Congress makes in this regard reflect important value
choices and have significant political consequences. . . . History thus under-
scores that any model identifying the "proper" role of federal courts has ines-
capable and far-reaching substantive implications, and, as a result, an unavoid-
able political dimension. Defining the role of the federal courts is not a scien-
tific inquiry.
Erwin Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REv. 67, 75-76.
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achieving litigation efficiency; (5) assuring fundamental fairness;
(6) restraining the judicial branch within the judicial role; and (7)
expecting an overall coherence and logical consistency of jurisdic-
tional principles. 4
However, these are all more descriptive than prescriptive. None
of them has the force of must. Rather, they are all merely oughts
of gentle persuasion. Issues of federal court versus state court
jurisdiction are best understood to be issues of power. The demar-
cation of federal court jurisdiction is given over to the Con-
gress. 8 ' Federal jurisdiction is not law.'86 It is politics. General
lessons for the future can be gleaned from the history, tradition,
and precedents of federal jurisdiction. 7
Henry J. Friendly, learned judge and federal courts scholar,
described the reality of federal court jurisdiction as existing be-
tween two extreme philosophies.'88 The minimalist philosophy
posits that "the best course is to put trust in the state courts, sub-
ject to appropriate federal appellate review, save for those heads of
jurisdiction, by no means insignificant in case-generating power,
where everything is to be gained and nothing is to be lost by
granting original jurisdiction to inferior federal courts."'8 9 At the
other extreme, the maximalist philosophy "would go to the full
sweep of constitutional power" under Article III because "the fed-
eral courts provide a 'juster justice' than the state courts, [and] the
more cases there [are] in the federal courts, the better."'"
There are valid reasons, now and in the future, for preferring
184. Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State
and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "The Martian Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV.
1769, 1772-85 (1992).
185. See A.E. Dick Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism: On the Need for a
Fundamental Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 19 GA. L. REV. 789, 790-91 (1985)
(analyzing the state sovereignty and separation of powers limits on the power of the Su-
preme Court); H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L.
REv. 633, 635 (1993) (discussing the need for a principled law of federalism); Louise
Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism: Where We Are Now, 19 GA. L. REV. 1075,
1076 (1985) (discussing recent cases which have shifted power from state courts to feder-
al courts).
186. See Gene R. Nichol, Is There A Law of Federal Courts?, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 147,
152 (1993) (discussing the importance, ramifications, and manipulation of federal jurisdic-
tional rules).
187. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THm FEDERAL CoURTS-CRISIS AND REFORM 169-97
(1985) (discussing the theory of federalism and its current problems).
188. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 8-12 (1973).
189. Id. at 8.
190. Id. at 12.
744 [Vol. 45:705
A VIEW TO THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
state government as the locus for public policy. But without a
doubt, the maximalist philosophy has been ascendent in Congress
for the last few decades and one can confidently predict it will
continue to be so in the future. By the count of the Administrative
Office of U.S. Courts, over the last twenty years Congress has
enacted over 200 new laws-202 to be exact-that have multiplied
the workload of the federal courts. 9' There is no end in political
sight. Federalization is characterized by a multiplier effect. Today
there are few areas of primary state concern." Tomorrow there
will be fewer still.'93
Consider the following examples of federalizations that present-
ly are on the horizon: NAFTA/GATr, the Crime Act of 1994,
health care, products liability, and statutory overrulings of the Su-
preme Court.
1. NAFTA/GATT
The increasing globalization of the economy is manifested by
two treaties, one just ratified, one currently being renegotiated.
Their transnational consequences for domestic state and federal law
are noteworthy. '94
After President Clinton signed the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) in December 1992, Congress debated at great
length the treaty's "implications for the economy, unemployment,
and the environment" before eventually enacting wide-ranging
legislation to implement the treaty. NAFTA has created a conti-
191. Legislation Enacted During the Last Two Decades Tending to Increase Judiciary's
Workload, CT. ADMIN. BULL., Sept. 1994, at 16, 16-18. This increase in the number of
laws can be added to the concomitant growth in the size and influence of the federal
government in preexisting areas of federal law and the docket. Steven Flanders, What Do
Federal Courts Do? A Research Note, 5 REv. LrrsG. 199 (1986).
192. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competi-
tion and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZo L.
REv. 759, 759 (1987) ("[Today we are witnessing the promulgation of new types of
federal minimum standards that significantly regulate public corporations and constrain
state law"); Mary E. Kostel, A Public Choice Perspective on the Debate Over Federal
Versus State Corporate Law, 79 VA. L. REv. 2129, 2149-54 (1993) (discussing difficulties
with federal regulation of corporate law).
193. "[Flederal efforts in some areas have been successful, such as in the policing of
racial discrimination, regulating air, water, and other environmental pollution, but have
enjoyed little success in matters of health, education, welfare, housing, child support, and
drug abuse." Patrick E. Higginbotham, Federalism in the Future, in "FDERALISM: THE
SHIFrING BALANCE 55, 61 (Janice C. Griffith ed., 1989).
194. "As our shrinking planet approaches the millennium, one should expect some effort
to put important legal issues in comparative perspective." Friedrich K. Juenger, American
Jurisdiction: A Story of Comparative Neglect, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 23 (1993).
195. Demetrios G. Metropoulous, Constitutional Dimensions of the North American Free
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nental free trade area "covering over 369 million people and
$5,351 billion of gross domestic product," the largest in the
world.' Congress is still considering the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, more commonly referred to as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which has taken
eight years to negotiate, was signed by over 100 nations, and is
about 22,000 pages long. 9 7 It will reduce or eliminate more tar-
iffs and trade barriers than any other compact in world history.
GATT is bigger than NAFTA: it includes more than 100 countries,
covers more products and involves more money. The proposed new
agreement would affect exports and imports in everything imagin-
able in every state.
NAFTA has the potential for creating regulatory gaps in do-
mestic law. Subjects that before the treaty were regulated by feder-
al or state statutes may be effectively deregulated."8 The treaty is
remarkable in the degree of its specificity.' 9 On its face, the trea-
ty provides that governments will continue to wield the sovereign
regulatory powers over the health and safety of workers, the wel-
fare of consumers, and the general environment. But it is under-
stood that NAFTA will have the de jure effect of preempting state
and national laws that have a significant effect on trade.' Fur-
thermore, economic pressures on state governments may well create
a de facto preemption of such measures currently on the books.
States legislatures may deregulate to attract and encourage new
industry and investment and to prevent existing businesses from
relocating. 0'
One of the de jure displacements in NAFTA has to do with
federal court jurisdiction. Under the treaty, a binational dispute
resolution system is substituted for the existing mechanism of fed-
eral regulatory agency action reviewed by the U.S. Courts of Ap-
Trade Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 141, 141 (1994).
196. Id. at 143.
197. Joe Cobb, The Real Threat to U.S. Sovereignty, Heritage Foundation Lecture, No.
497 (Aug. 1, 1994). GATT was later ratified by a lame-duck session of the 103d Con-
gress on December 1, 1994. 140 Cong. Rec. S15379 (1994).
198. See David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies of the
Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 407, 464-65 (1994) (describing two ways that the common market could
effect domestic regulation).
199. Id. at 469.
200. Id. at 465.
201. Id.
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peals.' Setting aside the more immediate constitutional issue un-
der Article I1,23 NAFTA raises profound questions for the future
of constitutional sovereignty in the United States and how these
transnational arrangements will be reconciled to our federalism.2
The treaty's provisions for binational dispute resolution and supra-
national administrative-type appeals are far too elaborate for de-
tailed description here. But the treaty promises to accelerate feder-
alization in many traditionally domestic areas of the law, including
investments, intellectual property, market regulations, and trade
remedies. °"
One of the most controversial aspects of the proposed GATT is
the World Trade Organization (WTO), which presents an even
greater and immediate challenge to existing understandings of sov-
ereignty. Each member nation will have one vote in the WTO,
which, under the GATT agreement, is given exclusive authority to
interpret the treaty and its own power. GATT does not allow reser-
vations. Thus, Congress cannot pass legislation to change the
agreement. Furthermore, a provision obliges each member nation to
ensure conformity of its law, regulations, and administrative proce-
dures to the agreement. Thus, Congress is not given a role to
change domestic laws, federal and state, that contravene the agree-
ment.
Prominent conservative and liberal commentators have ex-
pressed their concern for the diminution of sovereignty involved in
the agreement.' GATT will limit federal sovereignty to the ex-
202. See generally Metropoulos, supra note 195, at 142-49 (describing NAFTA's bina-
tional panel system).
203. See generally id. at 159-68 (concluding that the panel system should be invalidated
because it conflicts with Article I).
204. Id. at 169.
205. See Kristin L. Oelstrom, Note, A Treaty for the Future: The Dispute Settlement
Mechanisms of the'NAFTA, 25 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 783, 783 (1994) (stating that
NAFTA will have "significant ramifications in areas such as market access, investment,
intellectual property, and trade remedies"); see generally David A. Gantz, Resolution of
Investment Disputes Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 10 ARIZ. J. INT'L
& CoMP. L. 335 (1993) (discussing the NAFFA provisions for settlement of investment
disputes); Michael H. Greenberg, Chapter 19 of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement
and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Implications for the Court of Internation-
al Trade, 25 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 37 (1993) (presenting as a positive alternative dis-
pute resolution device the binational dispute provisions in the FTA and NAFTA for
antidumping and countervailing duty determinations); Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Chapter 19 of
the NAFTA: Binational Panels as the Trade Courts of Last Resort, 27 INT'L LAW. 707
(1993) (discussing the functioning and validity of the NAFTA Chapter 19 binational panel
process for antidumping and countervailing duty cases).
206. See David S. Cloud, Critics Fear GATT May Declare Open Season on U.S. Laws,
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
tent that Congress acquiesces. It will limit state sovereignty by
federal preemption of state laws enforced by mechanisms in the
agreement that create a duty of signatory nations to bring into
compliance offending "subfederal" laws. This will also oblige fed-
eral courts to interpret and defend the treaty and the implementing
federal legislation.
Moving past federalization to internationalization of the law has
even more profound implications for the future of constitutional
sovereignty in the United States.2"7 It is one thing to reassign
sovereign power from the state level to the federal level; it is
something altogether different to move it to an international institu-
tion. At the level of international dispute resolution, even the feder-
al judicial branch is one interface removed from decisionmaking
authority. This is a kind of "preemption squared." These treaties
authorize dispute resolution by international entities and the autho-
rization is exclusive of domestic state and federal courts.
Admittedly, I lack the knowledge and sophistication to say
more about the future of international law. To me, international
law today and treaties such as NAFTA and GATT are like a game
of poker in an Old West saloon: the game is about money and
there are guns on the table; everyone expects everyone to cheat
and everyone does; fights always break out. I submit, however, that
the state and federal courts need to be looking over the shoulder of
Congress and the President to understand what cards they are play-
ing and what is at stake in terms of their judicial future. While this
is especially true of the states, this should be a larger concern for
all Americans. Ask the antifederalists what can happen to sover-
eignty when the commerce power is transferred from one level of
government to another.
2. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994
By far, most criminal prosecutions take place in state court."0
CONG. Q., July 23, 1994, at 2005, 2005; David Shribman, GATT: Vilifying the Inscruta-
ble, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 1994, at 3 (identifying Phyllis Schlafly and Ralph Nader as
among those who feel that the WTO would compromise American sovereignty).
207. See Peter du Pont, Federalism in the Twenty-First Century: Will States Exist?, 16
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137, 143 (1992) (stating that GATT proposals superimpose
international norms on states while national laws and norms imposed by federalism are
promulgated by our own government).
208. "Nineteen out of twenty crimes in America are still handled by the States." H.
Scott Wallace, When More is Less: The Drive to Federalize Is a Road to Ruin, 8 CRIM.
JusT. 8 (Fall 1993).
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The historical and traditional understanding is that the police power
to promulgate and enforce substantive criminal law is one of the
primary responsibilities of the sovereign states. The federal role in
criminal law is limited by constitutional design to uniquely federal
interests or policies that are otherwise beyond the states. While
there are no federal common law crimes, federal courts are given
exclusive federal question jurisdiction over all criminal offenses
against the statutes of the United States.'
The Department of Justice and the typical U.S. Attorney's
Office have written prosecution guidelines, often labelled "declina-
tion policies," that describe principles for informed exercise of
federal prosecutorial discretion."' Of course, some offenses are
exclusively federal crimes, much like the exclusive federal question
jurisdiction on the civil side.2 ' For these federal offenses, the is-
sue is not "where" but "whether" to prosecute. Other federal
crimes do not have this exclusivity and the "where" question must
be answered. For some of these, there are "special federal inter-
ests" that create a federal court priority."2 For example, when the
crime is an interstate matter the prosecution favors federal court
because of the nationwide presence and authority of federal law
enforcement agencies and the procedural advantages of preparing
and trying the prosecution. Federal jurisdiction and procedures may
also afford the prosecutor more opportunities to consolidate cases
and offenses than comparable state procedures. Sentencing law
differences, including the federal guidelines and mandatory minima,
play a role in the decision. Finally, political priorities established in
Washington, D.C. dictate that certain prosecutions be filed in feder-
al courts. These include "Operation Triggerlock" (cases dealing
with firearms in violent and drug-related crimes), "Operation
Fasttrack" (cases involving bank fraud, thefts, and embezzlement),
and the savings & loan crisis. The near future likely will bring
such programmatic priorities for health care fraud and environmen-
tal crimes. What are perceived as "big cases," in terms of the harm
or amount of drugs or funds involved, have a unique claim on
209. WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 124-26.
210. John G. Douglas, Deciding Which Cases to Prosecute in Federal Court: The Feder-
al Prosecutor's Perspective (text available with author).
211. Federal offenses include crimes occurring on military installations or other federal
enclaves, national security offenses (espionage), customs and import-export crimes, escapes
from federal prisons, obstruction of justice, and perjury in federal court.
212. These crimes include counterfeiting U.S. currency, threats or assaults on federal
officers, fraud or theft directed at federal agencies and programs, such as Social Security.
7491995]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
federal courts.
Most of these prosecutorial decisions are predictable, but dis-
cretion still exists for determining where a criminal case will be
prosecuted. This often depends on practical realities, including the
relative resources of the Department of Justice and local U.S.
Attorney's office, the agency relations, and forfeiture incentives.
This last incentive, federal forfeiture of assets, is decreased by the
federal authorities sharing the assets seized with their state counter-
parts.
Recently, there has been accelerating congressional momentum
to federalize more areas of traditional state concern with the con-
sequence of shifting large numbers of cases from state dockets to
federal dockets."' This trend is most pronounced in the criminal
law. The trend is attributable to various factors, including the zeal-
ousness of federal prosecutors, the expansiveness with which feder-
al courts have interpreted federal criminal statutes, the urgency of
the states and local governments for federal assistance, and the
resulting congressional-political interest in the criminal justice sys-
tem.214 Further exacerbating the effect of this trend has been an
increase in the overall volume of criminal filings and appeals.
215
213. See SCHWARZER & WHEELER, supra note 178, at 1 (discussing the growing con-
cern among judges and commentators over the trend toward federalization of state crimes
and civil causes of action); see, e.g., Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519,
106 Stat. 3384 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1993)) (federalizing
the traditional state concern of auto theft); Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18
U.S.C. § 43 (Supp. V 1993) (addressing attacks against animal enterprises); Child Support
Recovery Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-521, 106 Stat. 3403 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 18 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1991) and 42 U.S.C. (Supp. In 1991)) (imposing a criminal
penalty for flight to avoid payment of child support); Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. (Supp. I1 1991))
(providing state law enforcement with assistance in establishing drug-free school zones);
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (providing
penalties for fraud and related activities in regards to computers and related devices);
False Identification Crime Control Act of 1982, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028, 1738 (1988) (provid-
ing penalties for crimes involving false identification); Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3568 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.
(1988) and 42 U.S.C. 1988)) (establishing a national system for locating parents and their
children to prevent custody-related kidnappings).
214. See Roger J. Miner, Federal Courts, Federal Crimes, and Federalism, 10 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 117, 117-18 (1987) (listing three reasons for increasing federal court
involvement in criminal prosecutions: desire of state and local governments to receive
federal assistance, congressional interest in new criminal legislation, and broad interpreta-
tions of federal criminal statutes by federal courts); Stanley Marcus, The Federalization of
State Law, PROC. OF THE W. REGIONAL CONF. ON ST.-FED. JUD. RELATIONSHIPS, June 4-
5, 1993, at 74.
215. SCHWARZER & WHEELER, supra note 178, at 3.
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The state justice system funding crisis discussed above is an
additional factor leading to the case shift from state to federal
dockets. The attitude is that the federal prison system is larger and
better funded and more easily expanded than the typical state pris-
on. A state prosecutor is motivated to place new offenders on a
federal track if, as a practical matter, the conviction of one state
prisoner would mean the release of another state prisoner to make
room for the new convict. The sense in the criminal justice system
is that states are unable to build prisons as easily as the federal
government.
Another factor accounting for the state to federal shift that is
obvious, yet has escaped analysis for the most part, is the ever
increasing attorney-power in the federal prosecutorial function. The
Department of Justice itself has experienced personnel increases but
even more noteworthy is the addition in recent years of very large
numbers of Assistant United States Attorneys in the districts. Each
new federal prosecutor position by definition increases the capacity
of the federal system to bring prosecutions. This inevitably increas-
es the potential for federalization through federal prosecutorial
discretion and cooperation with state prosecutors. Furthermore, we
can expect more of this potential to be realized when the an-
nounced justification for the new federal positions is generally to
assist the states to deal with the crime problem and when individu-
al United States Attorneys adopt corresponding local agendas to
coordinate federal prosecutions with state and local officials. Feder-
al-state cooperation and coordination in law enforcement and pros-
ecution more often than not result in more criminal filings in U.S.
district courts. This is not necessarily to criticize these develop-
ments but to point out that their impact on the federalization of the
criminal law is pronounced.
Crime is costly and so is fighting crime. According to official
estimates, the annual cost of crime in the United States is in ex-
cess of $163 billion.16 In the summer of 1994, Congress passed
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 199417
and committed an additional $30 billion over the next four years to
fight crime. The special trust fund established under that act will
216. Pierre Thomas, Beyond Grief and Fear is Crime's Bottom Line, WASH. POST, July
5, 1994, at Al, A6.
217. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). See H.R. CorF. REP. No. 103-711,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (discussing the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994).
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amount to about 2% of the federal budget for the period.2 8
For the states, the new Act is something of a mixed blessing.
The legislation creates large numbers of federal grant programs, but
the state and local governments are expected to come up with
matching funds and eventually take over full funding.29 For the
courts, the Act manifests an "hourglass problem" because "[t]he
crime bill devotes new resources to police and prisons but little to
the court systems that move offenders from arrest to incarcera-
tion."" ° Recognizing that the Act will dramatically increase de-
mands on the judicial system, Congress will make available over
the next five years $200 million for the federal courts and $150
million for the state courts. This is only $350 million out of $30
billion allocated in the Act. 21
The 1994 legislation resembles a nesting doll, as the Act con-
tains multiple independent statutes on divergent topics arranged in
thirty-three sections. As evidence of this diversity, consider the
following examples of federalization of traditional state matters: the
Recreational Hunting Safety and Preservation Act;'m the Senior
Citizens Against Marketing Scams Act;'m  the Missing
Alzheimer's Disease Patient Alert Program; 4 the Motor Vehicle
Theft Prevention Act;' the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act; 6 the
Driver's Privacy Protection Act; 7 the Computer Abuse Amend-
ments Act;22 the Drunk Driving Child Protection Act; 9  and
the Drive-By Shooting Prevention ActY
218. George Hager, The Latest Untouchable Fund, CONG. Q. WKLY, Aug. 6, 1994, at
2252.
219. Holly Idelson, Effects of Costly Crime Bill Will Be Tough to Measure, CONG. Q.
WKLY., Aug. 6, 1994, at 2251.
220. Id. at 2253.
221. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 §§ 190001, 210602.
By comparison, law enforcement will get $8.8 billion for additional police and corrections
will get $7.9 billion for more prisons. David Masci, The Modified Crime Bill, CONG. Q.
WKLY., Aug. 27, 1994, at 2490.
222. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 320801 (codified at
16 U.S.C.A. § 5201 (West Supp. 1994)).
223. Id. § 250001 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2325 (West Supp. 1994)).
224. Id. § 240001 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 14181 (West Supp. 1994)).
225. Id. § 220001 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 511 (West Supp. 1994)).
226. Id. § 170101 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (West Supp. 1994)).
227. Id. § 300001 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2721 (West Supp. 1994)).
228. Id. § 290001 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West Supp. 1994)).
229. Id. § 100001 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 13 (West Supp. 1994)).
230. Id. § 60008 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 36 (West Supp. 1994)).
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More to the point, there are at least seven particular features of
the 1994 legislation that are sure to act like magnets to attract state
cases to federal courts: (1) new harsher provisions relating to drug
offenses; ' (2) new federal offenses for various types of partici-
pation in criminal street gangs, including a provision that permits
juveniles as young as thirteen years old to be prosecuted as adults
for certain serious violent felonies; 2 (3) the so-called "three
strikes and you're out" provision, which mandates a life sentence
for conviction of a third violent felony; 3 (4) new federal bans
on assault weapons; 4 (5) the federal sentencing enhancement for
hate crimes;' 5 (6) the new Violence Against Women Act that
makes it a federal crime to commit certain interstate acts of do-
mestic violence and creates a civil remedy for gender-motivated
violence;1 6 and (7) the sixty new federal death penalties that in-
lude carjacking and drive-by shootings when a death occurs.37
One of the major themes in the debate leading up to the 1994
Act and the legislation itself is the emphasis on the role and re-
sponsibility of the federal government for dealing effectively with
the drug abuse problem. Certainly, the enforcement of the drug
laws is a shared responsibility of both state and federal courts. 3
In the future, however, the federal courts may become a casualty
of the so-called "war on drugs," which has as one of its chief
strategies the federalization of many drug offenses that used to be
handled in state courts. This has led Chief Justice Rehnquist to ex-
press his concern that federal courts were being transformed into
"national narcotics courts." 39
Drug cases not only increase workload. Because of the Speedy
Trial Act," they take precedence and actually displace other cas-
231. Id. §§ 90101-90107 (imposing consecutive sentences for drug related offenses).
232. Id. § 140001 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West Supp. 1994)).
233. Id. § 70001 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 3559 (West Supp. 1994)).
234. Id. § 110101 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 921 (West Supp. 1994)).
235. Id. § 280003 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 994 (West Supp. 1994)) (providing en-
hancement of not less than three offense levels).
236. Id. § 40001 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2247-2248 (West Supp. 1994)).
237. Id. § 60001 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.A.).
238. McKusick, supra note 27, at 13; J. Clifford Wallace, Tackling the Caseload Crisis,
A.B.A. J., June 1994, at 88.
239. Rehnquist, supra note 27. Consider some of the Chief Justice's statistics. Between
1980 and 1990, total criminal case filings increased 60% in the federal courts; drug cases
increased 290%. The criminal docket today is about 15% of the district courts' caseload.
But time and motion studies have determined that criminal cases occupy approximately
48% of the federal judge's time spent judging (more than 80% in some districts).
240. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1974).
7531995]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
es on the civil docket. Another part of the problem is the mandato-
ry minimum sentences required under the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984.24' These have fueled the trend toward federalizing what
used to be state possession crimes. If the federal statutes are rela-
tively "tougher," then state and federal prosecutors are more likely
to exercise their charging discretion to funnel more and more drug
cases into federal courts.
The familiar overlap of prosecutorial responsibility in the drug
laws is growing in other areas of criminal law, particularly gun
control and violent crime which are becoming a national problems
requiring federal solutions. The 1994 Act is the latest in the series
of federal statutes that continue the trend of federalizing the crimi-
nal law. Perhaps as a result of the difficulty of passage and the
need for compromise, the new Act has something for everyone.242
This is not a strength. No one knows if the legislation will reduce
violent crime and the impact will be difficult to measure. One of
the most likely consequences of legislation and programs such as
the 1994 Crime Control Act will be even greater public expecta-
tions for federal solutions to the serious problems facing society.
This sort of legislation assigns a secondary role to the states, to act
as grantees and agents of the congressional principal.24 Federal
judges themselves are deeply concerned about these legislative
developments.2" Like it or not, the future promises even more of
this federalization.24
241. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 (1984).
242. Not everyone is impressed:
I feel a lot safer now that the crime bill has passed. Now it will be
a federal crime punishable by death to commit murder in an airport, unless the
murder is committed during a labor dispute. At long last, America will have a
Drug Free Truck Stop Act and a Missing Alzheimer's Disease Patient Alert
Program. Crooks will spend an extra year in jail for offenses involving the
Congressional Medal of Honor. And genocide-yes, genocide-will be a federal
crime punishable by death or a fine not to exceed $1 million, or both. Even if
it is committed during a labor dispute.
Michael Grunwald, The Crime Behind the Crime Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 1, 1994, at
61.
243. An example is the appropriation of nearly $10 billion for new state prison con-
struction that is made available only to states that adopt tough "truth-in-sentencing" laws.
Masci, supra note 221, at 2490.
244. See Henry J. Reske, A Bigger Role for the Feds, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1994, at 14, 14
(pointing out the increased strain on the federal courts due to the increase in the number
of federal crimes); Henry J. Reske, Judges Irked by Tough-On-Crime Laws, A.B.A. J.,
Oct. 1994, at 18, 18 (criticizing the federal imposition of sentencing guidelines and man-
datory minimum sentences).
245. See Wallace, supra note 208, at 8 (noting that criminal legislation is experiencing
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3. Health Care
Congress did not enact a comprehensive federal health care bill
in 1994. But some limited legislation is almost a sure thing before
too long, and there is a strong likelihood that Congress will com-
pletely federalize health care sometime in the future.2' The de-
bate has subsided, but proponents promise to return. 247
The numbers are staggering to contemplate. 2' Adjusting for
inflation, since 1950 health care expenditures have risen each year
by 5.5% overall and 4.1% per capita.249 The proportion of GNP
has tripled since 1950 and expenditures devoted to health care are
projected to reach 15% of GNP in the year 2000."o In 1994,
Americans will spend one trillion dollars on health care, and yet,
according to the Clinton administration's estimates, 37 million
Americans are without health care and an additional 25 million
have inadequate coverage."
Even if there is not federal legislation, we can expect that there
will be more disputes and more litigation as costs of health care
otherwise continue to rise, and individuals, employers, and insurers
try to keep ahead and compete among themselves to avoid higher
costs. 2 Furthermore, it should be noted that the health care field
increasing momentum in Congress). There are no constitutional limits left. See James M.
Maloney, Shooting for an Omnipotent Congress. The Constitutionality of Federal Regula-
tion of Intrastate Firearms Possession, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1795, 1816-27 (1994) (argu-
ing that Congress should have to establish only a minimal nexus to interstate commerce
in order to regulate criminal activity pursuant to the Commerce Clause). But see United
States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1342 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding the Gun-Free School Zones
Act unconstitutional because it could not be passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause),
cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994).
246. See David S. Cloud, Mitchell Trying to Find a Graceful Exit, CONG. Q., Sept. 24,
1994, at 2693 (noting the congressional efforts to overcome the stalled health care legis-
lation agenda); Alissa J. Rubin, Prospects for Major Overhaul Fade as Senate Goes
Home, CONG. Q., Aug. 27, 1994, at 2486 (reporting Democratic conciliations that would
move the stalled health care debate away from universal coverage towards a more broadly
supported plan).
247. Alissa J. Rubin, Overhaul Issue Unlikely to Rest in Peace, CONG. Q., Oct. 1,
1994, at 2797. See also Peter MacPherson, Some Modest Proposals on Republican Table,
CONG. Q., Dec. 31, 1994, at 3611 (stating that Republicans' agenda includes health care
reform proposals).
248. See Fuller & Boersema, supra note 16, at 223 (noting the steady increase in health
care costs, from $559 billion in 1988 to $685 billion in 1990).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. WH1TE HousE DOMESTIC PoLicY COUNCIL, HEALTH SECURrrY-THm PRESIDENT'S
REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE at xiii (1993).
252. Fuller & Boersema, supra note 16, at 225.
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already has been federalized to a large degree 53 Medicare pro-
vides health insurance for some 33 million Americans, most of
whom are over the age of 65."54 Medicaid is a joint federal-state
program that subsidizes the elderly and the poor through a publicly
financed program. 5 The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) establishes administrative and substantive requirements
for the private administration of employee benefit plans, particular-
ly pensions, with a few applications to health insurance that have
been interpreted to preempt some state legislative efforts to regulate
health care. 6 Most recently, the Americans With Disabilities Act
of 1990, which protects handicapped persons from discrimination,
has been interpreted to preempt state health programs that establish
priorities for coverage. 7
The federalism implications to be expected from greater feder-
alization of health care ought to be obvious.' 5 State governments
act as major regulators, employer-payers, and providers of health
care. Often overlooked is the fact that the states at times operate as
public interest groups, modem Madisonian factions, lobbying Con-
gress. Some states, in fact, have attempted a comprehensive reform
of the health care system. 9 Thus, the stakes are high for every-
one concerned: the states, the federal government, and individual
Americans. Federalizing 15% of the GNP will be a large and com-
plicated undertaking.
No one can be sure what, if any, federal program will be en-
acted in the near or distant future. We can be sure of the fact that
any plan will create a new federal bureaucracy.' The Clinton
administration put forward a 1462-page plan that called for a co-
lossal bureaucracy.' Former Senate Majority Leader Mitchell cut
that down to a mere 1410 pages, with dozens of new federal and
253. See Wendy E. Parmet, Regulation and Federalism: Legal Impediments to State
Health Care Reform, 19 Am. J. L. & MED. 121, 130-44 (1993) (surveying existing feder-
al health care laws).
254. Id. at 130-31.
255. Id. at 132-33.
256. Id. at 132-40.
257. Id. at 140-42.
258. See Fernando R. Laguarda, Federalism Myth: States as Laboratories of Health
Care Reform, 82 GEO. L.J. 159, 160-61 (1993) (believing states should serve as health
reform "laboratories").
259. Id. at 179-89 (describing proposed statewide plans for Hawaii and Oregon).
260. Dana Priest, The Side Effects of Health Care Reform, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY.,
Aug. 15, 1994, at 31.
261. WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 251.
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state agencies.262 These new agencies "would have untested au-
thority to centralize, reorganize, monitor and enforce the way medi-
cal care is bought, sold, and to a lesser extent practiced in this
country." '63 These two proposals and the other proposals being
debated have in common the imposition of new responsibilities on
the state governments.2 Indeed, one of the most difficult issues
facing the Congress is just how much regulatory authority should
be imposed on the states and what sort of program diversity should
be allowed.' One commentator has analyzed the various propos-
als and found seven ways the plans arguably intrude on state sov-
ereignty: (1) federal regulation of employee benefits of nonfederal
public sector employees; (2) unfunded federal mandates for state
regulation; (3) mandated state regulation and threatened preemption
upon state default; (4) mandated state regulation and threatened the
states surcharges for federal regulation upon state default; (5) man-
dated state regulation and threatened federal tax on private actors
upon state default; (6) imposition of federal taxes on the private
sector upon a failure of the state to regulate; and (7) proffered fi-
nancial incentives for state regulation.'
Finally to be considered is the huge implication for court case-
loads from a new program of this magnitude.2 7 Suppose there
are four billion claims in a given year. We might expect 90% of
those to be routinely handled. That leaves only 10%, or 40 million
claims that are denied and then contested within the newly created
bureaucracy. Suppose only 1 out of 40, a conservative estimate,
survive agency review in the form of some petition for judicial
review. This means 40,000 new court proceedings each year in the
form of appeals from agency action. That is close to the total num-
ber of appeals currently decided annually by the U.S. courts of
appeals.
Both the Conference of Chief Justices and the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States separately considered and adopted four
principles for health care reform as it affects the court system:
262. S. 2357, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (short title: "Health Security Ace,).
263. Priest, supra note 260, at 31.
264. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994).
265. Candace Hoke, Constitutional Impediments to National Health Reform: Tenth
Amendment and Spending Clause Hurdles, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 489, 499 (1994).
266. Id. at 501-03.
267. Telephone Interview with Professor John B. Oakley, University of California at Los
Angeles (Aug. 10, 1994).
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1. Full exhaustion of administrative remedies for bene-
fit denial claims should be required.
2. Following exhaustion of administrative remedies,
and consistent with general principles of federalism, state
courts should be the primary forum for review of benefit
denial claims.
3. Traditional discrimination claims should be handled
differently from benefit denial claims based on issues such
as medical necessity.
4. To ensure the effectiveness of the enforcement
provisions of any health care legislation, it is critical that
sufficient resources be provided to the responsible adminis-
trative and judicial entities.26
These principles are intended to be limited to court jurisdiction and
procedures and are not addressed to the substantive policy issues
involved in health care reform.269 The jurisdictional preference for
the state courts is recognition that "state courts possess the capabil-
ity and practical expertise to fully and fairly adjudicate health care
cases based on a long tradition of resolving medical liability and
health insurance cases." '27 Furthermore, "the geographical distribu-
tion of state courts provides greater accessibility for adjudication of
claims and affords greater control at the state level to ensure that
local plans fully reflect and meet local needs.""27 It remains to be
seen if Congress will listen to the advice of the judges and adhere
to these principles.272 Finally, it should be noted that federal re-
form of state medical malpractice law is a significant part of the
larger debate over health care reform.273 All of the majority pro-
posals have provisions about the subject, although there is great
variety in the proposals over such details as caps on noneconomic
damages, limits on attorneys' contingent fees, alternative dispute
268. Judicial Conference Adopts Principles for Health Care Reform, THE TIERD
BRANCH, Aug. 1994, at 1.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 2.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 1 (explaining that the House Judiciary Committee marked up a portion
of the Health Security Act and approved an amendment that only partially embraced the
principles).
273. See generally Julie Cohen, Tort Reform in Play in Health Debate, LEGAL TIMES,
Aug. 22, 1994, at 1, 8, 11 (using federal reforms to preempt state liability law is contro-
versial).
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resolution, and preemption.
4. A Federal Products Liability Law
Product safety law is a creation of both federal agency regula-
tion and state common law tort. Federal law currently preempts
state products liability law in a large number of cases because
"[flederal agencies now regulate the manufacture, design, and label-
ing of hundreds of consumer products." '274 Consider just a few
examples from everyday life: the Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission promulgates standards for a number of consumer prod-
ucts;275 the National Highway Transportation Safety Administra-
tion develops safety standards for automobiles;276 the Food and
Drug Administration regulates drugs and food labeling;2' the De-
partment of Agriculture regulates food production and market-
ing;27 and Congress imposes statutory requirements for labeling
tobacco products and alcohol.279
Proposals for a comprehensive federal products liability statute
that would preempt state common law have been before the Con-
gress since 1979."8 In 1977, a Task Force of the Department of
Commerce issued a report concluding that business and legal con-
cerns about the state tort systems were well-founded: uncertainty
and diversity among the states' laws increased costs of insurance
and litigation costs."' Since then, consumer groups and business
interests have been debating proposals alongside lawyers and schol-
ars. 2 In 1993 the Senate ignored the proposal for the tenth year
in a row."a But the shrinking margin of opposition has fortified
the hardcore powerful supporters of the measure." The current
274. Richard C. Ausness, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Doctrines, 44
S.C. L. REV. 187, 189 (1993) (citing Barbara L. Atwell, Products Liability and Preemp-
tion: A Judicial Framework, 39 BUFF. L. REV. 181, 181 (1991)).
275. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051, 2056, 2058 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
276. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1420 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
277. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-394 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
278. 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-470, 601-695 & 1031-56 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
279. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341, 4401-4408 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 27 U.S.C. §§ 213-
219a (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
280. Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liabil-
ity Actions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1121, 1122 n.4 (1988).
281. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCTS LIABIuT
FINAL REPORT (1977).
282. Diane E. Mitts, Note, The Products Liability Crisis: A Federal Statutory Solution,
1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 757, 758.
283. Theodore B. Olson, The Parasitic Destruction of America's Civil Justice System, 47
SMU L. REV. 359, 367 (1994).
284. Mark A. Hoffman, Product Liability Reform Bill Killed: But Backers Point to
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Congress has such a bill before it. 5 The question is not if there
will be federal legislation, but when. The answer appears to be
within the future contemplated in this paper.
Just what will be included in the federal statute is a more
difficult prediction. The latest bill fully preempts state products
liability law but denies any jurisdiction to federal courts. 6 It sets
forth expedited settlement procedures, including ADR and offer of
judgment rules.287 Issues of seller liability, punitive damages, and
time limits on liability are also provided. 8 There are an esti-
mated 40,000 products liability suits each year that would be cov-
ered by any federal legislation.289
To be sure, there are public policy issues of certainty and uni-
formity in this area of the law; however, any "[p]roposal ... that
preempt[s] an area of traditional state concern should bear a heavy
burden of justification for overriding state autonomy."2" But here,
too, the effect of the globalization of the economy will be felt on
domestic law.
5. Statutory Overrulings of the Supreme Court
A rather fascinating recent development fits here in the discus-
sion of federalization of the law: attempts by Congress to overrule
constitutional holdings of the Supreme Court by passing statutes.
The hornbook proposition, of course, is that Congress always has
the last word on what a statute means.29' If the courts, state or
federal, interpret a federal statute in a manner not to the liking of
Shrinking Margin of Opposition, Bus. INS., Sept. 14, 1992, at 1.
285. The proposal is known as the Product Liability Fairness Act, S. 687, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993); see Robert J. Samuelson, Lawyer Heaven, WASH. POST WKLY., June 27,
1994, at 28 (discussing reaction of legal community to Product Liability Fairness Act).
286. S. 687, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Samuelson, supra note 285, at 28.
290. Harvey S. Perlman, Products Liability Reform in Congress: An Issue in Federalism,
48 OHIo ST. LJ. 503, 507 (1987).
291. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Inter-
pretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (examining the impetus for and effect of
congressional overriding of Supreme Court decisions through revision of statutes); Abner J.
Mikva & Jeff Bleich, When Congress Overrules the Court, 79 CAL. L. REv. 729 (1991)
(comparing Congress' recent overruling of the Supreme Court through the 1991 Civil
Rights Act to similar historical congressional overrulings); Michael E. Solimine & James
L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Interpre-
tations, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 425 (1992).
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Congress, then Congress simply can amend the statute to disap-
prove of the courts' handiwork. At times, however, Congress has
attempted to have the last word on constitutional issues as well by
passing statutes with the intended effect of undoing constitutional
interpretations made by the Supreme Court."
The latest example of this technique is the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993.293 With this act, Congress invoked the
power of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to disapprove of
the Supreme Court's holding in Employment Division v. Smith,294
the 1990 peyote case. Utilizing a test created by earlier Supreme
Court precedents, the statute dictates a less deferential compelling
interest test of strict scrutiny, even though the Supreme Court
applied a lower, more deferential standard of judicial review in
Smith.295 Technically, Congress did not overrule the Court's deci-
sion. That power does not exist except through Article V. What
Congress did with this statute was to create a new federal statutory
right or cause of action, enforceable in state or federal court, after
the Court had refused to find it in the Constitution. Statutes such
as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, therefore, are a variation
on the federalization theme: the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Constitution is the occasion for Congress to enact federal legis-
lation ratcheting up individual rights.
If the Supreme Court upholds this legislative technique, we can
expect similar federal statutes in the future. Consider two illustra-
tive possibilities. A bill currently before Congress, entitled the
Freedom of Choice Act,2' would restore, codify, and arguably
292. See Mark E. Herrman, Note, Looking Down From the Hill: Factors Determining
Success of Congressional Efforts to Reverse Supreme Court Interpretations of the Constitu-
tion, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 543, 545 (1992) (examining the methods used by Con-
gress to respond to the Court and the Court's acceptance or rejection of those methods).
293. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
294. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that laws not aimed at religion, but nonetheless
having the effect of prohibiting the exercise of religion, are constitutional under the Free
Exercise Clause).
295. This compelling interest test was derived by Congress from Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). For a description and
critique of Smith and of congressional response to Smith, see Douglas Laycock, The Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration'Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221, 231. See also Rex E. Lee, The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative Choice and Judicial Review, 1993 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 73, 85; Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional
Rights, Can the Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1029, 1033 (1993).
296. S. 25, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). For background information on and a consti-
tutional analysis of the Freedom of Choice Act, see Douglas A. Axel, Note, The Constitu-,
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broaden, the Supreme Court's holding in Roe v. Wade,2' with the
effect of disapproving the Court's decisions since Roe that have
narrowed and limited that 1973 holding.298 The measure would
prohibit virtually every state regulation of abortion.2' Another bill
that was introduced a year ago would have overruled the Supreme
Court's 1989 decision invalidating Richmond, Virginia's affirmative
action program for minority business set-asides in government con-
struction contracts. 3' ° The theory of this bill was that Congress
has power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to do
more itself,31 and the Section 5 power includes the authority to
require state and local governments to do more than what the
Supreme Court requires the state and local governments to do
under the Equal Protection Clause.3"e Presumably, Congress could
invoke this power to rr 'ndate affirmative programs that are neither
required under the Constitution nor assented to by the state and
local governments. 3 Considering the federal legislature's track
record with respect to federalism, one would not expect Congress
to exercise this power and enact a new federalism statute restoring
greater sovereignty to the states.3 4
B. Jurisdiction, Procedure, and Organization
Federal court jurisdiction, procedure, and organization will re-
main much the same in the future. The future will present fewer
legislative surprises in these related procedural areas than we can
expect from Congress on the substantive side just described.3 5
tionality of the Freedom of Choice Act of 1993, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 641 (1994).
297. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
298. Cases having this narrowing effect on Roe include Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) and Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
For additional discussion on the narrowing effects on Roe, see Axel, supra note 296, at
642.
299. S. 25, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 3700, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
300. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
301. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
302. See 135 CONG. REc. S7303-08 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1989) (discussing S. 1234, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) and designating certain areas as high intensity drug trafficking
areas in part because stopping the flow of drugs is a national, not a local, problem).
303. See Linda P. Campbell, States Fear More -Issues Becoming a Federal Case, Cm.
TRIB., July 15, 1990, at C5 (discussing the reactions of state and local governments to
the Metro Broadcasting case).
304. But see Robert H. Freilich, A Proposed Congressional "Statute of Federalism," 19
URB. L. 539, 551 (1987) (asserting that Congress must pass a statute of federalism now
"[w]hile interest is high and the need great").
305. Without further attribution, this discussion relies on Thomas E. Baker, A Catalogue
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1. Federal Questions
Federal question jurisdiction is at the "core of modem federal
court jurisdiction."3" More than half of the cases brought in fed-
eral court each year are federal question cases. 7 Many of the
justifications offered for this jurisdiction revolve around a mistrust
of state courts." 8 The fear is that state courts might misapply
federal law due to a lack of familiarity or sympathy with federal
policies. Another justification historically offered for federal ques-
tion jurisdiction is uniformity in the national law. However, effi-
ciency might have been sacrificed in the attempt to achieve unifor-
mity. It is not readily apparent that the Supreme Court has an
easier time supervising the 94 districts and 13 courts of appeals
than the 50 state supreme courts.
Federal courts can have exclusive jurisdiction over federal
question cases or they can have jurisdiction concurrent with the
state courts. In practice, most federal question cases involve con-
current jurisdiction. 3°1 There is one general federal question juris-
diction statute,310 and there are numerous special federal question
jurisdiction statutes, some of which repeat the "arising under"
terminology."' Between 1875 and 1980, the general federal ques-
tion jurisdiction statute carried with it an amount in controversy
requirement." 2 During that period, the special federal question
statutes without the amount requirement were more significant' 3
of Judicial Federalism in the United States, 45 S.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 1995) (detailing
conflicts between the state and national judicial branches).
306. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 252 (2d ed. 1994).
307. WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 101 n.3.
308. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 181, at 168 (arguing that at least some
federal question cases should not be left to state courts to further interests of uniformity
and "prompt vindication" of federally guaranteed rights).
309. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1343 (1988) (granting federal courts concurrent juris-
diction over diversity of citizenship actions and civil rights actions); Tafflin v. Leevitt,
493 U.S. 455, 467 (1990) (holding state courts have concurrent jurisdiction under federal
anti-racketeering statutes).
310. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
311. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333 (admiralty), 1337 (commerce), 1338 (patents), 1339 (postal mat-
ters), 1343 (civil rights), 1344 (election disputes), 1352 (federal bonds) (1988).
312. See WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 190-95 (explaining the history of the amount in
controversy requirement). A few special federal question statutes still have an amount in
controversy requirement. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(A)-(B) (1988) (setting the
amount in controversy requirement for consumer actions brought in federal courts at
$50,000 with a requirement that each individual claim have an amount in controversy of
at least $25).
313. WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 190-95.
1995]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Now that there is no amount in controversy required for general
federal questions, logically there are two possible directions for
future congressional reform. Congress could repeal all the special
statutes and leave the general statute as a large gateway into feder-
al court. Alternatively, Congress could repeal the general statute
and preserve the special statutes as windows into federal court. The
latter approach may be more consistent with the legislative intent
behind the federal question scheme which establishes priorities for
specific types of cases with special claims on the federal courts
and treats the general statute as a residual category no longer need-
ed.31
4
If the substantive law is federal, federal question jurisdiction
exists." 5 The United States government is the most frequent liti-
gator in federal courts. Federal courts have jurisdiction over all
federal criminal offenses,316 and the United States is a party in
more than one-fourth of the civil cases in district courts." 7 There-
fore, whenever the law, criminal or civil, is "federalized," the case-
load of federal courts grows proportionally. In the future, as more
and more of every day life comes under the aegis and control of
the federal government, there will be more and more federal cases,
both by category and by number.1
314. See Thomas E. Baker, Thinking About Federal Jurisdiction-Of Serpents and Swal-
lows, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 239, 267-69 (1986) (describing the relevance of special federal
jurisdiction statutes with or without the general federal jurisdiction statute).
315. Judge Posner takes the position: "I suggest that whenever the economic theory of
federalism assigns substantive lawmaking responsibility to the federal government, the
economic theory of federal jurisdiction would assign jurisdiction (whether exclusive or
concurrent is an issue that I will not try to resolve in this talk) to the federal courts."
Richard A. Posner, Toward an Economic Theory of Federal Jurisdiction, 6 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 41, 46 (1982).
316. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1988).
317. WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 126.
318. The categories themselves are growing. What were once more limited forays into
state policy have grown to be almost undefined federal domains, such as antitrust, the
environment, and civil rights. See generally Bruce Babbitt, Federalism and the Environ-
ment: An Intergovernmental Perspective of the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12 ENW'T 847 (1982)
(asserting that state governments should be allowed a larger role in federal environmental
decisionmaking); Suzanne M. Boris, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: A Case
Study, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 877 (1990) (analyzing application of Age Discrimination
in Employment Act that Congress passed to provide older Americans the same employ-
ment protection that others receive under Title VII); Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing the
Jurisdictional Foundation of Antitrust Federalism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 657 (1993)
(urging a return to the federalism debate which prompted passage of the Sherman Act);
John J. Sarno, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Federal Mandate to Create an Inte-
grated Society, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 401, 417 (1993) (stating that the ADA may
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2. Diversity Jurisdiction
Since the Judiciary Act of 1789 was enacted, federal courts
have been afforded original jurisdiction of diversity cases. The
present statute provides for jurisdiction over suits between citizens
of different states or between a citizen of a state and an alien
when the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000."'9 The jurisdic-
tion is concurrent and not exclusive in the federal court. There are
two noteworthy judicially created federalism exceptions: even when
the statutory requirements are satisfied, federal courts will decline
to decide domestic relations cases or cases involving the probate of
estates." Since 1938, federal courts have been obliged to follow
the substantive law of the forum state and the national rules of
procedure in diversity cases."'
The debate over the advisability of diversity jurisdiction goes
back to its inception and shows no sign of abating in the future.
The contemporary debate is highly relevant to the future of the
federal courts.3" The parties to the debate generally have chosen
sides so that state and federal judges and academics"H favor abo-
lition while the practicing lawyers favor retention. The bar has
been successful in persuading Congress to retain diversity jurisdic-
tion. However, the discernible modem trend has been to limit and
reduce the scope of jurisdiction, for example, by raising the thresh-
old jurisdictional amount324 and defining citizenship for corpo-
rations more broadly."H
force a confrontation between Congress and the judiciary to determine the scope of con-
gressional civil rights authority).
319. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988).
320. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992) (thoroughly examining the do-
mestic relations exception); Phillips v. Rogenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1973) (dis-
cussing the scope of these exceptions).
321. See Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rulemaking Procedure, 22
TEx. TECH L. REv. 323, 324-28 (1991) (outlining the history of substantive and procedur-
al law as it applied in federal diversity suits).
322. See F3DERAL. COtRTS STUDY COMm., supra note 36 (analyzing the past and pres-
ent status of the federal courts and making suggestions for the future).
323. "Caveat lector! I am a notorious diversity abolitionist." Thomas E. Baker, Federal
Jurisdiction, 16 T1"x. TECH L. REv. 145, 164 (1985).
324. See Thomas E. Baker, The History and Tradition of the Amount in Controversy
Requirement: A Proposal to "Up the Ante" in Diversity Jurisdiction, 102 F.R.D. 299, 302
(1984) ("As long as we have had federal courts, Congress has used the requirement of an
amount in controversy to limit original and derivative access to the lower federal courts.
Equally constant have been the increases in the fimancial threshold.").
325. WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 163-71 (detailing the history of corporate citizenship);
cf. Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 189 (1990) (providing an in-depth analysis
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Nonetheless, over the last few decades diversity cases still have
accounted for about 20% of the district courts' docket and about
10-14% of the courts of appeals' caseload." In time and motion
studies, diversity cases prove to be more demanding of federal
judicial resources from the standpoint of both judges and juries.3"
The most straightforward argument against diversity jurisdiction is
that these figures disclose a discrete category of cases with a rela-
tively weak claim on federal judicial resources. These cases none-
theless drain resources which are growing increasingly scarce rela-
tive to demand."s Furthermore, administering this jurisdiction is
inherently troublesome and it encroaches on state sovereignty.329
The advantage of having a tactical choice of forums, opponents of
diversity argue, simply has become too costly. Finally, the conse-
quences for the states' courts of abolishing diversity jurisdiction are
not all that significant.33
Politically speaking, none of these arguments really matter. It is
a very safe prediction that diversity jurisdiction will be around a
long time into the future. Based on past congressional responses,
we can expect that the jurisdiction will be curtailed in various
ways short of outright abolition. Odds are, for example, that the
longstanding anomaly that allows an in-state plaintiff to sue in
federal court will be eliminated.33' This will reduce the diversity
caseload by one-third; this would amount to about 16,000 cases
each year at present levels and future projections at a multiple of
that total.332 Congress also might get around to indexing the juris-
dictional amount requirement so that the statutory requirement
automatically keeps up with inflation.333 Like a balloon that bulg-
of corporate citizenship in diversity cases yet noting the Court has "just as firmly resisted
extending that treatment to other entities").
326. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 36, at 423.
327. Id. at 423-24.
328. See id. at 427-29 ("[P]erhaps no other major class of cases has a weaker claim on
federal judicial resources.").
329. See Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the
Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REv. 1671 (1992) (supporting state sovereignty in a dis-
cussion on the federalism issues pervading diversity jurisdiction).
330. Victor Eugene Flango, Changes in Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: Effects on State
Court Caseloads, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 405 (1990); Victor Eugene Flango, How Would
Abolition of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction Affect State Courts?, 74 JUDICATtPRE 35 (1990).
331. See Conference Supports Repeal of In-State Plaintiff Diversity Jurisdiction, THIRD
BRANCH, June 1994, at 4.
332. Id.
333. Cf. Baker, supra note 324, at 325 n.173 (stating a preference for more frequent
congressional readjustments rather than indexing).
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es at the opposite end of where it is squeezed, these curtailments
likely will be more than offset in other areas.
A subcategory of diversity cases promises some far-reaching
reform for federal court jurisdiction in the immediate future, al-
though it is difficult to predict what form it will take. In May
1993, the American Law Institute approved the Proposed Final
Draft of the Complex Litigation Project 334 and proposed it to the
Congress for enactment. It is the culmination of more than eight
years of study and debate and, although there are those who would
criticize the Project,335 the ALI proposal has been described as
"the most innovative, resourceful, and ambitious work ever under-
taken in the United States on the subject of multistate complex
litigation., 36 The ALI proposal would create new statutory stan-
dards for determining when complex litigation should be consoli-
dated and new statutory mechanisms for transferring and consoli-
dating related lawsuits within the federal system, from state courts
to a federal court, from federal courts to a state court, and from
state courts to a state court.33 The ALI Project will influence the
approach courts take to these issues, even if Congress does not
enact the ALI measure.33' But there is a good chance that federal
legislation will be enacted and that it will look something like the
ALI proposal.
The present paper is an inadequate compass within which to
describe in great detail the 700-page ALI proposal, complete with
explanatory comments and reporter's notes.339 There are some di-
gressions beyond even law professors.3 4 What follows, therefore,
is a summary of a summary.34 The concept of complex litigation
broadened over the life of the Project to include related claims
being litigated by multiple parties in multiple fora, often dealing
with difficult issues of causation or events over long periods of
334. AMERICAN LAW INSTTUE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PRoJECT (Proposed Final Draft
1993).
335. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Unfinished Symphony: The Complex Litigation Project
Rests, 54 LA. L. REV. 977 (1994) (enumerating a variety of shortcomings of the project).
336. Symeon C. Symeonides, The ALI's Complex Litigation Project: Commencing the
National Debate, 54 LA. L. REv. 843, 844 (1994).
337. See generally id. (providing an overview and analysis of these proposed mecha-
nisms).
338. Id. at 844-45.
339. See generally Symposium, American Law Institute Complex Litigation Project, 54
LA. L. REV. 833 (1994) (including numerous viewpoints and critiques of the ALI project).
340. The author served as a member of the Consultative Group for the ALI project.
341. Symeonides, supra note 336, at 845-48.
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time. Such litigation can be the result of a single event disaster,
such as an airplane crash, or multiple events over a long period,
such as the asbestos-in-the-workplace cases. These clustered litiga-
tions have the potential for relitigation of identical or nearly identi-
cal issues and require great private and public resources for their
resolution.
Under the ALI proposal, a Complex Litigation Panel of federal
judges will replace the existing Multidistrict Litigation Panel. 42
This Complex Litigation Panel will apply stated criteria for deter-
mining which cases are appropriate for consolidation and transfer.
The Proposed Final Draft provides for different consolidation crite-
ria and different procedures for transfer, depending upon whether
the cases are being transferred and consolidated from multiple
courts to a single court. Possible transfers include federal to feder-
al, state to federal, federal to state, and state to state. 43 A contro-
versial provision would federalize the choice-of-law rules binding
on federal and state transferee courts.3" The ALI's choice of law
rules are so complex and elaborate that "depecage" (the application
of the law of different states to different issues in the same claim)
is predicted to be a common outcome.34
Even critics of the ALI Project, who complain that the propos-
al has too much of the smell of the scholar's lamp, recognize there
is a crying need for a procedure of this kind, if not this scope, and
experts expect that sooner or later Congress will visit the area with
a federal statute.3" If the Congress takes the ALI approach or
something like it, then "the dominant intersystem flow of cases
would be from state courts to federal courts."347 Here again we
see more federalization. The added cases will be highly judge-
intensive, although they have a genuine claim on the national juris-
diction. As for horizontal federalism, the ALI Project finessed the
possibility of state-to-state transfers by urging that the states con-
sider adopting an Interstate Complex Litigation Compact or enact-
342. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1968).
343. Id. at 848-51.
344. Id. at 851-60; P. John Kozyris, The Conflicts Provisions of the ALI's Complex
Litigation Project: A Glass Half Full?, 54 LA. L. REV. 953 (1994).
345. Symeonides, supra note 336, at 860.
346. See, e.g., Gene R. Shreve, Reform Aspirations of the Complex Litigation Project,
54 LA. L. REv. 1139, 1152-53 (1994) (discussing need for reform and predicting Con-
gress will propose reform in this area soon).
347. Herbert P. Wilkins, The ALI's Complex Litigation Project: A State Judge's View,
54 LA. L. REv. 1155, 1157 (1994).
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ing the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act." As for vertical fed-
eralism, there is a dissenting opinion. Even though the American
Bar Association,349 the Federal Courts Study Committee,3 5 and
leading academics support the overall ALI approach to consolidate
proceedings on the federal side, there are cogent constitutional and
practical advantages to consolidate proceedings on the state
side.35" ' Ideally, state court consolidation should be afforded equal
time in the debate. 2 But we should not expect Congress to lis-
ten. 3 The most likely prediction, therefore, is that future federal
legislation will authorize transfer and consolidation of complex
litigation in federal courts. We can only hope that this inevitable
legislation, which would create federal jurisdiction over disasters, is
not a disaster itself.
3. Habeas Corpus
By federal statute, a person convicted of a state crime and held
in state custody can attack the state conviction collaterally in feder-
al court in what is technically a civil suit by alleging that the
state's custody is in violation of the Constitution of the United
States. 4 A federal judge has jurisdiction to order the release of
the state prisoner on this ground. It is an understatement to ob-
serve, "[t]he power of a single federal judge to overturn a decision
affirmed by an entire state court system is troubling to many." '355
For the most part, actual guilt or innocence does not enter into
it.35
6
348. Id. at 1159. For a discussion on the two alternatives for state to state transfer that
the ALI Project suggested, see Edward H. Cooper, Interstate Consolidation: A Comparison
of the Al Project with the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, 54 LA. L. REv. 897
(1994); John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of
Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 411 (1988).
349. Robert A. Sedler & Aaron D. Twerski, The Case Against All Encompassing Feder-
al Mass Tort Legislation: Sacrifice Without Gain, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 76 (1989).
350. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 36, at 44-45.
351. Mark C. Weber, Complex Litigation and the State Courts: Constitutional and Prac-
tical Advantages of the State Forum Over the Federal Forum in Mass Tort Cases, 21
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 215 (1994).
352. Id. at 274. See George T. Conway, III, Note, The Consolidation of Multistate Liti-
gation in State Courts, 96 YALE LJ. 1099, 1100 (1987) (arguing that the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation, which is charged with the task of consolidating federal claims,
should also be given authority to consolidate state proceedings).
353. See H.R. 3406, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (proposing consolidation of federal
proceedings).
354. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1988).
355. CHEmERiNsKY, supra note 306, at 781.
356. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 853 (1993) (holding that claim of actual
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Federal habeas corpus in the past has been a dramatic and
controversial aspect of judicial federalism." 7 The federal jurisdic-
tion "raise[s] basic questions about federalism, separation of pow-
ers, the purposes of the criminal justice system, and the nature of
litigation." '  Recent Supreme Court decisions have displayed a
narrowing attitude toward statutory jurisdiction and procedures. For
example, an unsuccessful petitioner may not bring a subsequent
petition unless there is demonstrated both "good cause" for not
having raised the issue earlier and "prejudice" from not having
decided the issue or actual innocence. 59 Also, in an important
decision, the Court held that habeas petitioners may only assert
rights that existed and were articulated by the courts as of the time
of their convictions." The Supreme Court itself now emphasizes
the potential for friction between state and federal courts, the soci-
etal costs in terms of judicial finality, and the importance of effi-
ciency in the criminal justice system.36
From the federal court side, the concern with caseload often is
expressed, particularly since the constitutionalization of criminal
procedure virtually guarantees that multiple federal issues can be
raised in every state prosecution. Commentators have noted the
"needle in the haystack" problem in that very few of the petitions
are granted.36 A recent study completed by the National Center
for State Courts sheds light on some longstanding issues concern-
ing the jurisdiction.363 The results of this thorough study of feder-
innocence based on newly discovered evidence is not ground for federal habeas relief);
Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38
U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970); Jill Hanson Reinmuth, When Actual Innocence Is Irrelevant:
Federal Habeas Relief for State Prisoners After Herrera v. Collins, 69 WASH. L. REv.
279 (1994); Jordan Streiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REV. 303
(1993).
357. See generally Evan Tsen Lee, The Theories of Federal Habeas Corpus, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 151 (1994) (discussing and analyzing various theories that have been proposed in
the federal habeas corpus arena).
358. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 306, at 781.
359. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977).
360. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 288 (1989).
361. Id. at 309-10.
362. "Comprehensive statistics are lacking, but those that are available indicate that the
writ is granted in at most 4% of the cases in which it is sought, and in many of these
cases it is possible for the state to retry the petitioner." WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 366.
363. NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS (1994); see also Richard Faust et al., The Creat Writ in Action: Empirical Light
on the Federal Habeas Corpus Debate, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 637 (1990-
1991) (analyzing the results of a similar study, also funded by the State Justice Institute,
covering cases filed in the Southern District of New York, and focussing on issues relat-
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al and state petitions from four states (Alabama, California, New
York and Texas) during the period from 1990 to 1992 disclose that
federal courts rarely grant relief. Out of 1626 federal petitions filed
in the surveyed states, only 17-or about 1 out of 100-were
granted."' The claims presented to federal courts are similar to
those raised in state courts,365 and the claim most often raised is
ineffective assistance of counsel. 6" A relatively small and declin-
ing percentage of prisoners file petitions, but some file multiple
times 67 The typical petitioner is serving a lengthy sentence for a
serious offense.36 Although petitions do not usually demand a
great deal of judge-time, they place significant time demands on
law clerks and staff attorneys.369 The study supports the tradition-
al criticism that federal review of state convictions is a duplication
of effort.3 7' Finally, the study validated consensus opinion that re-
form is needed, but concluded that meaningful reform of federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction will not likely be politically possible
until death penalty issues are unpacked from the debate.371
Recent proposals for reform of the death penalty procedures
provide a view on the future of federal habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion.3" In 1989, the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Cor-
ing to the debate over federal courts' habeas corpus jurisdiction).
364. NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 363, at 61.
365. See id. at 58 (presenting table showing, by percentages, the types of claims raised
in state and federal courts in the four surveyed states).
366. Id. at 45. See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assis-
tance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679 (1990)
(surveying the law of ineffective assistance of counsel and arguing for a reform that
would allow review of defaulted claims only where there is a reasonable possibility of
overturning an unjust conviction).
367. NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 363, at 92.
368. Id. at 35-38 (pointing to studies showing that most habeas prisoners were convicted
of a serious offense after a jury trial and were consequently serving long sentences, rang-
ing from 24 to 30 years in state courts and 16 to 24 years in federal courts).
369. See id. at 20-22 (noting that significant staff time is spent identifying constitutional
violations and determining whether counsel should be appointed, due in part to the fact
that most petitions are handwritten and filed without assistance of counsel).
370. Id. at 91.
371. See id. at 89-93 (stating that the issue of habeas corpus reform has been shaped
by attitudes toward the death penalty, and arguing that habeas reform in capital cases
needs to be separated from reform in noncapital cases).
372. Compare Evan Caminker & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Lawless Execution of Robert
Alton Harris, 102 YALE LJ. 225 (1992) (arguing that a person should never be executed
when a potentially meritorious and previously undecided argument is presented) with Ste-
ven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Equity and Hierarchy: Reflections on the Harris Exe-
cution, 102 YALE L.J. 255 (1992) (arguing that values of federalism and the nature of the
federal judicial hierarchy, as well as the timeliness of a prisoner's petition, are important
1995]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
pus in Capital Cases, appointed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
chaired by former Justice Powell, issued a report concluding that
the "present system of multi-layered state and federal appeal and
collateral review has led to piecemeal and repetitious litigation, and
years of delay between sentencing and judicial resolution as to
whether the sentence was permissible by law. 3 73 The Ad Hoc
Committee recommended a six-month period for filing federal
petitions which would begin to run when counsel is appointed to
represent the prisoner." The same year, the American Bar Asso-
ciation Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus issued an
independent report reaching many similar conclusions but empha-
sizing the importance of appointing counsel in habeas proceed-
ings.375 The A.B.A. report recommended a one-year statute of
limitations for habeas petitions, beginning at the conclusion of the
prisoner's direct appeals and tolled until counsel is appointed.376
As one might expect, the various committee recommendations
were incorporated in bills introduced in Congress.3" Although the
bills have been redrafted various times, no legislation has
emerged.3 78 It is unclear whether reforms will be limited to death
penalty cases or whether the momentum toward reform will carry
farther.379 There seems to be a vague residual feeling among con-
gressional leaders that some legislation is needed, but the sense of
urgency that once existed no longer seems to be much in evidence.
Perhaps, this finally is recognition on the part of those who were
advocating greater statutory restrictions that they have been running
considerations in deciding whether to stay an execution).
373. REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, AD Hoc COMMIT-
TEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES 1, 1 (1989).
374. Id.
375. A.B.A. CRIM. JUSTICE SECTION REP. TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (1989).
376. Id.
377. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 306, at 795-96 (summarizing the provisions of re-
cent bills introduced in Congress).
378. Id.
379. "Whatever a person may think of the death penalty, few dispute that the conduct
of postconviction proceedings in capital cases demeans almost everyone-the lawyers, the
judges, the defendants, the media, and the politicians and others who act as cheerleaders
at the spectacle." James E. Coleman, Jr., Litigating at the Speed of Light: Postconviction
Proceedings Under a Death Warrant, 16 LrITG., Summer 1990, at 14; cf. Robert P.
Davidow, Federal Habeas Corpus: The Effect of Holding State Capital Collateral Pro-
ceedings Before a Judge Running for Re-Election, 8 N.D. J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
317 (1994) (arguing for a full fact-finding hearing by a federal court in all death penalty
cases in which a state court's fact-finding hearing is conducted by a judge running for re-
election).
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for a train they already have caught: recent Supreme Court inter-
pretations narrowing the scope of existing statutes may have al-
ready accomplished what advocates of greater statutory restrictions
wanted.3"
The next round of bills might be sponsored by those who
would like to maintain or even restore lost jurisdiction in the face
of judicial erosion of habeas jurisdiction. However, their chances of
success do not seem very good. There will be more bills and fur-
ther debate, but legislation is not likely any time soon. The Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994-legislation six
years in the making that contains something for everyone-is also
silent about federal habeas corpus."' The votes in support of ha-
beas corpus jurisdiction simply do not appear to be there to do
anything.3 8
2
4. The End of the Rule of Concurrent Jurisdiction
The general rule of concurrent jurisdiction is that when there
are two parallel civil suits between private parties, one in state
court and one in federal court, the suits should proceed indepen-
dently until one or the other is reduced to a judgment and then the
first judgment is argued to be res judicata or claim preclusive in
the second court. Preclusion doctrine "take[s] on an added dimen-
sion because of the special problems that come from having two
systems of courts, state and federal. 3 83 The doctrine generally
seems to have lagged behind the rest of federal procedure in terms
of sophistication and modernization. Lately, however, commentators
and courts have shown a renewed interest in the doctrine generally
and in its application across the divide of judicial federalism partic-
380. See generally Joseph L. Hoffmann, Starting from Scratch: Rethinking Federal Ha-
beas Review of Death Penalty Cases, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 133 (1992) (arguing for a
complete rethinking of the role of federal habeas in light of the Supreme Court's gradual
scaling back of habeas relief); J. Thomas Sullivan, "Reforming" Federal Habeas Corpus:
The Cost to Federalism; The Burden for Defense Counsel; and the Loss of Innocence, 61
UMKC L. REV. 291 (1992) (discussing the Supreme Court's more restrictive view of the
role of habeas corpus and arguing that this view threatens the vitality of the criminal
justice system).
381. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMTTEE OF THE CONFERENCE, H.R.
REP. 103-711, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
382. H.R. 4092, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (showing that too few votes for habeas
corpus prevented it from becoming part of the bill). However, the November 1994 elec-
tion resulted in a sea-change in Congress which renders past predictions rather obsolete
and which renders new predictions more or less uninformed, if not more uncertain.
383. WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 730.
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ularly. Partly the result of pressures from crowded dockets, a hard-
ened attitude has developed towards concurrent jurisdiction. Some
believe that litigants should be afforded only "one day" in court
and not have two chances to litigation.384 Allowing the same liti-
gant a second chance to litigate the same issue is inefficient and
wasteful of scarce judicial resources."' We can fully expect that
"[tihe artificiality and dysfunctional nature of that bifurcated ar-
rangement will become increasingly obvious."386
If we were starting at the beginning of our court system in
1791, we could debate the advisability of having two sets of trial
courts, federal and state. Even today this seems like a strange
arrangement. 7 Other western democracies with federal systems
function quite well based on an entirely different judicial arrange-
ment: the state/provincial courts perform the trial function and the
federal/national courts perform the appellate function. 8 We can
dimly perceive this approach in some of our own jurisdictions.
Early on, it was settled that the Supreme Court of the United
States has jurisdiction to review decisions of even the highest court
of a state on federal questions based on the importance of unifor-
mity and supremacy." 9 On the other hand, state court determina-
tions of issues of state constitutional law are fully final and not
subject to federal court review." As a general proposition, lower
federal courts may not act as appellate courts for state deci-
sions.39" ' But one cannot understand the federal habeas corpus ju-
risdiction3" for state prisoners as anything but the notion that
lower federal courts are acting as the surrogate of the Supreme
Court to review federal constitutional decisions of the state courts.
Despite our long history of duplicating the trial function in both
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Daniel J. Meador, Concluding Remarks: National Conference on State-Federal Judi-
cial Relationships, 78 VA. L. REv. 1895, 1901 (1992).
387. See generally Carl Baar, Inter-Court Relations in Comparative Perspective: Toward
an Ecology of Trial Courts, 12 JUST. SYS. J. 19 (1987) (discussing the trend toward trial
court unification); Meador, supra note 386, at 1901 (criticizing the dual system as "dys-
functional").
388. WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 720-21.
389. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 315 (1816).
390. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).
391. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); see
also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (holding that the district
court's jurisdiction is only original).
392. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
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state and federal courts, it is at least possible, and certainly provoc-
ative, to imagine a bifurcated system with trials provided in one
judicial system and appeals taken in the other.
How would this work? We cannot suppose that the federal
courts would perform the trial function and the state courts would
perform the appellate function. This would be contrary to the expe-
rience in other countries we desire to emulate. Also, the whole of
U.S. judicial history is just the opposite.393 Contemporary reality
ought to bound even musings about the future. Then, we are left to
imagine a future judicial system in which all trials are conducted
before state courts and those decisions are appealed before federal
courts, not necessarily the Supreme Court. There would be consti-
tutional concerns to overcome, to be sure, but they would not be
insurmountable. State judges and federal judges have suggested this
arrangement to deal with existing problems such as the judicial
federalism frictions felt from habeas corpus for state prisoners394
and the growing gap between caseload demand and federal trial
court supply in federal question jurisdiction.395 In theory, this bi-
furcation of function is possible. Discussing the theory aids present
understanding and future planning. But it almost goes without
saying that the future is not likely to bring this much rationality to
the court system in the United States. There simply is too much
history for the future to deliver unification of the trial function.
The unification of state and federal trial courts is not likely. I
do predict, however, that in the future the general rule of concur-
rent jurisdiction will come undone and will be discarded on both
the federal and the state side as a buggy-whip era doctrine that has
no place in modem judicial federalism. In its place, the courts will
create a rule of "jurisdictional preclusion" that states only one of
the parallel lawsuits may proceed, not both.3" Frankly, "[i]t is
393. Justice Holmes once declared: "I do not think the United States would come to an
end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union
would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several
states." OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1921).
394. James Duke Cameron, Federal Review, Finality of State Court Decisions, and Pro-
posal for a National Court of Appeals-A State Judge's Solution to a Continuing Prob-
lem, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 545.
395. See Jon 0. Newman, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals to Preserve the
Federal System, 56 U. CM. L. REv. 761, 768 (1989) (arguing that reallocation of jurisdic-
tion from federal to state courts is most effective means of dealing with increasing federal
caseload).
396. The same net effects could be accomplished by federal legislation. Jack B.
Weinstein, Coordination of State and Federal Judicial Systems, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1,
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difficult to imagine a constitutional objection to such a rational
cooperative system." '397 However, this new concurrent jurisdiction
will be accomplished through very different theories on each side,
federal and state.
On the federal side, there already are statutory and judicial
analogues of the predicted rule. There is a venerable statutory
mechanism for removing a case from state court to federal
court. 98 It only allows a defendant in state court to move to a
federal forum when the federal district court has subject matter
jurisdiction. The various court-created abstention doctrines describe
circumstances and procedures when federal courts decline to exer-
cise their jurisdiction.3 Each of the abstention doctrines has at
its core the idea that the federal court is justified in deferring to
the state court under appropriate circumstances.' The Supreme
Court has endorsed the mechanism of certifying a question of state
law to the highest court of the state if authorization exists under
state statute or state court rule.41
All these mechanisms for state jurisdiction are the forerunners
of the Younger doctrine.' This judicially created doctrine has
13-15 (1982).
397. Id. at 13.
398. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1452 (1988). Another federal statute allows a federal court to
stay a suit challenging the constitutionality of state prison conditions to permit exhaustion
of administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1988).
399. "The various types of abstention are not rigid pigeonholes into which federal courts
must try to fit cases. Rather, they reflect a complex of considerations designed to soften
the tensions inherent in a system that contemplates parallel judicial processes." Pennzoil
Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987). It has been observed that "[Pennzoil's]
footnote holds the potential for much greater deference to the state courts under principles
of federalism and comity." Roger J. Miner, The Tensions of a Dual Court System and
Some Prescriptions for Relief, 51 ALB. L. REv. 151, 164 (1987).
400. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 31 (1959) (authoriz-
ing deference in diversity cases where state law directly applies); Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,
319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943) (authorizes deference to state administrative and judicial regula-
tion); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (authorizing deference
to state court determinations of state law that could render federal questions moot.); cf.
Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 198 (1959) (finding inappropriate
application of abstention doctrine because state law on issue was clear).
401. See Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390 (1974) (stating certification is
available by statute or by federal court discretion in defined circumstances); cf. England v.
Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1964) (finding that a
party remitted to state court may return to federal court to resolve federal claims).
402. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 37 (1971) (holding that federal courts will not
enjoin pending state criminal prosecutions without evidence of great and immediate threat
to plaintiff's federally protected rights).
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three ingredients: federalism, equity, and comity. 3 Over many
decisions, it has been extended asymptotically to approach the
proposition that the existence of a private lawsuit pending in state
court obliges a federal court in a parallel lawsuit to abstain.'
The Supreme Court itself insists that the doctrine has not yet been
extended this far, 5 but I predict that the doctrine finally will be
extended in scope if it already has not been.'
On the state side, the doctrine has farther to go. Existing feder-
al statutes authorize removal of cases from state to federal
court, 7 but there is no provision for removing a case from fed-
eral to state court. Under the supremacy clause, state courts that
otherwise have jurisdiction may not decline to enforce federal laws,
as a general proposition."5 State courts cannot enjoin proceedings
in federal court.' But there is nothing in these traditional rules
of judicial federalism that would prohibit a state supreme court
from borrowing a page from U.S. Reports to develop a state ver-
sion of the federal abstention doctrine. When a federal question is
pending before a state court and there is a parallel federal lawsuit,
the state court could defer to the federal court.
When a question of state law is pending before a state court
and there is a parallel diversity lawsuit in federal court, however,
there is another procedural option: the state court could issue an
invitation to the federal court to certify the controlling state law
question to the state court.410 To make this most advantageous
403. Id. at 43-45.
404. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (finding abstention appropriate
because pending state case may have resolved issue on state law grounds); Moore v.
Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423-35 (1979) (warranting federal abstention because of pending state
child custody proceedings); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 333-39 (1977) (finding district
court erred in enjoining civil contempt proceedings pending in state court); Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (remanding nuisance action to determine if Younger
standards warrant federal intervention despite pending state court proceedings).
405. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1975)
(stating not every state proceeding justifies Younger abstention doctrine).
406. Thomas E. Baker, "Our Federalism" in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. or How the
Younger Doctrine Keeps Getting Older Not Better, 9 REv. LiTIG. 303, 337-44 (1990).
407. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1452 (1988).
408. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367-75 (1990) (finding that a state law de-
fense cannot be used in a § 1983 action if it violates federal law).
409. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 411-12 (1964) (recognizing that a state
court cannot enjoin a party from prosecuting or appealing an in personan action in feder-
al court).
410. See Paul A. LeBel, Legal Positivism and Federalism: The Certification Experience,
19 GA. L. REv. 999 (1985) (discussing the jurisprudential underpinnings of the certifica-
tion process).
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and efficient, state statutes and state court rules that presently au-
thorize federal appellate courts to certify questions of state law to
state supreme courts might be expanded radically so that a U.S.
district court could certify such a question to a state supreme
court.41' This would be analogous to the federal court asking the
state court for a declaratory judgment on the state law. It would
have to be squared with the state law concerning advisory opin-
ions.412 And the state court should feel duty bound to do its part
and answer the question certified.4"3
In both federal question cases and diversity cases, criteria could
be developed to inform the discretion of the state court trial judge
on state abstention doctrine. Factors might include: (1) which court
first acquired jurisdiction; (2) the convenience of the forum for the
litigants and witnesses; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal
litigation; and (4) the comparative progress in each court toward
trial.414 The inquiry should be factorial and qualitative.4 5 The
determinative question is which court, state or federal, has the
comparative advantage to fully and fairly decide the dispute. 16
411. Ira P. Robbins, The Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act: A Proposal for
Reform, 18 J. LEGIS. 127 (1992). Certification can work horizontally between states as
well. Corr & Robbins, supra note 348, at 431; see also Note, To Form a More Perfect
Union?: Federalism and Informal Interstate Cooperation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 842, 850
(1989) (finding the NAAG guidelines, which foster informal interstate cooperation, consti-
tutionally sound).
412. See In re Elliot, 446 P.2d 347, 357 (Wash. 1968) (finding advisory opinions may
be useful when analyzing an issue from federal court); United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v.
Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855, 863 (Tex. 1965) (asserting that the Texas State Constitution
looks unfavorably upon advisory opinions); Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735,
739-43 (Fla. 1961) (reviewing Florida statutory law to support Supreme Court's ability to
certify state contract law issues).
413. See Richard Alan Chase, A State Court's Refusal to Answer Certified Questions:
Are Inferences Permitted?, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 407, 415-16 (1992) (stating that certifi-
cation promotes federalism and comity between state and federal courts).
414. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 8-16
(1983) (applying four criteria to find a district court abused its discretion in granting a
stay order).
415. See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Report of the Committee on Federal Courts-The Ab-
stention Doctrine: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to State Court Proceed-
ings, 122 F.R.D. 89, 106-07 (1988) (discussing the factors federal courts should consider
when deciding between abstention and certification).
416. 1990 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CoMMrTEE 14 [hereinafter STUDY
COMMITEE REPORT].
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5. Federal Procedural Rules
We currently are experiencing remarkable changes in the ways
federal rules of procedure are promulgated. To understand what
might happen in the future, we must understand recent events.
Since 1958, the procedures for rulemaking have been relatively
stable. 17 The Judicial Conference is charged by Congress with
"carry[ing] on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the
general rules of practice and procedure."4 8 The Judicial Confer-
ence accomplishes its task through its Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure, commonly known as the Standing Committee,
and five separate Advisory Committees, one each for the five sepa-
rate sets of rules: appellate, bankruptcy, civil, criminal, and evi-
dence rules. 19 Members of these committees include federal judg-
es, state supreme court justices, representatives of the Department
of Justice, members of the practicing bar, and law professors."
Each committee has a reporter, typically a law professor, and the
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts provides staff support.
Anyone can propose a change in the rules to an Advisory
Committee. Any proposed change and related Committee Note is
reviewed by the Standing Committee and then released for a period
of public comment and hearings. The Advisory Committee recon-
siders the proposed change in light of the public comment and then
resubmits the proposal to the Standing Committee. The Standing
Committee must vote to transmit the proposal to the Judicial Con-
ference, which in turn passes the proposal on to the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court holds the actual power to promulgate a
rule change.4"' An amendment to a rule goes into effect unless
the Congress passes legislation rejecting, modifying, or deferring
the proposal.4 '
This rulemaking process has been subjected to extreme stress in
recent years and its future is in doubt. First, the Civil Justice Re-
form Act of 1990' decentralized and destabilized rulemaking by
decreeing a radical experiment in local rulemaking. Each district
417. See generally Baker, supra note 314.
418. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
419. Baker, supra note 314.
420. By appointment of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author has served as a member of
the Standing Committee since 1990.
421. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988).
422. 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988).
423. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. IV 1992).
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court is required by the 1990 Act to draft and implement a civil
justice expense and delay reduction plan that makes innovations in
court procedures and alternative dispute resolution techniques.424
As part of this legislative initiative, the districts will report on the
results and the plans will be studied and evaluated in reports to
Congress. Supporters of the courts have sounded the alarm that the
1990 Act sounds the deathknell for disinterested experts, centralized
rulemaking, and uniform national procedures.4'
Second, there has been increased politicization of the
rulemaking procedures. In 1988, Congress reformed the rulemaking
process to guarantee wider participation and fuller public involve-
ment from outside the judicial branch.426 During the consideration
of the most recent controversial amendments that went into effect
in December 1993, there was an unusual amount of back-and-forth
among the committees and between the committees and factions in
the profession.427 At the end of the rulemaking process, both
houses of Congress held hearings on the proposals. The House
passed a bill that would have rescinded those amendments, but the
measure stalled in the Senate.428 Subsequently, there was even
some discussion in Congress about rescinding the objectionable
rules after they went into effect, but nothing came of it.429
424. Id. § 471.
425.
The central importance of the Civil Justice Reform Act is this: the Act has
effected a revolutionary redistribution of the procedural rulemaking power from
the federal judicial branch to the legislative branch. Congress has taken proce-
dural rulemaking power away from judges and their expert advisors and dele-
gated it to local lawyers. By the expedient of declaring procedural rules to be
substantive law, Congress has by fiat stripped the judicial branch of a power
that uniquely bears on the judicial function: the power to prescribe internal
rules of procedure for federal courts. By legislative stealth in enacting the Civil
Justice Reform Act, Congress is continuing to transform the Advisory Commit-
tee on Civil Rules into a quaint, third-branch vestigial organ.
Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV.
375, 379 (1992).
426. 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1988) (sets forth the Judicial Improvements and Access to Jus-
tice Act). See Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform of Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 455, 468-69 (1993) (discussing the greater public input into proce-
dural formulation after the Act).
427. Walker, supra note 426, at 457-59 (discussing the process used in adopting the
new informal discovery rules).
428. H.R. REP. 2814, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
429. See William J. Hughes, Congressional Reaction to the 1993 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 SErON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 3, 11 (1993) (noting that
Congress had the power to modify the rules, but failed to do so).
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Federal judicial rulemaking and the federal rules are undergoing
a deconstruction and no one-no one on the bench, no one in the
practice, no one in the academy, and no one even in the Con-
gress-knows where it will lead. We seem to be in search of a
new paradigm, without knowing what we are looking for in a
paradigm.43 Consequently, there have been calls for a moratorium
on all rulemaking43' and more radical suggestions that civil proce-
dure be reconceptualized so that all existing rules be abolished and
dispute resolution procedure be entirely rewritten.432 Even the
rulemakers themselves seem unsure of their proper role. Many of
the most recent amendments included a kind of local option fea-
ture, sanctioning the anomaly of national rules of procedure with
local variation.433
In the future, we likely can expect regular forays into
rulemaking by Congress. The trend for Congress to efigage in
specific rulemaking, like the rules changes legislated in the new
crime bill,434 is definitely well-established and growing. We might
also expect more global initiatives like the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990, whether Congress is persuaded that the legislation
was a success or a failure, however that conclusion is reached.435
430. See Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural
Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 761, 813-15 (1993) (discussing the grant for a new proce-
dural paradigm); Jeffery W. Stemple, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Con-
struct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 659,
661 (1993) (discussing trends in procedural reform).
431. Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Morato-
rium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 855 (1993).
432.
To my knowledge, a brand new conceptualization of what procedure should do
and should be has yet to be attempted .... Accordingly, I propose that judges,
legislators and lawyers of today undertake to abolish all rules of civil, criminal
and appellate procedure and the attendant rules of evidence. I suggest in their
place a unified system which eliminates the entire concept of responsive plead-
ing as well as its accompanying pervasive discovery and scenario trials fol-
lowed by totality of the circumstances appeals.
John L. Kane, Procedural Reform and the Costs of Litigation, DOCKET, Fall 1990, at 36,
38.
433. STIENSTRA, supra note 177, at 767.
434. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, § 320935 amends
FED. R. EVID. 412, and creates three new evidence rules, FED. R. EVID. 413-415, which
would make evidence of a defendant's past similar acts admissible in a civil and a crimi-
nal case involving sexual assault or child molestation offense. FED. R. CRIM P. 32 is also
amended to afford the victim a right of allocution at the defendant's sentencing. Id. §
230101.
435. Carl Tobias, Silver Linings in Federal Civil Justice Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
On this subject, we must wait on Congress. It will be instructive
for the future just how the 1990 Act's experiment plays out. Legis-
lation has passed both the House and Senate that would extend the
deadlines for the evaluations and reports on the civil justice ex-
pense and delay reduction plans for another year.436 On the one
hand, if Congress deems the 1990 Act a legislative success, then
Congress could be tempted to assert itself again to override the
formal judicial rulemaking procedures. On the other hand, if the
1990 Act is deemed a failure, Congress could be tempted to exper-
iment with some other reform of judicial rulemaking procedures.
There certainly is no shortage of seers,437 but Congress' vision is
the only one that counts.
6. Personnel
As one barometer of the changes that already have occurred in
the federal judicial institution, consider that over the decades of the
1960s and 1970s, characterized by spiked increases in dockets, the
number of support personnel increased threefold.438 Both the
docket increases and the staffing response continued unabated
through the 1980s.439
Judicial personnel likewise have increased dramatically. The
Framers contemplated a minimal number of federal judges to staff
a few courts of limited jurisdiction. Alexander Hamilton wrote in
Federalist Paper No. 81 of a single federal judge in only "four or
five or half a dozen federal districts."'  The federal judicial pyra-
mid below the Supreme Court has been broadened unrecognizably
since then. Today, there are 179 circuit judges on the thirteen
courts of appeals." Federal statutes divide the country and terri-
tories into 94 geographical districts, presided over by 649 district
857, 860 (1993) (noting that the benefits from the Act have yet to be fully realized).
436. S. 2407, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. 4357, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
437. See generally Panel Discussion, Civil Litigation in the Twenty-First Century, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 1199 (1993).
438. See David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Feder-
al District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 CAL. L. REV. 65, 144 (1981) (noting that
between 1961 and 1980 the number of individuals employed by the federal judiciary
increased from 5158 to 14,551).
439. See Johnathan P. Nase, The Growth of the Federal Judicial Labor Force: A Bud-
get-Based Perspective, 70 JUDICATURE 157, 159 (1986) (stating that growth in complex
litigation and an increased work load lead to an increase in support staff in the judiciary).
440. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 486 (Alexander Hamilton).
441. ADMINuNSTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, UNDERSTANDING THE FEDERAL COURTS
8, 10 (1992).
[Vol. 45:705
1995] A VIEW TO THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 783
judges. 2 Two additional sets of federal judicial officers, who are
non-Article I judges, serve at the nisi prius level of the Article
III judiciary:" 3 345 full-time and 124 part-time U.S. Magistrate
judges"4 and 291 bankruptcy judges."5 If one were to add the
thousands of Article I administrative law judges appended to the
federal agencies, the group picture of the federal judiciary would
have to be an aerial photograph.
Thus, the recent debate over whether Congress should declare a
moratorium on creating federal judgeships and keep the number of
federal judges below 1000 profoundly misses the big picture.'"
Whether or not "1000" has some magical quality, that barrier fell
decades ago; Article HI judges today are a minority among federal
officers with judicial responsibilities. 7 The Judicial Conference
voted in September 1993 to reject the concept of a 1000 judge
limit and to reaff'rm the judicial branch's commitment to the prin-
ciple of limited federal courts staffed by an adequate number of
judges.' Projections for the future are rather disturbing, particu-
larly at the courts of appeals level; the future could bring a federal
judiciary that has more the appearance and the qualities of bureau-
cracy than court."9
442. Id. at 10.
443. Id. at 10-11.
444. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631 (1993) (outlining appointment, tenure, character of service,
number, and compensation of magistrate judges).
445. Id. §§ 151-158 (describing procedures for designation, appointment, salaries, and
appeals for bankruptcy judges).
446. See Judith Resnik, Rereading "The Federal Courts": Revising the Domain of Fed-
eral Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1021,
1033 n.4 (1994) (pointing out that if magistrate and bankruptcy judges are counted among
federal judges, we will have far surpassed the magic number of 1000).
447. See, e.g., Jon 0. Newman, 1,000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Federal Judi-
ciary, 76 JuDICATtRE 187, 187 (1993); Gerald B. Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice,
A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70 (arguing against expansion of the federal appellate judiciary
because quality will decrease). But see Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal
Courts-Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52 (advocating an
increase in the number of federal judges, particularly appellate court judges); Dolores K.
Sloviter, The Judiciary Needs Judicious Growth, NAT'L L.J., June 28, 1993, at 17.
448. STUDY COMMrTEE REPORT, supra note 416, at 16.
449. The Federal Courts Study Committee explained:
In the past three decades the number of appellate judges nationally
has almost trebled, ranging now from six in the First Circuit to twenty-eight in
the Ninth. The average court of appeals has thirteen judges. If caseload were
the sole determinant, and using the Judicial Conference's 255 participations
standard, there would be 206 judgeships for the twelve regional circuits, not the
present 156. The average court would have seventeen judges, and at least four
of the courts would be on the brink of twenty judgeships. Applying the same
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But calls for a moratorium on the creation of district and cir-
cuit judgeships45 simply miss the point. Here again, past congres-
sional behavior is the best predictor of future congressional behav-
ior. Practical political considerations, including thinking of the
federal courts as a government program or constituency service, are
far more powerful than debates over whether there is some ideal
size of the federal judiciary. The only thing that might slow down
judgeship creation is a concern over the budget. Creating each
federal judgeship carries a one-time investment of more than a
half-million dollars and annual costs are in excess of three quarters
of a million dollars.45' But those numbers are more noticeable
within the relatively small budget of the federal judiciary. One can
imagine that members of Congress see the costs as a sound invest-
ment with the benefit of patronage.
The future will bring continued growth in the Article I judi-
ciary, although not as much as we can expect for non-Article Im
personnel and support staff. Caseload will demand it. Congress will
approve it.
standard to conservative caseload projections suggests a need by 1999 for 315
appellate judges, with an average court of twenty-four judges (and forty-nine on
the Ninth Circuit). Tribunals of seventeen, much less twenty-four, sitting in
panels of three, may resemble a judgeship pool more than a single body pro-
viding unified circuit leadership and precedent. Still, larger courts such as these
may be workable. Whether tribunals of thirty or forty judges will be workable
is more problematic. The question is not simply one of administration but of
the effect, both within the circuit and nationally, of so many uncoordinated
opinions from so many judges.
Id. at 114.
450. See Newman, supra note 395, at 52 (asserting that different Presidents and Con-
gresses may have different philosophical views regarding the role of the judiciary). Contra
Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on
Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 765-67
(1983) (arguing that an increase in the number of federal district judges would curtail
growth of the appellate caseload).
451. See, e.g., GORDON BERMANT Er AL., IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER
OF FEDERAL JUDGES: AN ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS 36 (Fed. Jud. Ctr.
ed., 1993) (citing $814,000 per annum expense per circuit judge); Irving R. Kaufman,
New Remedies for the Next Century of Judicial Reform: Time as the Greatest Innovator,
57 FORDHAM L. REv. 253, 258 (1988) (approximating $630,000 as the dollar figure to
establish a circuit judgeship).
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7. Structural Fatigue
The problems for the structure of the federal courts are most
pronounced at the intermediate level.452 At the Supreme Court
level, there have been worries about workload from time to
time," but these have been assuaged by jurisdictional
changes,454 most recently in 1988, that provide the Justices near
complete discretion over the selection of which cases to hear and
decide. This seems to be working. In the 1992-1993 Term, 6336
cases were before the Court. Of the 226 cases addressed on the
merits, only 119 were decided by a full opinion. The remainder of
the cases were denied or dismissed.45
But at the two levels below the Supreme Court, there is no
discretion. The district courts and the courts of appeals must dis-
pose of each case on their docket. At the district court level, Con-
gress has created more district judgeships and added magistrate-
judges and bankruptcy judges in an attempt to keep pace with
docket growth. For the most part, these additions have worked
well, although the press of cases has caused some jurisdictional
and procedural stress.
The most serious structural fatigue centers on the courts is the
middle tier.456 The last major restructuring of the federal courts
was in 1891 when the courts of appeals were created.45 Pausing
452. See generally Kenneth W. Starr, The Courts of Appeals and the Future of the
Federal Judiciary, 1991 Wisc. L. REV. 1 (1991) (arguing that new structure of courts of
appeals makes it difficult for judges to collaborate on cases and issues); see also Kenneth
W. Starr, The Supreme Court and the Future of the Federal Judiciary, 32 ARIZ. L. REV.
211, 219 (1990) (discussing structural changes to the judiciary in light of founding princi-
ples of our American government).
453. SAMUEL EsTREIcHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT's ROLE:
A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS (1986); cf Thomas E. Baker,
Siskel and Ebert at the Supreme Court, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1472, 1473-74 (1989) (review-
ing REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT's ROLE, supra, and giving authors "one thumb up
and one thumb down").
454. See Robert L. Stem et aL., Epitaph for Mandatory Jurisdiction, A.B.A. J., Dec.
1988, at 66 (citing legislation that released the Court from appeals it was technically
obliged to hear); John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1 (1983) (urging Congress to remove the remainder of the Court's mandatory juris-
diction).
455. For the October 1993 Term, the total number of cases was 7786 and the Justices
wrote only 99 opinions. WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 15.
456. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 306, at 22 ("Undoubtedly, the most significant
change in the structure of the federal courts over the past 200 years has involved the
evolution of the courts of appeals.").
457. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
to consider for just a moment all that has happened in national life
and in the legal system over the intervening century obviates any
surprise that the nineteenth century design may be showing signs
of fatigue. Until the present generation, the organization of the
courts of appeals worked rather well. But the last four decades
have brought the courts of appeals to a serious "crisis of vol-
ume.""8 Consider these figures for the regional courts of appeals:
In 1950, there were 65 authorized circuit judgeships, 2,830
appeals were filed, and 2,355 appeals were terminated (36
per authorized judgeship). In 1990, there were 156 autho-
rized circuit judgeships; 40,898 appeals were filed; and
39,520 appeals were terminated (246.9 per authorized
judgeship). 9
Over the years, Congress has responded primarily with two
extramural reforms: adding judges and dividing circuits. The previ-
ous section of this paper describes the future implications of creat-
ing new judgeships. As for dividing circuits, as was done to the
old Fifth Circuit and is still being debated for the present
Ninth Circuit," it is enough to say that "Congress lately has
shown signs of abandoning the technique."' 2 Dividing circuits is
not a remedy for the problems of the courts of appeals. Caseload
is distributive: if Congress simply splits an overloaded circuit into
two new courts of appeals, the same total number of judges on the
two new courts must decide the same total number of appeals.
Circuit splitting is not likely to be a future reform, unless it is part
of some major restructuring.
If the inevitable happens, that more appeals are filed and more
judgeships are created, then Congress will face the task of
reimagining the intermediate federal tier. 3 Congress knows the
458. "However people may view other aspects of the federal judiciary, few deny that its
appellate courts are in a 'crisis of volume' that has transformed them from the institutions
they were even a generation ago." STUDY COMMTE REPORT, supra note 416, at 109.
459. Thomas E. Baker & Denis J. Hauptly, Taking Another Measure of the "Crisis of
Volume" in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 97, 103 (1994).
460. BAKER, supra note 119, at 52-73.
461. Id. at 74-105.
462. Id. at 228.
463. Professor Meador asserts that "[I1f appeals continue to increase, as seems likely,
the creation of still more judgeships will be inevitable. That will cause increasing difficul-
ties in maintaining intra- and intercircuit harmony in federal decisional law. Ultimately,
some sort of redesign or restructuring of the appellate system will probably be unavoid-
able." Professor Daniel J. Meador: A Perspective on Judicial Improvements, THIRD
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time is approaching when it will be required to redesign the courts
of appeals. In December 1993, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC)
published a report commissioned by the Congress entitled, "Struc-
tural and Other Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals."'
The FJC Report reviews many alternatives for the courts of ap-
peals: total or partial consolidation; size reduction; multiple tiers;
discretionary appeals; differentiating appellate tracks; district court
error review; jurisdiction reduction; and other nonjurisdictional op-
tions."
What Congress will do is anyone's guess. However, Congress
ought to plan for the future of the courts of appeals by creating a
study group to act as legislative architects that will develop and
model alternative federal appellate structures with some level of
detail and particularity. Then, Congress should hold hearings and
exercise sound legislative judgment to choose from the alterna-
tives.' Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that "[allthough no
consensus has yet developed around any particular set of changes
to the status quo-and to be sure any alternatives will present
practical and political difficulties-it is safe to say that change will
come."4 7 The inescapable prediction is that he is correct, and the
next generation will witness a major congressional reform of the
federal intermediate courts.
C. A Postscript
As far as federalization is concerned, the obvious question is
whether it will continue or even accelerate. "[Flederalization is a
complex process that engages many players and is driven by politi-
cal, legal, economic, social, and pragmatic factors.""46 If the past
BRANCH, Dec. 1992, at 10. For additional articles by Professor Meador, see Daniel J.
Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 56 U. Cm-. L. REv. 603 (1989); Daniel J. Meador, American Courts
in the Bicentennial Decade and Beyond, 55 MIss. LJ. 1 (1985).
464. JUDITH A. McKEtNA, FEDERAL JuD. CTR. STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES
FOR THE FED. COURTS OF APPEALS, REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1993).
465. Id.
466. For a detailed discussion of such a proposal, see Thomas E. Baker, A Proposal
that Congress Create a Commission on Federal Court Structure, 14 MISS. C. L. REV.
271 (1994).
467. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks at the 1993 National
Workshop for Judges of the U.S. Courts of Appeals (Feb. 8, 1993) (quoted in BAKER,
supra note 119, at 302 n.40).
468. SCHWARZER & WHEELER, supra note 178, at 40.
1995]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
congressional behavior is any indicator, the future will bring more
federalization of the law. 9 Thus, we can expect that more peo-
ple, in more situations, will be able to "make a federal case out of
it." Indeed, that very expression has already become dated and has
lost its sarcastic edge.
For the sake of fairness and accuracy, the beginning observa-
tion that the federal courts are not doing as much as the state
courts to prepare for the future does not mean that the federal
judiciary is doing nothing.470 In 1988, Congress created the Fed-
eral Courts Study Committee as an ad hoc committee of the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States.47 Appointed by Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, the fifteen-person Committee included representa-
tives of all three federal branches, state government officials, prac-
titioners, and academics.472 This blue-ribbon group of court insid-
ers issued a comprehensive final report that evaluated virtually the
entire federal court system. The Study Committee offered many
initiatives for the future of the federal courts.473 The Judicial Con-
ference of the United States has constituted a standing committee
on long-range planning for the judiciary.474 Both the Adminis-
trative Office of U.S. Courts and the Federal Judicial Center have
developed significant levels of support for long-range planning
initiatives.475 Thus, experimentation at the federal level is central-
ized and more deliberate.476
However, state courts have comparatively greater involvement
and more diversity in futures activities. One possible explanation
relates to perception and motivation. The siege mentality at the
469. In a recent private letter a federal judge I know wrote, "The 'future' depends 99%
on Congress. That is what makes me pessimistic."
470. As Oliver Wendell Holmes said, "[N]o one will understand me to be speaking
with disrespect . . . [for] one may criticize even what one reveres." Oliver W. Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 473 (1897).
471. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
472. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 416, at 31.
473. Id. at 35-170.
474. See Baker, supra note 4, at 10-15; Otto R. Skopil, Jr., Framework for Long-Range
Planning in the Federal Judiciary, Speech Before the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference
(May 1992), in LONG-RANGE PLANNING FOR CIRCUIT COUNCILS 29 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. ed.,
1992) (addressing the committees' role and operations).
475. See, e.g., BERMANT ET AL., supra note 451; Charles W. Nihan, Strategic Planning:
A Process Overview Speech Before the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference (May 1992), in
LONG-RANGE PLANNING FOR CIRCUIT COUNCILS, supra note 474, at 35.
476. See, e.g., FEDERAL JUD. CmR., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISO-
RY COMMIrEE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW (1981) (discussing standard consider-
ations for evaluating an experimental program).
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state level-the sense that workload exceeds judicial resources so
much that basic functions are threatened and system breakdown is
feared-is relatively more severe and certainly of far longer dura-
tion than at the federal level. Despite all the problems facing feder-
al courts, federal judges remarkably, perhaps unrealistically, remain
unconcerned and unthreatened.4' As a group, federal judges are
more content than their state colleagues.
A second possible explanation is systemic. The federal court
system, like each individual state court system, is centrally and
hierarchically organized. Yet, the two systems have in common the
same remarkable variation in federalism. By definition, the federal
system encompasses all the variation in legal culture to be found in
the fifty states. At the same time, however, the federal system must
respond to a problem as an entire entity without the hegemony of
state subdivisions. Solutions to problems and reforms must be
national. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, apply
equally in the District of Wyoming and in the Southern District of
New York. On the state side, differences between Wyoming and
New York are built into the court organizations, jurisdictions, and
procedures. I submit that the necessary requirement of national
uniformity means that federal reforms amount to the lowest com-
mon denominator of change and solution.
IV. JUDICIAL FEDERALISM INITIATIVES IN THE FUTURE
Having discussed futurism and having described the separate
futures of the state courts and the federal courts, it is incumbent on
me to identify trends and ideas that will describe how the two
judiciaries will relate to each other in the years ahead. This effort
will include what is likely to happen as well as what might hap-
pen. I want to talk about the future the courts can expect and the
future the judiciaries can shape together. My particular focus will
be on the areas I envision for cooperation between state and feder-
al courts.
477. See Michael C. Gizzi, Perspectives of a Crisis, 78 JUDICATURE 106, 106 (1994)
(discussing the issue of whether there is a crisis).
7891995]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
A. The Theory of Judicial Federalism
Before getting to the particulars, it is helpful to understand
what we mean by "judicial federalism."4 8 The general principle
of federalism is not found in so many words in the text of the
Constitution, but nonetheless is an essential part of the deep struc-
ture of our government.479 Madison described it as our "partly
federal and partly national" Constitution." The need for the ad-
jective "judicial" should be apparent. The relationship between the
state and national judicial branches is the only place on the con-
temporary constitutional scene where federalism is taken serious-
ly." In every other area of national life, the Supreme Court has
abdicated its constitutional duty and has deferred to Congress at
the expense of state sovereignty. This abdication is evidenced by
the Court's Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment jurispru-
dence."s2 "Federalism is dead" everywhere else but between the
state and federal judicial branches. 3 Judicial federalism thus de-
478. For a detailed discussion on this issue, see Baker, supra note 305.
479. See Ralph A. Rossum, A Means-Ends Approach to the Study of the Constitution
and Constitutional Law, 13 TEACHING POL. Sci. 36, 43-45 (1985).
480. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
481. See Stanley C. Brubaker, From Incompetent Imperialism to Principled Prudence:
The Role of the Courts in Restoring "The State," 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 82 (1982)
(discussing the role of the courts in protecting the constitutional value of federalism but
advocating that the political branches should be responsible for this task); Mitchell E.
Daniels, Jr. & Alexander Dimitrief, Taking Federalism Seriously, 36 DEPAUL L. REV. 463
(1987) (examining the impact of Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985), on federalism); Stephen L. Fluckiger, The Changing Relationship of the Judi-
ciary to the Policy and Administrative Processes of Governments: An Overview of Recent
Commentary on the Nature, Causes, Consequences, and Proposals for Reform of Contem-
porary Judicial Encroachment, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REV. 671 (arguing that judicial encroach-
ment threatens the survival of federalism and separation of powers); Lino A. Graglia, The
Growth of National Judicial Power, 14 NOVA L. REV. 53 (1989) (arguing that American
constitutionalism is the history of the aggrandizement of centralized judicial power).
482. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that Congress can use its
spending power under the Commerce Clause to encourage uniformity in the states' drink-
ing age and finding that such an act does not violate the Tenth Amendment); Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that wage and hour
provisions imposed on state entity did not exceed Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause and pointing to the political process as the protector of the states); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the regulation of production and consumption
of wheat by Congress under the Commerce Clause is permissible even though wheat is
local in character and its effect upon interstate commerce is indirect). It should be noted,
however, that within a year after Garcia, the cities and states convinced Congress to
overturn the specific ruling of Garcia by getting an exemption from the controlling stat-
ute. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99 Stat. 787 (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203, 207, 211, 215-216 (1988)).
483. PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITrI/ON, AND THE WARREN COURT 96
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fined and narrowed is a fascinating kind of constitutional neuro-
sis.4 4
This condition would not be so interesting or so important if
the state and federal judiciaries were each concerned only with its
own laws. Each judicial branch, however, confronts questions that
arise under the law of the other sovereign routinely and frequently.
State courts decide questions of federal law and federal courts
decide questions of state law.
Confrontation is inherent in this design of our federalism.'
Conflicts are inevitable. The organizations and jurisdictions of the
state courts and the national courts intersect at points of inevitable
friction. Issues of jurisdiction are issues of power. Issues of power
rely on sovereignty and supremacy. The law of federal jurisdiction
reflects a basic duality."s6 One set of federal statutes and one set
of Supreme Court decisions glorify the federal courts as the prima-
ry protectors of individual rights. A second set of federal statutes
and a second set of Supreme Court decisions do the same for the
state courts. These two sets of statutes and decisions are no more
compatible than their underlying assumptions. This sometimes is
called the "parity debate" and it is seemingly unending, although at
different times one side or the other has enjoyed the ascendancy in
Congress and in the Supreme Court. The assumptions about the
relative competency of the state and federal judiciaries are empiri-
cally unprovable. 7 But both sides have in common the norm of
federalism." s
The philosophical rationale for judicial federalism is explainable
as an aspect of the larger intellectual history of federalism. 9 The
(1970).
484. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neu-
rosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 906 (1994) ("In fact, federalism is America's neurosis.").
485. A national court system made up of dual systems of state and national courts is
"comprehensible only as a blueprint for conflict and confrontation, not for cooperation and
deference." Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology,
and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 684 (1981).
486. See Martha A. Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 683, 684 (1981) (describing federal jurisdiction as indicative of "schizo-
phrenia").
487. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 306, at 36-37; see also Baker, supra note 151, at 827-
28 ("I decline to decide which I favor, federal judges or state judges. My problem is that
I respect both groups.").
488. See Ann Althouse, Variations.on a Theory of Normative Federalism: A Supreme
Court Dialogue, 42 DuKE Li. 979 (1993) ("In the midst of an ongoing dialogue about
the respective powers of the state and national governments, voices on both sides agree
that the Constitution preserves federalism .... ").
489. See Charles Fried, Federalism-Why Should We Care?, 6 HARv. J.L. & PuB.
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mode of confrontation and conflict and the debate over parity is
best understood as a holdover from what might be labelled "dual
federalism." Dual federalism posited that "'the federal government
and the separate states constituted two mutually exclusive systems
of sovereignty, that both were supreme within their respective
spheres, and that neither could exercise its authority in such a way
to intrude, even incidentally, upon the sphere of sovereignty re-
served to the other. ' ' '49° The mode of cooperation and communi-
cation characterizing judicial federalism today is fairly attributable
to the theory of "cooperative federalism." Cooperative federalism
views the "state and federal governments as complementary parts
of a single governmental process [and] [t]he two court systems
are ... but one system of justice to protect individual freedom
from government excess."49'
Cooperative federalism is the philosophy on the rise in the
judicial realm. Justice O'Connor has compared the relationship
between the state and federal courts to a marriage that must be
based on mutual respect and requires effort on both sides.4" Judi-
cial federalism is based on this philosophy of cooperative federal-
ism, not on any political ideology or legal philosophy. Judicial
federalism knows no liberals or conservatives, only judges trying to
be true to their judicial oath. Chief Justice Rehnquist describes our
Hamiltonian system of state and federal courts as an "arrange-
ment[] contemplat[ing] a large measure of intersystem cross-fertil-
POL'Y 1 (1982) (discussing traditional values or virtues of federalism such as history,
local autonomy, individual liberty, reducing excessive government spending, and efficien-
cy); Lino A. Graglia, From Federal Union to National Monolith: Mileposts in the Demise
of American Federalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129 (1993) (detailing the major
constitutional cases which have led to the demise of federalism); Ed Herschler, Federal-
ism: A State Perspective, 4 DEr. C.L. REV. 1131 (1986) ("Two centuries ago, the framers
worked to produce a constitution fashioning a federal system of government . . . [But]
we have lost the 'federalism' concept. . . . "); Maurice J. Holland, Prospects for Federal-
ism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 31 (1982) (discussing the historical decline of federal-
ism and predicting and uncertain future for federalism).
490. Baker, supra note 151, at 824 (citations omitted).
491. Id. at 826 (citations omitted). See also John B. Oakley, The Future Relationship of
California's State and Federal Courts: An Essay on Jurisdictional Reform, the Transfor-
mation of Property, and the New Age of Information, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2233, 2246-49
(1993) (recommending short-term coordination and long-term integration of state and fed-
eral courts).
492. "Our judicial federalism can and will work. But the marriage between our state
and federal courts, like any other marriage, requires each partner to respect the other, to
make a special effort to get along together, and to recognize the proper sphere of the
other partner." Sandra Day O'Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
1 (1985).
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ization and collaboration."'493 Justice Brennan insists, "[tihe time
has come.., to recognize fully that, while our functions are dif-
ferent and while our decisions must sometimes disagree, we are
nevertheless all engaged in administering the law of the same
nation."494 Federalism still is important to judges and to courts as
a principle of how they get along.495
B. Judge-to-Judge Initiatives
At the 1992 National Conference on State-Federal Judicial
Relationships, Chief Justice Ellen Peters of Connecticut gave a
report from the trenches that is a good general "list of things to
do" for state and federal judges one-on-one.496 I cannot improve
on her list. We cannot expect that the problems and the solutions
will change in the coming years. Legislators hold hearings. Bar
associations appoint committees. Scholars conduct studies. But
judges must decide cases and the press of caseload has turned
many judges into innovators.4' Therefore, on the local level, we
493. Calling for "a renewed focus on the original Hamiltonian notion of the collabora-
tive relationship between state and federal courts," Chief Justice Rehnquist went on,
"Hamilton wrote that 'the national and state systems are to be regarded as ONE
WHOLE.' And, to this day, a significant portion of federal and state jurisdiction is con-
current. ... These arrangements contemplate a large measure of intersystem cross-fertiliza-
tion and collaboration." Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 1.
494. In a speech before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Justice Brennan endorsed
judicial federalism:
It seems to me that notions of conflict and of fundamental difference of aims
between state courts and the federal courts have been grossly and unfortunately
exaggerated. The time has come, I think, to recognize fully that, while our
functions are different and while our decisions must sometimes disagree, we are
nevertheless all engaged in administering the law of the same nation. Our com-
mon denominator is that we both work under the pressure of an increasing,
inexorable demand for decision of cases churned up out of real life by the
legal system, and involving deeply felt necessities of real life litigants. There is
no justification for the view that we are headed in opposite directions, and that
the only legal bond between us is the subjugating one of the Supremacy
Clause.
William J. Brennan, Jr., Some Judicial Aspects of Federalism, REViSTA JURIDIcA DE LA
UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO Rico 1 (1983).
495. See generally Judith A. McMorrow, Judicial Federalism and Direct Interaction Be-
tween State and Federal Courts, 72 MAss. L. REv. 21 (1987).
496. Ellen Peters, State-Federal Judicial Relationships: A Report from the Trenches, 78
VA. L. REv. 1887, 1892 (1992).
497. Judges are practical managers, out of necessity:
Federal caseload has been the subject of congressional investigation, bar associ-
ation study, and scholarly symposia. For the most part, discussions about case-
load have proceeded from the assumption that, since they neither file cases nor
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ought to expect future coordination to develop along the following
lines suggested by Judge Peters:
Routine collaboration in trial administration: Regular con-
sultation to achieve "coordination of court calendars, juror
lists, expert witness lists, and attorney discipline proceed-
ings."498 To be most successful and useful these ought to
be made routine, but there is some benefit to be gained
even from only a case-specific approach.
Sharing space and facilities: "Cooperative access to court-
rooms and other court facilities to ease temporary space
shortages in either court system." '  Unfortunately, we
have experienced an unusual number of national disasters,
floods, earthquakes, fires, and hurricanes. Cooperation is at
a premium during such crises, but space and facilities prob-
lems short of a catastrophe also claim the help of the two
court systems.
Assuring the systematic exchange of information: Routine
"exchange of information would help to identify related
cases pending in the two court systems so that the courts
could explore joint discovery procedures, joint motions
practice, and joint settlement initiatives."5"
Greater reliance on an improved certification procedure:
"The federal certification of issues of state law to state
courts would be enhanced by agreement about procedures
for the appropriate definition of novel questions of law by
the federal courts and for their speedy resolution by the
control jurisdiction, judges are faced with the unhappy choice between increas-
ing backlogs or less carefully considered decisions. Judges, however, have not
viewed their options so narrowly. Instead, some judges have endorsed and
implemented procedural innovations they believe will speed cases up or termi-
nate them without trials. Most judges, in addition, have implemented rationing:
they save their time for the cases they believe require the most, delegating as
much as possible of the work they view as routine to non-Article III adjuncts.
Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 3.
498. Peters, supra note 496, at 1892.
499. Id.
500. Id.
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state courts."'
Joint educational programs: Joint state-federal judicial
educational programs "would stretch educational resources
and facilitate the exchange of new ideas."5'
I want to emphasize the first of these, state and federal judge
cooperation and collaboration in trial administration. At the 1992
National Conference, Judge Schwarzer and his FJC colleagues told
stories about the way individual trial judges were coordinating
litigation in the state and federal courts.503 At the present Confer-
ence, we heard more about administrative and litigation coordina-
tion from the panel moderated by Judge Fitzpatrick."' George B.
Cauthen described the intricacies of bankruptcy procedure that
necessitate coordination.0 Deborah M. Russell described the in-
terplay of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, class actions, and
the provisions for multi-district litigation that are on the books and
what creative lawyers and judges are doing with them.S°" Judge
Starcher described the West Virginia practical experiments with
coordinating discovery."°
As we heard, there is a premium placed on this kind of coordi-
nation in bankruptcy and mass tort litigation. But those insights
and techniques can and will be generalized across the docket in the
future. Likewise, we heard the panel moderated by Plato Chacheris
describe some of the problems in search of solutions on the crimi-
nal side. 8
Most of the work in the court system gets done at the trial
level. Most of the judicial federalism can be expected to take place
there °9 State trial judges and federal trial judges have a great
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination of Liti-
gation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689 (1992).
504. Middle Atlantic State-Federal Judicial Relationships Conference, Administrative and
Litigation Coordination Between the State and Federal Courts (Judge Johanna L.
Fitzpatrick, moderator).
505. George B. Cauthen, Bankruptcy and State/Federal Judicial Relations (1994) (text
available from author).
506. Deborah M. Russell, Management of Mass Tort Litigation: Class Actions and Mul-
ti-District Litigation (1994) (text available from author).
507. Larry V. Starcher, Discovery Issues/Coordination (1994) (text available from au-
thor).
508. Middle Atlantic State-Federal Judicial Relationships Conference, Criminal Case
Processing in the Middle Atlantic States (Plato Chacheris, moderator).
509. Frank M. Coffin, Grace Under Pressure: A Call for Judicial Self-Help, 50 Oino
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deal in common. They live and work in the same community.
They come from the same bar, as do the attorneys that appear in
their courts. They belong to the same local organizations. It is not
uncommon that a federal judge once sat on the state bench. They
know each other and each other's problems. They ought to be
disposed to help each other. There are differences, of course, in
what they do and how they do it, but the similarities ought to be
emphasized. They need each other's help. And they need each
other's help most with what they do most: preparing and trying
cases.
Judge Schwarzer's account brings together stories from past
isolated coordinations that, in the future, will become the norm in
such cases. In appropriate situations, we can expect state and feder-
al courts to coordinate discovery and pretrial proceedings related to
discovery and settlement, to hold joint hearings and even joint
trials. State and federal intersystem coordination will be more in
evidence in the future because it has "proven effective" at
"promot[ing] economy, efficiency, and consistency." ' l In the fu-
ture, we can expect innovative coordinations using courts' comput-
ers. Judges might establish procedures for sharing law clerks and
staff attorneys, in effect detailing them to perform all the support
work in a case for both courts.
There was a time when I advocated an amendment to the rele-
vant federal and state rules of civil procedure to authorize
intersystem cooperation.51 ' Now I am not so sure this is needed
or even a good idea. When it comes to rules of procedure, judges
tend to be either strict constructionists or loose constructionists.
The former will not do anything not explicitly authorized in the
rules; the latter will do anything not explicitly prohibited in the
rules. A general rule approving intersystem cooperation will not
provide a loose constructionist with any more incentive to experi-
ment; a detailed rule might retard strict constructionists. These
intersystem initiatives have more of the quality of a local rule or a
standing order, than a national or statewide rule.
In the future, I predict more trial judges and courts will under-
take more intersystem coordination without any formal rule chang-
es, encouraged by better communication possibilities. The National
ST. U. 399, 401 (1989).
510. Schwarzer et al., supra note 503, at 1732.
511. Id. at 1750.
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Center for State Courts already is compiling a manual of the most
effective procedures that state and federal courts have developed to
cooperate with each other."2 Greater involvement in cooperative
ventures will lead to new methods, as the practice becomes more
accepted and more widespread. Certainly, what I have heard at this
Conference seconds the notion that this will be a fruitful area for
judicial federalism in the coming years. It is critical that these
judge-to-judge initiatives be studied, evaluated and reported, so that
other judges can use and adapt techniques 3
C. Court-to-Court Initiatives
Moving up from judge-to-judge initiatives, there is future possi-
bility for court-to-court coordination at the appellate level in the
area of federal habeas corpus in state death penalty cases. Recall
that earlier I predicted Congress will not enact any reform for this
pressure point in judicial federalism. Nonetheless, there is some
possibility for judicial reform of the applicable procedures. I base
this suggestion on the current controversy in the Ninth Circuit.
Back in February 1994, prompted by the controversy and procedur-
al complications in the execution of Robert Alton Harris,5 14 the
Ninth Circuit promulgated a new Local Rule 22 for the circuit for
federal habeas appeals in state death penalty cases.1 Briefly
summarized, the new local rule: divides habeas corpus litigation
into first petition and subsequent petition components;" 6 directs
that the same three-judge panel handle all litigation in a particular
capital case; 7 applies to related non-habeas litigation;"' institu-
tionalizes single-judge stays of execution;1 9 and creates multiple
levels of en banc review which may be conducted without a major-
ity vote of the judges."l
The point needs to be explicitly made that I am NOT approving
or endorsing the contents of the Ninth Circuit Rule. That would be
512. Announcement, Manual to Share Ideas, CoURT ADMIN. BULLETIN, Sept. 1994, at 1
(contact Tom Munsterman, National Center for State Courts, 1700 N. Moore Street, Suite
1710, Arlington, VA 22209).
513. Geoff Gallas, Judicial Leadership Excellence: A Research Prospectus, 12 JusT. SYS.
L 39 (1987).
514. Vasquez v. Harris, 112 S. Ct. 1713 (1992).
515. 9TH Cm. R. 22.
516. 9TH CIR. R. 22-3, 22-4.
517. 9TH Cm. R. 22-2(a)(3).
518. Id.
519. 9TH CIR. R. 22-4(d)(5).
520. 9TH CIR. R. 22-4(e).
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inappropriate for me to do. Attorneys General from Arizona, Cali-
fornia, Nevada, and Oregon have asked the Judicial Conference of
the United States to exercise its statutory power to abrogate the
Rule, and the matter currently is pending before the Standing Com-
mittee on Rules of which I am a member.52" '
What I am endorsing is the future possibility of using local
rules of the circuits to deal with regional problems that are of a
recurring nature. It is important to remember that the regional U.S.
courts. of appeals are "separate and designedly distinct institu-
tions." 22 Each has "a unique social and judicial culture."5" The
most logical unit of federal government to deal with some issues
of judicial federalism is the circuit. Such appellate court-to-court
cooperation could be accomplished regionally between the state
supreme courts and the courts of appeals. Again, without comment-
ing on the merits of the Ninth Circuit's new Rule 22, federal habe-
as in state death cases is an important and recurring concern for
state and federal courts that might be dealt with in the future by
court rules.524
Another possibility for innovative local rules might be to estab-
lish formal written procedures on the federal side for the certifica-
tion of questions of state law to the state courts. 52 These could
and should be coordinated with the state supreme courts, in a
cooperative effort to draft the most efficient and useful federal
court procedures. Establishing new uniform certification procedures
on the federal court side should be accompanied by a reevaluation
of existing state statutes and rules for certification as well. 26 I
have always thought of the certification device as a missed oppor-
tunity for judicial federalism for the simple reason that not enough
521. Brief of the State Attorneys General of Ariz., Cal., Nev., and Or. (Sept. 14, 1994)
(available from author).
522. BAKER, supra note 119, at 107.
523. Id.
524. See Marchus M. Kaufman, Crisis in the Courts, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1990, at 28, 32
(discussing the inability of California courts to enforce the death penalty); Victoria Slind-
Flor, 9th Circuit's Theme: Federalism, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 30, 1993, at 3, 32 (discussing
tensions between state and federal courts in federal habeas corpus cases).
525. See Jack J. Rose, Note, Erie R.R. and State Power to Control State Law: Switch-
ing Tracks to New Certification of Questions of Law Procedures, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV.
421, 450-51 (1989) (proposing federal rule of appellate procedure which would facilitate
certification procedures).
526. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 493 n.21 (1983) (ex-
plaining that state authorized certification procedures simplify submission of questions of
state statutory interpretation to state supreme courts).
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questions are certified. Regularizing the procedures from the federal
side would encourage greater usage, as would expansion of the
procedure from the state side to authorize the federal district courts
to certify questions. While only about half of the states currently
allow for federal district court certifications, this represents a great
potential gain for judicial federalism.
Certification might be made reciprocal on the federal side.
Given the phenomenon of "federalization," state courts will be
deciding more and more questions of federal law. We ought to
consider authorizing state courts to certify questions of federal law
to the federal courts of appeals. This would have to be accom-
plished with a new federal jurisdictional statute. In one sense this
makes more sense at the courts of appeals level than at the Su-
preme Court level. The courts of appeals have become regional
"mini-supreme courts" for many issues of federal law on which
there is a "conflict among the circuits." These conflicts persist and
accumulate with the consequence that the controlling law of the
circuit is different from region to region.527
In fact, the mechanism of "[c]ertification has a long history in
federal practice." ' It has existed since the beginning of the fed-
eral courts down to the present statute that authorizes courts of ap-
peals to certify questions of federal law to the Supreme Court.529
This certification procedure has been used only three times in the
last thirty years" and has been described as "an anachronism
that the courts of appeals should not use."53' Certifying questions
of federal law within the federal court system compromises two
important Supreme Court policies: the avoidance of unnecessary
decisions of abstract questions of law and the discretion of the
Court over its docket. Neither of these problems would apply to
questions of federal law certified by state supreme courts to the
federal courts of appeals.
Two federal procedures already on the books are somewhat
similar to the statute being proposed, although they relate to certifi-
cations within the federal system. A district court can certify a
527. See BAKER, supra note 119, at 17-21 (explaining that increasing numbers of ap-
peals prohibit the Supreme Court from reviewing appellate interpretations of federal law
resulting in regional discrepancies).
528. WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 777.
529. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1988).
530. WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 778 n.33.
531. Id at 778.
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partial final judgment to the court of appeals under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b) if more than one claim is presented or multi-
ple parties are involved and the matter in question is separable and
has been finally decided. 32 Even more analogous is the little-used
permissive interlocutory appeal authorized in 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b). 33 Upon entering an order that is not otherwise appeal-
able and that decides a controlling issue of law about which there
is substantial uncertainty, a district court may certify the question
and the court of appeals may decide it.534
D. Judiciary-to-Judiciary Initiatives
Moving up from court-to-court, the next group of future initia-
tives will take place at the judiciary-to-judiciary level of judicial
federalism. These activities take place between representative bodies
such as the Conference of Chief Justices, the Judicial Conference
of the United States, the National State-Federal Judicial Council,
and State-Federal Judicial Councils in the states. However, these
initiatives are not confined within the judicial branches. Rather,
many of the most important future activities in this category will
be joint ventures of the state and federal judicial branches aimed at
those outside the courts. The challenges of the future will place a
high premium on efforts by the judicial branches to make their
case to the legislative branch, the bar, the academy, and the public.
At this level, the job description of judges "change[s] from being
an arbiter within the courts to being an arbiter for the courts." 35
The essential attitude for judiciary-to-judiciary initiatives is
cooperation. Only through cooperation can the state and federal
judiciaries maximize their chances to influence those outside the
courts. Unilateral or self-interested behavior surely will worsen the
overall situation of the courts. 36 The state and federal judiciaries
532. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b); THoMAS E. BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF
THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALs § 3.05 (1989).
533. See BAKER, supra note 532, § 4.03 (explaining the process whereby district courts
may bring interlocutory appeals to circuit courts to decide controversial legal issues).
534. It is somewhat relevant to my earlier proposal to promulgate Local Rules of the
Circuit to note here that in 1992 Congress amended the jurisdictional statute by adding a
new section that authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate rules authorizing interlocuto-
ry appeals within the federal system. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (Supp. V 1993).
535. Peters, supra note 496, at 1893 (paraphrasing Malcolm M. Lucas, Keynote Address
at the National Conference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships, 78 VA. L. REV. 1663,
1669 (1992)).
536. Cf. Note, To Form a More Perfect Union: Federalism and Informal Interstate
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need to worry together about certain problems, and they need to
devise solutions together.
1. Organization
To worry together and to find solutions together, the judiciaries
must first come together. The national bodies representing state and
federal courts are the Conference of Chief Justices and the Judicial
Conference of the United States. State jurists serve on the Judicial
Conference's various Rules Committees. Both the Judicial Confer-
ence and the Conference of Chief Justices have standing commit-
tees consisting of state and federal judges who are charged with an
ongoing assessment of ways to improve relations between the two
judicial branches. Meetings of these committees and meetings of
individual leaders and representatives of the state and federal judi-
cial branches on particular topics increase the familiarity and
knowledge critical to cooperation.
There needs to be greater interaction, in the future, between the
support organizations of both judiciaries. The Administrative Office
of U.S. Courts and the Federal Judicial Center and their state ad-
ministrative counterparts should be expected to emulate the judges.
They should come together on an organized and regular basis to
keep each other informed, bring to bear their expertise on common
problems, and facilitate greater cooperation between the state and
federal courts.
Traditionally, the Conference of Chief Justices and the Judicial
Conference of the United States have been inwardly oriented, but a
signal event for the future of judicial federalism was the creation
of the National Judicial Council of State and Federal Courts.3 7
The concept originated in a resolution of the Conference of Chief
Justices that was endorsed by the Federal Courts Study Commit-
tee. 38 The two parent conferences created the National Judicial
Council in 1990 and positioned it between themselves and the
state-federal councils. 39 Its charge was:
Cooperation, 102 HARv. L. REv. 842, 844-47 (1989) (discussing generally the importance
of cooperation between the federal government and the separate state governments but not
specifically addressing the courts).
537. See Edward B. McConnell, Planning for the State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L.
REV. 1849, 1854-57 (1992) (describing the impact of the creation of the National Judicial
Council of State and Federal Courts).
538. See STUDY CoMMr=rE REPORT, supra note 416, at 52-53.
539. McConnell, supra note 537, at 1854.
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first, to review the work of these local councils, so as to
identify problems of national concern to the state and fed-
eral courts; second, to consider reports made by the state-
federal relations committees of its two parent conferences;
third, to prepare an annual report setting forth its program
for the year; fourth, to convene an annual conference to
discuss its report and the issues therein identified; and fifth,
to undertake such other activities as might advance the
purposes of state-federal judicial system cooperation."
At the next level of cooperation we find the state-federal judi-
cial councils organized at the state level. These were initiated by
Chief Justice Burger and enjoyed a peak level of activity during
the 1970s, then all but disappeared during the 1980s, and now are
making a comeback that seems encouraging. 4' One of the priori-
ties for these reincarnations is to achieve some continuity. 42 They
owe their first incarnation to a perception of growing friction be-
tween the state and federal courts. Their resurgence may be fairly
attributed to a perception of growing commonality. 43 The new
emphasis is on communication, cooperation, and coordination.
There has been some sentiment expressed that the next logical
organization, at least in larger cities, is a metropolitan state-federal
judicial council.5" At the metropolitan level, the local council
could function as a clearinghouse to inform, encourage, and pro-
mote the expansion of successful judge-to-judge initiatives in judi-
cial federalism.
All these conferences and councils must have some reason for
being, something to do. And one thing they do is hold meetings
and sponsor conferences. Over the last several years, state and
federal judges have participated in many important national meet-
ings: the 1990 Conference on the Future of the Courts; the 1990
National Conference on Court Management; the 1992 National
540. Id. at 1854-55.
541. See id. at 1856-57 (stating that although only nine state councils were active in
1980, 19 were active in 1990).
542. See generally Office of Interjudicial Affairs, Organizing and Using a Council of
State and Federal Judges (Fed. Jud. Ctr. ed., 1993) (explaining how to organize and main-
tain continuity).
543. William W. Schwarzer, Long-Range Planning Suggestions for State-Federal Judicial
Councils, PROC. OF THE W. REGIONAL CoNF. ON ST.-FED. JUD. RELATIONSHIPS, June 4-5,
1993, at 70, 71.
544. Id. at 73.
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Conference on Court Technology; and the 1992 National Confer-
ence on State-Federal Judicial Relationships.545 These national
meetings have been followed up by the 1993 Western Regional
Conference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships and this 1994
Middle Atlantic State-Federal Judicial Relationships Conference.
Meetings and conferences are important because a critical mass is
necessary for the generation of the new ideas that are so critical to
court reform.5"
The state-level councils appear to be at risk for repeating the
cycle of decline from which they have only recently recovered.
During that past cycle, the councils declined due to insufficient
funding and staffing, lack of leadership, an inability or an unwill-
ingness to deal with certain issues, a failure to set substantive
priorities, and, most of all, the disillusionment which follows unre-
alistic expectations.547 In many of the councils' accounts of them-
selves from the present cycle, several themes emerge: the need for
assuring continuity, the importance of dialogue, and the background
uncertainty of their mission.5' At their meetings, judges, who like
other busy people have too many meetings to attend, seem to find
themselves looking around for something to do.
In the future, as they struggle to define their mission, it will be
important not to expect too much from the state-level councils.
They exist as ad hoc bodies with a primary goal of communication
rather than as official institutions with public policy responsibili-
ties.549 They are valuable as a needed forum.55 ' Borrowing a
545. McConnell, supra note 537, at 1857 (listing conferences from 1971 to 1992).
546.
We can start by letting ideas flourish. Ideas are the critical mass of communi-
cations and the fuel of politics. Some ideas succeed and others do not. The
only risk in sharing ideas is that dreams of successful implementation and
execution may exceed reality. What is the alternative?
Robert W. Kastenmeier, Let Ideas Flourish: How We Can Improve Our Justice System, 72
JUDICATURE 122 (1988).
547. Samuel W. Phillips, Creating and Sustaining Successful State-Federal Judicial Coun-
cils, Middle Atlantic State-Federal Judicial Relationships Conference (1994) (outline ex-
plained in speech at conference is available with author).
548. See, e.g., Reports of State-Fedeial Judicial Councils: State-by-State Priorities, PROC.
OF THE W. REGIONAL CONF. ON ST.-FED. JUD. RELATIONSHIPS, June 4-5, 1993, at 82-92
(including descriptions of the atmosphere of state-federal judicial relationships and goals in
the near future for judicial councils for the following states: Alaska, Arizona, California,
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington).
549. Schwarzer, supra note 543, at 70.
550.
Activities such as these, which bring together judges and administrators from
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page from the experiences in the Ninth Circuit, state-level councils
should consider sponsoring meetings and symposia on judicial
federalism issues of a recurring nature, such as capital habeas
proceedings or bankruptcy. 5' They can exchange information
about studies of gender fairness in the courts and how to orches-
trate appropriate responses. They can trade ideas on handling pro
se litigation, the use of interpreters, and scheduling around counsel
conflicts. Issues about televising trials and appeals have been mere-
ly postponed by the Judicial Conference's recent decision to dis-
continue the federal experiment; there are some who want Congress
to get into the act.5 52 State courts have a great deal to teach fed-
eral courts about media.
State-level councils do have some potential to act as the inter-
face between the judiciaries and the state legislature. Additionally,
they represent additional potential for grassroots lobbying of the
state's congressional delegation, but this will require coordination
from the National Judicial Council for the State and Federal
Courts.
2. Relations with the Political Branches
Courts always have and always will depend on the kindness of
strangers, strangers in the executive and legislative branches.5 3
This audience need not be reminded that "[i]n the long run, legis-
lators are indispensable to properly functioning courts."5 4 In the
future, the various judiciary-to-judiciary bodies must work in con-
both the state and federal systems, as well as attorneys who practice in both
forums, are effective for the sharing of ideas and experiences and for learning
new and better ways of doing things.
McConnell, supra note 537, at 1857.
551. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, State-Federal Judicial Councils: the National Ex-
perience (1994) (outline listing such meetings, symposiums, and achievements is available
with author).
552. See Tony Mauro, Camera Debate Was Sloppy and Shallow, LEGAL TIMES, Sept.
26, 1994, at 10 (criticizing decision to keep cameras out).
553. "Whoever you are-I have always depended on the kindness of strangers." THOM-
AS 'T-ENNESSEE" WELLiAMS, A STREETCAR NAMED DESIRE act HI, sc. 11, at 170 (1953)
(quoting character of Blanche DuBois). For a discussion of policies Congress should adopt
when enacting legislation regarding judicial administration, see Cornelius M. Kerwin, Judi-
cial Implementation of Public Policy: The Courts and Legislation for the Judiciary, 16
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415, 439-40 (1979) (concluding that the judiciary and legislature
should reach a consensus, the legislation should not be overly specific and the legislation
should attempt to utilize existing judicial structure).
554. Meador, supra note 386, at 1897.
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cert to improve relations with the legislative branch. The 1990
National Conference on Legislative-Judicial Relations,5 55 attended
by state and federal leaders from both branches, made the follow-
ing recommendations for the future of interbranch relations: "(1)
increased use of formal communication mechanisms; (2) develop-
ment within states of coordinated statements of judicial branch
views on legislation so that the judiciary can speak to the legisla-
ture with a single voice; (3) establishment of interbranch education-
al and orientation programs on branch procedures, perspectives, and
problems; (4) encouragement of outside groups, such as bar associ-
ations, to serve as intermediaries between the legislature and the
judiciary; (5) use of court and legislative staff to serve as inter-
branch liaisons; (6) increased use of legislative and judicial study
commissions and task forces composed of representatives appointed
by each branch; and (7) state and regional conferences to improve
local legislative-judicial relationships."556
The "mportance of good relations with the state legislature for
finding solutions for the current court funding crisis was discussed
above. But state legislators also bear the responsibility for the
statutory jurisdiction and organization of the state courts and for
the selection and tenure arrangements for state judges. 7 A for-
mer state legislator described the common general legislative per-
spective on the judiciary that must be overcome: "ITihere is a
combination of awe and resentment toward judges-especially from
nonlawyer legislators-judges are aloof and remote-except when
they want a pay raise-and judges are paid a lot more than law-
makers."558 Given the trend in many state legislatures toward
higher percentages of nonlawyer members, legislative attitudes
toward the courts are likely to worsen, unless the judiciary suc-
ceeds in dispelling these misperceptions.559 The tradition of the
independent judiciary and the lore of separation of powers oblige
the judicial branches to proceed "judiciously" in such matters, to
remain apart from the rough and tumble of ordinary politics. The
members of the judicial branches, however, would be derelict in
555. See Andrew D. Christie & Nancy C. Maron, Find a Better Way to Work with the
Legislature: How to Establish a Constructive Relationship, JUDGEs' J., Summer 1991, at
14 (discussing the participants and the purposes of the conference).
556. McConnell, supra note 14, at 9, 13, 40.
557. Meador, supra note 386, at 1898.
558. Ira Pilchen, The Future and the Courts: A Perspective from Illinois, 76 JUDICA-
TuRE 137, 142 (1992).
559. Id.
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their duty if they did not participate in the public policy relating to
court issues."W
As was discussed above, Congress directly controls federal
court jurisdiction. Indirectly, the federal jurisdiction statutes deter-
mine the respective role of the state courts. Congress deserves the
credit or the blame for "federalization." (Recall the potential case-
load implications attributable to the proposals for federal health
care legislation.) Congress, as a matter of constitutional course,
determines the budget of the federal courts."6' Congress lately al-
so has wielded a significant power over the funding of state courts.
The $30 billion Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994 is the most recent example. Thus, Congress is the prover-
bial 800-pound gorilla in any picture of the future of the state and
federal courts. Just getting along with a gorilla is difficult enough,
getting one to do something is even more of a challenge. What
makes this so difficult is that "Congress is largely oblivious of the
well-being of the judiciary as an institution, and the judiciary often
seems unaware of the critical nuances of the legislative pro-
cess."'62 In the movie "Cool Hand Luke," remember what the
warden told Paul Newman when he was having problems adjusting
to this kind of authoritarian relationship: "What we've got here is a
failure to communicate." 63
The federal judiciary and the state judiciary need each other's
help. A friend of mine, who currently sits on the federal bench and
who previously sat on his state's supreme court, a judge of some
reputation and bearing, told me about the time he was making a
call on a member of Congress about some issue important to the
federal judiciary. After only a few minutes, the member took an-
other call and shuttled the judge onto a staffer, who listened briefly
until he determined the subject matter. Then the staffer interrupted
to explain to the judge how busy he was on other more important,
more pressing matters and the meeting ended. The judge left frus-
trated without being heard.
560. Cf. Edward N. Beiser, Perspectives on the Judiciary, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 475, 477-
79 (1990) (describing the tension between the need to resolve disputes using precedent
and the need to make policy decisions as "institutional schizophrenia").
561. See generally Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, Funding the Federal Judi-
ciary: The Congressional Connection, 69 JUDICATURE 43 (1985) (discussing different strat-
egies the federal judiciary uses to obtain proper funding from Congress).
562. Robert A. Katzmann, The Underlying Concerns, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TO-
WARD INSTITUTIONAL CoMrrY, supra note 54, at 7.
563. FRANK R. PIERSON, COOL HAND LUKE (1967) (screenplay).
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What can be done? I submit that state and federal judges must
join forces to advocate their shared agenda for judicial federalism.
They must maximize their contacts and influence. First, the judicial
federalism agenda for the future must be established by the state-
national bodies working together. This is not intended as any threat
to the autonomy of the National Conference of Chief Justices or
the Judicial Conference of the United States. Second, the judiciaries
must rely on existing mechanisms and develop new mechanisms
for dealing with Congress."6 The Legislative and Public Affairs
Office in the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts is an example
of a familiar mechanism. Different new mechanisms need to be
imagined to work more directly with two different groups: the
members and staff of the Judiciary Committees, who are more
knowledgeable about court issues, and the members and staff of
the Authorizing Committees/Appropriations Committees as well as
the other committees that can and do affect the courts. These new
mechanisms should be designed differently to deal with different
stages of the legislative process: problem identification and initia-
tion of legislation, consideration and enactment, and postenactment
oversight."
In the past, more emphasis has been placed by the judiciary on
the judge-to-member contact than on the staff-to-staff contact. My
story about my federal judge friend, however, illustrates why it
will be important in the future for the courts to have permanent
staff with full-time responsibilities for congressional liaison. Ongo-
ing relationships at this level are essential for the long term."
New mechanisms for improving the relationship between the courts
and Congress might resemble existing mechanisms between Con-
gress and the executive branch. One best example is the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations that was created by
Congress "to monitor the operation of the American federal system
and to recommend improvements." '567
I must confess that I am not hopeful. The future of the courts,
state and federal, is in large part under the control of Congress.
564. Robert A. Katzmann, The Continuing Challenge, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS:
TOWARD INsTiTnTONAL CoMrY, supra note 54, at 185.
565. l
566. See id. at 188 (discussing various methods for bringing these two groups closer
together).
567. Id. ("It is a permanent national bipartisan body, created by Congress, representing
the executive and the legislative branches of the federal, state, and local governments and
the public.").
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Currently, the importance of judicial federalism is lost on members
and preserving it will demand a higher degree of care than I see
them devoting to any issue today. But I cannot improve on the
concluding observations of the 1986 Brookings Institution colloqui-
um on the relationship between the courts and Congress:
Apart from reaching some understanding about the ground
rules for communication and issues relating to statutory
construction, interpretation, and revision, it is vital to con-
sider practical ways to improve the mechanisms for interac-
tion between the judiciary and Congress. Such an analysis
has at least three components: evaluating structural change
within the judiciary and Congress; applying lessons from
other approaches; and ascertaining ways to promote ongo-
ing exchanges.56
As for the other political branch, the relationship between the
judiciary and the executive branch understandably receives less
attention than that with the legislative branch, "[b]ut it would be a
mistake to ignore the necessity for establishing better channels of
communication with the executive.,1 69 At the national level, the
Department of Justice is a likely ally on many issues. These days
it does not have the focus it once had when there was an Office
for Improvements in the Administration of Justice,"'0 but the Of-
fice for Policy Development has possibilities.57' On the state side,
the relationship between the state judiciary and the governor is
critical to any hope for improvement in the state of the courts.
3. Mobilizing "Friends of the Courts"
Building a consensus among those inside the judicial branches
is a means toward the end of influencing the legislative branches
for the good of the courts. That consensus ought to be broadened
568. Id. at 185. The present author was a colloquium participant. Conference Partici-
pants, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOwARD INSITrUTIONAL COMITY, supra note 54, ar
193. See also Robert A. Katzmann, Wayne Morse Forum, November 10, 1992: Have We
Lost the Ability to Govern? The Challenge of Making Public Policy, 72 ORE. L. REV.
229, 243-46 (1993) (discussing proposed mechanisms for increasing understanding between
the judiciary and the other branches).
569. COFFIN, supra note 42, at 321.
570. See generally Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the Federal Circuit: A Personal Ac-
count, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 581 (1992) (discussing the reasons for establishing the Office
for Improvements in the Administration of Justice).
571. COFFIN, supra note 42, at 322.
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to include those outside the judiciary who use the courts: the bar,
the academy, and the public. These groups represent possible allies
for the judges, but they also have a great stake in the effective
administration of the courts. Involving the private sector brings
different perspectives and additional resources to the judicial feder-
alism effort. Broader involvement also makes it more difficult for
the legislative branches to practice benign neglect of the courts.
This will require a great deal of communication and coordina-
tion among existing judiciary and judiciary-related entities, includ-
ing the Judicial Conference of the United States, the Conference of
Chief Justices, the National State-Federal Judicial Council and state
level councils, the National Conference of State Trial Judges, the
National Conference of Federal Trial Judges, the Conference of
State Court Administrators, the Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts, the Federal Judicial Center, the National Center for State
Courts, and the State Justice Institute.
a. The Bar
Members of the bar have a different perspective on the courts
than judges' They are concerned, and should be, about the
problems facing the courts. They are worrying about such issues as
the displacement of civil trials by drug cases and the implications
for greater reliance on alternative dispute resolution. They will have
to keep up with how the law will deal with scientific advances and
how courts will rely on new technologies, such as computers and
electronic filings. Most importantly, members of the bar must insist
that "[tihe strength and vitality of [the] court[s] cannot be compro-
mised by inadequate compensation, poorer facilities or working
conditions, or insufficient support staff."'  The organized bar is
in a position to come to the aid of the courts. Legislators must
hear lawyers' voices alongside the judges'. It is incumbent on the
judges to involve the bar.
More bar participation at conferences like this is in order. But
bar representatives also ought to be included on the state-federal
judicial councils. Those councils, in turn, ought to encourage state
and national bar associations to form standing bench-bar commit-
tees charged with the responsibility to work for court reform and
572. See, e.g., Pamela J. Wlhite, The Future From a Practitioner's Perspective, 50 MD.
L. REV. 71, 71-74 (1991).
573. Id. at 73.
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improvements in the state legislatures and in Congress. The judicia-
ries need to organize themselves to sustain a long term dialogue
with the courts. Within that ongoing relationship, the bar must
contribute to judicial initiatives inside the courts and with the legis-
lative branches. For the judges' part, they will be obliged to accept
members of the bar as equal partners in finding solutions for the
problems facing the courts. 74
Does anyone doubt whether the organized bars and their mem-
berships will assume a prominent role in the debates over the
issues discussed earlier in this paper: court funding, alternative
dispute resolution, futures studies, federalization, and reform of
jurisdiction and procedure?575 The bar already is motivated. It will
be up to the judiciary, in the future, to activate the bar and to
involve lawyers in a meaningful way in judicial federalism initia-
tives. Lawyers, by their numbers and influence, are critical to the
success of these initiatives." Existing entities, such as the
A.B.A.'s Judicial Administration Division and Appellate Judges'
Conference, must be redirected to take the lead on relevant court
issues.
b. The Academy
You might suppose that judges could be confident of recruiting
numerous allies among the law professorate." 7 But these days
one encounters some strange characters in the groves of aca-
deme.57 The judicial branches will have to borrow the strategy
574. "Today's lawyer must also contribute by assuming his or her share of the problem-
solving duty." J. Clifford Wallace, The Future of the Judiciary: A Proposal, 27 CAL. W.
L. REV. 361, 365 (1991).
575. Perceptions of the Bar, PROC. OF THE W. REGIONAL CONF. ON ST.-FED. JUD. RE-
LATIONSHIPS, June 4-5, 1993, at 56-63 (discussions of these issues).
576. See generally Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil
Justice, 28 GA. L. REv. 633 (1994) (examining the reasons why American lawyers are
seen as major actors responsible for major problems); Robert L. Nelson, The Futures of
American Lawyers: A Demographic Profile of a Changing Profession in a Changing Soci-
ety, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 345 (1994) (suggesting ways in which the explosive
growth in the legal industry can be channelled to better society); Symposium, The 21st
Century Lawyer: Is There a Gap to Be Narrowed?, 69 WASH. L. REv. 505 (1994) (dis-
cussing the need for law schools to restructure their curriculums in order to better prepare
their students to practice in the profession).
577. See generally Kenneth F. Ripple, The Judge and the Academic Community, 50
OHIO ST. LJ. 1237 (1989).
578. This is not intended as a slight against academic diversity. Professor Althouse tells
the story of a visit by Chief Justice Rehnquist to speak at her law school:
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from the marines and sign up a few good professors.
Several years ago, U.S. Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards ad-
dressed the annual meeting of law teachers and complained that
legal education is "falling short of any meaningful effort to 'shape
the legal profession.""' Having traded academic tenure for Arti-
cle III tenure, Judge Edwards was secure enough to follow up that
address with a 1992 article in the Michigan Law Review express-
ing his deep concern about "the growing disjunction between legal
education and the profession.""80 He worried that the law schools
and the profession were moving in opposite directions. He charged
that the law schools were not doing what they should be doing:
"training ethical practitioners and producing scholarship that judges,
legislators, and practitioners can use.""58 Judge Edwards described
the response to his article as "nothing short of extraordinary.""58
He was "overwhelmed" and "amazed" at the positive reactions
from all directions. 83 The academy, apparently unaware of the
irony, reacted by holding a symposium about Judge Edwards'
article, offering various explanations and defenses to his charge 84
Frankly, I do not understand all the fuss. Judge Edwards' story
is not a "man bites dog" kind of headline. Pull any issue of a
The Chief told some jokes, elaborated on his ties to Wisconsin, and discoursed
at length about the workload of the courts. The issues were neutral, administra-
tive, managerial, structural.
"Did he say anything provocative?" asked a colleague who had missed
the speech.
"He never got any more provocative than to say he's against diversity."
My friend was shocked. "He's against diversityl!??"
"Diversity jurisdiction," I said, realizing she was not a proceduralist.
Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wechsler Hotel, 47 VAND. L.
REv. 993, 994 (1994).
579. Harry T. Edwards, The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Legal Profession,
38 J. LEGAL EDuc. 285, 285 (1988).
580. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992).
581. Id.
582. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 MIH. L. REV. 2191, 2191 (1993).
583. Id. at 2193. See also Harry T. Edwards, Another "Postscript" to "The Growing
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession", 69 WASH. L. REV. 561,
562 (1994) (expounding further on the overwhelming responses to his article).
584. See Symposium, Legal Education, 91 MtcH. L. REV. 1921 (1993). Some predict
that in the future, technology will narrow the gap. See Ronald W. Staudt, Does the
Grandmother Come With It?: Teaching and Practicing Law in the 21st Century, 44 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 499 (1994) (offering suggestions on how 21st century communications
technology can draw together law professors and practicing professors).
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prestigious law review and read the table of contents. Many of you
are judges, ask yourself when was the last time you found a law
review article helpful in your judicial decisionmaking 85 Law pro-
fessors mostly write articles for each other. 86 Like their univer-
sity colleagues, most law school professors are in thrall to theo-
ry.87 I am guilty of some of it myself. 8
Most law professors, like most judges and most lawyers, do
not spend a lot of time thinking about the great issues of court
administration. 89 But some do. Judges should recruit professors
who regularly teach courses about the state and federal courts to
get involved in court reform. Many of these professors served as
585. See Patricia M. Wald, Teaching the Trade: An Appellate Judge's View of Practice-
Oriented Legal Education, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 35, 42 (1986) (stating that "too few law
review articles prove helpful in appellate decision making.").
586. See Conference on Constitutional Law: Constitutional Theory and the Practice of
Judging, 63 COLO. L. REV. 291 (1992) (debating to whom constitutional theorists are
speaking and if anyone is listening).
587.
In the mid-1960s, higher education in the United States began "a gradual but
ineluctable movement away from substance toward theory, away from the em-
pirical data of field studies ... toward ideological readings of the data.
During the 1970s and the '80s, the theoretical menu expanded and diversified,
accommodating a number of special-interest or grievance-group agenda (e.g.,
feminism, environmentalism) as well as a flurry of Continental intellectual fash-
ions, including structuralism, poststructuralism, and deconstruction.
In fairness, the academy, or at least a significant part of it, has already recog-
nized the error of its ways. Substance is making a comeback, even in the
nation's better universities ..... The return to substance has not yet been
decisive, and perhaps it never will be, but the theory-mongers no longer appear
to be in the ascendancy.
Jay Tolson, By Theory Possessed, WILSON Q., Summer 1994, at 4, 4-5. See also Mark
Tushnet, Erudition in the Law Reviews, 44 J. LEGAL EDUc. 249 (1994) (lambasting three
badly written law review articles).
588. See Thomas E. Baker, "The Right of the People to Be Secure ... ": Toward A
Metatheory of the Fourth Amendment, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 881 (1989).
589. Here is what a practicing lawyer said about a paper on federalism written by a
nationally prominent professor at the top-ranked law school:
The paper is court centered ...
The paper is ignorant of actual administrative structure and practice ...
The paper is extremely weak in prescriptions that would be useful to a political
executive, agency administrator, or legislator ...
The irony of these failings is that we are living in a period of great ferment
about "federalism."
Ben W. Heineman, Jr., The Law Schools' Failing Grade on Federalism, 92 YALE L.J.
1349, 1349-50 (1983).
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law clerks. The state-federal judicial councils need to encourage
individual judges to call on their former clerks to get involved.
Judges need to establish a presence in the law schools.5 9' Particu-
larly on the state side, one of the unmined resources available to
judges are the intemship/extemship programs at law schools that
provide student research assistants in chambers.59'
But the law schools and law professors need to involve them-
selves, as well. Law professors can be counted on to involve col-
leagues in the social sciences. They should provide the necessary
research for future structural and procedural reforms.5" Too often,
past debates over court reform have been merely anecdotal rather
than empirical.593 Too often, the promise of reforms has been ex-
aggerated over actual results.594 At universities, judges can find
researchers who are experts in social scientific, empirical research,
experts who can analyze demographic trends, weigh conflicting
data, and determine how to collect additional data on future de-
mands on the courts. Court reformers need to be reminded of
Justice Holmes' observation, "'[i]gnorance is the best of law re-
formers. People are glad to discuss a question on general princi-
ples, when they have forgotten the special knowledge necessary for
technical reasoning."' 595 Initiatives for judicial federalism must be
informed by research. The universities can contribute alongside the
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, the Federal Judicial Center,
the National Center for State Courts, and the State Justice Institute.
There is one important quasi-academic forum worthy of sepa-
rate mention: the American Law Institute. The American Law
Institute is preliminarily considering a project to formulate a revi-
sion of Title 28 of the United States Code, the provisions for fed-
590. Starr, supra note 452, at 8.
591. See id. at 7 (urging judges to make greater use of law students as interns and
externs); JOHN B. OAKLEY & ROBERT S. THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 27-29 (1980) (providing a brief description of judicial externship programs).
592. Wallace, supra note 574, at 364.
593. See generally Baker, supra note 324, at 334 (noting that "the rulemaking process
primarily relies on research by the reporters and on the informed intuition of the members
of the Advisory Committees and the Standing Committee"); Symposium, Empirical Studies
of Civil Procedure, 51 LAW & CONTEmp. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 1 (calling attention to
the problems and issues facing empirical study programs).
594. Geoff Gallas, Court Reform: Has It Been Built on an Adequate Foundation?, 63
JUDICATURE 28, 35-37 (1979).
595. OUvER W. HOLMES, JR., TnE COMMON LAw 64 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963)
quoted in Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a
Moratorium, 59 BROOKLYN L. REv. 841, 841 n.1 (1993).
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eral court jurisdiction. Professor John B. Oakley was commissioned
to prepare a prospectus for the project. The last time the Institute
examined this area, at the request of Chief Justice Earl Warren, the
effort culminated in the 1969 Study of the Division of Jurisdiction
Between the State and Federal Courts."l The 1969 study focused
primarily on the district courts and the their major heads of juris-
diction. It was more noteworthy for bringing attention to problems
of jurisdiction than as a catalyst for legislation. By contrast, the
study now being proposed is expected to "produce a set of recom-
mendations that, insofar as they take statutory form, would have a
realistic chance of adoption, in large part at least, by the Con-
gress." '  This will be a most important forum for debating issues
of judicial federalism in the short term future. It should be incum-
bent on the National Judicial Council of State and Federal Courts
to monitor this development and to participate actively on behalf of
jurisdictional initiatives to restore some of the balance to the feder-
alism divide between state and federal courts, first before the
American Law Institute and then before the Congress.
c. The Public
The present trend will continue in the future. The consumer's
view will be important: "In the future the public will be watching
the courts more closely and judging the judges." ' The public is
a critical ally in any political matter, including the politics of court
reform. Court reform frequently is the victim of organized special
interests with specific agendas. Anyone in Congress will tell you
that it is far easier to kill a bill than it is to pass legislation. The
state and federal judiciaries need to develop what U.S. Circuit
Judge Frank M. Coffin calls citizen surrogates: "a non-partisan
watchdog citizen group, respected by the media and the citizenry
generally, which would therefore be able to have its voice heard on
the most vital issues affecting the courts."' " The bar should act
as an intermediary between the judiciaries and these groups, to
596. AMERICAN LAW INSTIUrE, STUDY OF THE DIvIsION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969).
597. Memorandum from Professor John B. Oakley, University of California at Los An-
geles, to Interested Persons 1 (May 10, 1994) (on file with author).
598. Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Consumer and the Courts, 74 JUDICATURE 93, 94
(1990).
599. COFFIN, supra note 42, at 322.
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organize and focus their efforts on behalf of judicial federalism.'
In fact, the A.B.A. has begun this initiative through its National
Coalition for Justice, an effort to unite lawyers and laypersons in
efforts to improve the justice system." Other bar groups need to
be involved as well, such as the American College of Trial Law-
yers and the National Lawyers' Guild. Public interest groups like
Common Cause also can be expected to support the effort to im-
prove the court system. Coordinating these efforts must take place
at the national level, so this is a task for the National State-Federal
Judicial Council, but the state-federal judicial councils at the state
level can be expected to get involved.
Judge Coffin advises that the judiciaries also must reach out to
the public more generally, to educate voters about the court sys-
tem.' To accomplish this, the courts will have to overcome the
public's lack of confidence in government generally and in the
political system.'° Public opinion polls reveal that the average
citizen is unfamiliar with the courts.' This can take many varied
forms, beginning with effective programs in the public schools and
before other civic groups.'
The people need to be educated about the importance of the
courts and their problems.' In the past, judges have done these
sorts of public appearances as a matter of routine; in the future,
these appearances will be more critical as the issues facing the
courts become more politicized. All politics, including judicial
politics, is local.' This attitude applies inside the courtroom as
well. There, judges must exercise a positive control for the sake of
600. See Frank M. Coffin, Communication Among the Branches: Can the Bar Serve as
a Catalyst?, 75 JUDICATuRE 125, 126 (1991) (calling for the bar to act as a catalyst in
organizing the citizen groups).
601. Don J. DeBenedictis, Facing the Justice Deficit, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1992, at 109, 109;
Excerpts from a Report by the ABA Special Committee on Funding the Justice System,
JUDGES' J., Winter 1932, at 7, 42-43.
602. COFFIN, supra note 42, at 323-25.
603. See Public Confidence in the Judiciary, PROC. OF THE W. REGIONAL CONF. ON
ST.-FED. JuD. RELATIONSHIPS, June 4-5, 1993, at 64 (beginning a dialogue about how
public confidence in the judiciary is affected by various behaviors and actions).
604. Id. at 66.
605. Id. at 68-69.
606. Frank X. Gordon, Jr., The Judicial Image: Is a Facelift Necessary?, JuST. Sys. J.,
Winter 1985, at 315, 315-16; see H.R. REP. No. 512, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), re-
printed in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 6879, 6889 (expressing concern about the lack of public
awareness of legislation aimed at judicial improvement).
607. Public Confidence in the Judiciary, PROC. OF THE W. REGIONAL CONF. ON ST.-
FED. JuD. RELATIONSHips, June 4-5, 1993, at 67.
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litigants, jurors, and witnesses." These interactions with the court
systems shape public perceptions.'
That brings us to television. Like it or not, the unblinking eye
is the icon of our culture."' People's perceptions of the courts,
and nearly everything else, are formed by television.' Television
represents "one particularly appealing vehicle for fostering greater
public awareness of the courts' day-to-day activities. 612 All but a
handful of states allow television coverage of court proceedings
and the federal courts recently conducted an experiment with tele-
vision.613 "Court TV" is a national cable television channel with
more than 14 million subscribers, dedicated exclusively to covering
judicial proceedings.6 4 The O.J. Simpson prosecution has made a
media star out of Judge Lance Ito. Have judges been prepared to
put their best foot forward, instead of in their mouths? Should not
judicial education programs be designed to train judges in some
basic on-camera skills. I should not be heard to advocate "playing
to the camera." The story of a trial has its own drama without
staging, and the judge's role is and must remain dignified. Think
of it from the other direction, however. When actors portray law-
yers and judges, they always bring in legal advisors to show them
how lawyers and judges act.
The press, electronic and print media, fit here in this discus-
sion. Press coverage affects public understanding and political
608. See Susan Snow & Steve Friedland, The Judge as Healer: A Humanistic Perspec-
tive, 69 DENVER U. L. REv. 713, 714 (1992) (favoring a humanistic approach to the
judicial process over which judges have control in order to effect a more positive out-
come for litigants).
609. See Abrahamson, supra note 598, at 95 (noting that inappropriate judicial demeanor
is a frequently voiced public concern about the judiciary).
610. Cf Thomas E. Baker, C-SPAN: A Guide for Law Professors, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC.
295, 296 (1990) (describing the role television plays in a student's education, including a
law student's education). The Federal Judicial Center has experimented with C-SPAN
broadcasting of a seminar. Denis J. Hauptly, The Future of Judicial Education, 40 FED.
B. NEws & J. 503, 507-08 (1993).
611.
We live in an age when people depend upon television to get information. One
national survey found that 65 percent of the people get most of their news
from TV and 50 percent get all of their news from TV.
R. William Ide I, A Grassroots Commitment, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 8.
612. The Future of Our Federal Courts, 74 JUDICATURE 4, 4 (1990).
613. Thomas E. Baker, May It Please the Court: The Most Significant Oral Arguments
Made Before the Supreme Court Since 1955, 69 TULANE L. REv. 319, 322 (1994)
(book/tape review).
614. Harris, supra note 133, at 803-07.
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reactions to individual cases as well as the court system in gener-
al.615 Courts are joining the game late, but they are employing
media relations experts and training judges in press relations.616
The Supreme Court of the United States has had a Public Informa-
tion Officer since 1935.617 The Federal Courts Study Committee
endorsed various proposals to improve future relations between the
courts and the media, including employing media experts, holding
"press days," training judges as spokespersons, and expanding
publications and programs about the courts.618
Education of the public must be a centerpiece on the agenda
for state-federal initiatives. The public needs to know about the
courts. Indeed, the courts need to have a greater understanding of
their constitutional role, their organization, their operation and
procedures, their problems and their proposed solutions.619 Coping
with the challenges of the future will oblige the courts to take a
far more activist and political role than at any previous time in our
history. I borrow Judge Coffin's summary:
The important point is that state and federal courts must
make room in their crowded agenda for educational out-
reach, must obtain expert advice, and must devise a pro-
gram for carrying their cause to the people, because, in the
last analysis, it is the people's cause also. 2
615.
Through its decision whether to report a case, from whom to solicit comments
on the case, and how to react editorially, the press affects not only how widely
a decision will be known but also what the political reaction will be. Press
coverage very often heavily influences whether litigants will appeal, whether the
political branches will take counteraction, even what the aura surrounding a
decision will be when it comes to the attention of higher courts.
Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the
Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARV. L. REV. 887, 895 (1987).
616. Id.
617. THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JusTICE, WHITE BURKETT MILLER CENTER FOR PUBLIC
AFFAIRS 56 (Peter G. Fish ed., 1984).
618. STUDY COMm=TrEE REPORT, supra note 416, at 164-65.
619. McConnell, supra note 14, at 40.
620. COFFIN, supra note 42, at 324; see also Deanna Reece Tacha, Renewing Our Civic
Commitment: Lawyers and Judges as Painters of the "Big Picture," 41 U. KAN. L. REV.
481 (1993) (discussing why lawyers and judges should take on a public education role).
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E. A Postscript on Judicial Federalism Initiatives
In the future, as in the past, judicial federalism initiatives will
not be easily accomplished. Judicial federalism is not itself inevita-
ble. It represents a choice by state and federal judges to come
together for the common good of all who rely on the courts.
Courts and judges, state and federal, have the highest and ultimate
responsibility to the people:
It is worth emphasizing-because it tends to be forgot-
ten-that in the final analysis courts do not exist to govern
themselves effectively. The appropriate standard by which
to judge court governance arrangements is not whether they
produce impressive budgeting systems or extensive legisla-
tive contact. The correct standard is whether governance
helps judges "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action"--weighing the costs of
federal [and state] adjudication to both parties and taxpay-
ers.
621
V. CONCLUSION
The Robert Frost poem from which my subtitle is taken could
have been describing my participation in this conference.6' Dur-
ing this segment, we have resembled those people on the beach
who spend their time looking out to sea. When we look into the
future of judicial federalism, we need to appreciate what we are
capable of seeing-that we cannot see out too far or in too deep.
Whatever we are doing, it is not the scientific method.6 1 My ap-
621. RUSSELL R. WHEELER & GORDON BERMANT, FEDERAL COURT GOVERNANCE: WHY
CONGRESS SHOULD-AND WHY CONGRESS SHOULD NOT-CREATE A FULL-TIME EXECU-
TIVE JUDGE, ABOLISH THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, AND REMOVE CIRCUIT JUDGES FROM
DISTRICT COURT GOVERNANCE 89-90 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. ed., 1994) (footnote omitted).
622. See generally Michael E. Tigar, 2020 Vision: A Bifocal View, 74 JUDICATURE 89,
89-90 (1990) (urging the courts look to the vision of poets to quicken their sense of
humanity).
623. This is true of our efforts to look forward as well as our efforts to look backward
for guidance about what we should expect and how we should reacL Grant Gilmore once
debunked the misperception of these activities as "science":
For two hundred years we have been in thrall to the eighteenth-century hypoth-
esis that there are, in social behavior and in societal development, patterns
which recur in the same way that they appear to recur in the physical universe.
If the hypothesis is sound, it must follow that, once the relevant developmental
sequences which have led us to our present state have been correctly analyzed,
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proach necessarily has been consistent with the motto engraved
outside the National Archives: "What is past is prologue.
'624
Having said that, I want to suggest a few goals for the future in
lieu of a conclusion.
Courts, futurists themselves, are not without suggestions on
how to cope with challenges that are coming.6s Having assessed
the challenges to be encountered in the future, the Delphi Study
offered a list of goals for those who will lead the courts into the
future: (1) improve access to the judicial system; (2) divert classes
of disputes to alternative dispute resolution and administrative
agencies; (3) emphasize judicial management of dispute resolution;
(4) reemphasize the courts' service ethos; (5) develop new initia-
tives in judicial education; (6) expand the lawyers' ability to prac-
tice law holistically and preventatively; (7) exemplify equal justice
under the law; (8) develop improved methodology for dealing with
scientific and technical issues; (9) increase the autonomy of courts
we will know not only where we are but where we are going. Our understand-
ing of the present will enable us to predict the future and, within limits, to
control it. Once the forces at work are known, they can be channeled or har-
nessed to serve the needs and wants not necessarily of mankind at large but at
least of those who are in a position to manipulate them.
We have never had to face up to that frightening possibility for the
excellent reason that no historian, social scientist, or legal theorist has ever
succeeded in predicting anything. After two hundred years of anguished labor,
the great hypothesis has produced nothing. The formulations proposed in each
generation have collapsed when the realities of the following generation have
become known. Nevertheless, the dream dies hard. Each new generation of
investigators has convinced itself that the cause of past failure lay in inadequate
methodology and that, with more refined techniques, the trick will finally be
pulled off. The historians continue to ransack the archives. The sociologists
continue to perfect increasingly complicated ways of carrying on their empirical
studies. It is true that some economists, having observed the fate of all the
theories put forward by their predecessors, have succumbed to skepticism and
seem ready to go out of the long-term prediction business.
One lesson which we can draw from all this is that the hypothesis is
itself in error. Man's fate will forever elude the attempts of his intellect to
understand it. The accidental variables which hedge us about effectively screen
the future from our view. The quest for the laws which will explain the riddle
of human behavior leads us not toward truth but toward the illusion of certain-
ty, which is our curse. So far as we have been able to learn, there are no
recurrent patterns in the course of human events; it is not possible to make
scientific statements about history, sociology, economics-or law.
GRANT GmMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 99-100 (1977).
624. Cf Nejelski, supra note 122, at 213 ("I have seen the future, and it works about
as well as the past, but with some differences.").
625. See McConnell, supra note 14, at 1 (discussing study which solicited judges' opin-
ions on what the courts must do to change with society).
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and judges to innovate procedurally; (10) develop better substantive
law; (11) improve public understanding and support for the courts;
(12) develop partnerships with the legislative and executive branch-
es for fostering reform and improvements; and (13) make better
use of technology to modernize the courtsY.
I will end by calling for an important "reality check," for me
and for you. We must all appreciate that goals of court experts and
insiders---even the best laid plans of judges and court commenta-
tors-are not always likely to become future political scenarios for
two reasons. First, those who would design and implement these
goals, judges and court administrators, for the most part, are
obliged to act in the present, to deal responsibly with today's prob-
lems in terms of today's solutions. The people running the court
system in the United States today resemble Alice in Through the
Looking Glass: they are running as fast as they can to stay in the
same place. 27 Planning for the future and implementing needed
reforms are activities that come at the end of a long day or on
weekends.
Second, public preferences and political compromises tend to
overtake even the most excellent government planning. We live in
complex times when many social problems are competing for the
time and attention of the people and their representatives. It is
virtually impossible to capture the public attention for court reform.
William H. Rehnquist is not going to be asked to appear on Oprah
Winfrey's show. 28
We must sustain and encourage each other. We must perse-
vere. 29 There is too much at stake to contemplate failure. This
626. Delphi Study, supra note 12, at 303-04.
627. Baker & Hauptly, supra note 459, at 107.
628. See Richard Morin, Wapner v. Rehnquist: No Contest, TV Judge Vastly Outpolls
Justices in Test of Public Recognition, WASH. PoST, June 23, 1989, at A21 (discussing
Americans' lack of recognition of the individuals currently sitting on the Supreme Court
while more Americans were aware of the judge presiding over "The Peoples' Court").
629. It was a great court reformer and state chief justice who coined the today com-
monplace observation that "judicial reform is no sport for the short-winded":
Manifestly judicial reform is no sport for the short-winded or for lawyers who
are afraid of temporary defeat. Rather we must recall the sound advice given
by General Jan Smuts to the students at Oxford: "When enlisted in a good
cause, never surrender, for you can never tell what morning reinforcements in
flashing armor will come marching over the hilltop."
MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION at xix (Arthur T. Vanderbilt ed., The
Law Center of New York University for the National Conference of Judicial Councils,
1949).
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then is the ultimate challenge facing the courts: to take the future
"into evidence," '30 to plan for it effectively, and, most important,
to sustain the bench and bar's commitment to the ideal of "Equal
Justice Under Law."
630. See Delphi Study, supra note 12, at 306 (noting that the courts need to anticipate
changing needs and change along with those needs).
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